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Abstract	  How	  do	  constitutions	  affect	  the	  degree	  of	  independence	  courts	  and	  judges	  exercise?	  More	  specifically,	  do	  constitutional	  guarantees	  of	  judicial	  independence	  protect	  courts	  and	  judges	  against	  usurpations	  of	  their	  powers?	  Conventional	  wisdom	  holds	  that	  constitutional	  arrangements	  are	  au-­‐tomatically	  enforced,	  denoting	  that	  formal	  institutions,	  such	  as	  written	  constitutions,	  can	  shape	  the	  way	  others	  behave	  (Carey,	  2000).	  This	  study	  examines	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  level	  of	  judicial	  in-­‐dependence	  enjoyed	  by	  a	  country’s	  judiciary	  is	  a	  function	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  intended	  to	  safeguard	  its	  independence.	  This	  hypothesis	  is	  tested	  on	  19	  countries	  in	  Latin	  America.	  The	  findings	  show	  that	  constitutional	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  independence	  affect	  courts’	  de	  facto	  level	  of	  independence.	  More	  specifically,	  I	  argue	  that	  nine	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  –	  the	  power	  of	  judicial	  review,	  length	  of	  judgeship,	  separation	  of	  power,	  selection	  and	  removal	  procedures,	  fiscal	  autonomy,	  qualifications,	  number	  of	  justices	  in	  the	  higher	  courts,	  and	  accessibility	  to	  the	  courts	  –	  works	  in	  unison	  to	  create	  independent	  courts.	  Moreover,	  the	  findings	  suggest	  that	  to	  create	  fully	  





Introduction	  How	  do	  constitutions	  affect	  the	  degree	  of	  independence	  courts	  and	  judges	  exercise?	  More	  specifically,	  do	  constitutional	  guarantees	  protect	  courts	  and	  judges	  against	  usurpations	  of	  their	  ju-­‐dicial	  independence?	  Furthermore,	  under	  what	  conditions	  have	  political	  institutions	  been	  able	  to	  violate	  these	  constitutional	  guarantees?	  Conventional	  wisdom	  holds	  that	  constitutional	  arrange-­‐ments	  are	  automatically	  enforced,	  denoting	  that	  formal	  institutions,	  such	  as	  written	  constitutions,	  can	  shape	  the	  way	  others	  behave	  (Carey,	  2000).	  Constitutional	  scholars	  in	  the	  1990s	  equated	  con-­‐stitutional	  provisions	  with	  institutions.	  While	  developed	  countries	  usually	  have	  stable	  constitution-­‐al	  frameworks	  and	  states	  ensure	  their	  enforcement,	  the	  same	  cannot	  be	  said	  of	  developing	  coun-­‐tries	  (e.g.,	  Pozas-­‐Loyo	  and	  Ríos-­‐Figueroa	  2010;	  de	  Vanssay	  and	  Spindler	  1994).	  In	  developing	  coun-­‐tries,	  scholars	  suggest,	  these	  formal	  institutions	  are	  rarely	  adhered	  to	  and,	  instead,	  are	  often	  violat-­‐ed	  (Levitsky	  and	  Murillo	  2009).	  Hence,	  the	  question	  arises,	  can	  some	  formal	  institutional	  condi-­‐tions,	  i.e.,	  constitutional	  provisions,	  ensure	  the	  protection	  of	  judicial	  independence	  in	  new	  democ-­‐racies	  more	  effectively	  than	  other	  conditions?	  
This	  study	  examines	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  level	  of	  judicial	  independence	  enjoyed	  by	  a	  country’s	  courts	  and	  judges	  is	  a	  function	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  intended	  to	  safeguard	  their	  independence.	  Using	  a	  cross-­‐sectional	  time-­‐series	  data	  of	  19	  Latin	  American	  countries	  from	  1984	  to	  2009,	  I	  model	  the	  effects	  of	  de	  jure	  constitutional	  provisions	  on	  de	  facto	  levels	  of	  judicial	  independ-­‐ence.	  In	  countries	  transitioning	  from	  authoritarian	  regimes	  to	  democracies,	  constitutional	  reform	  is	  paramount	  as	  are	  the	  effects	  these	  reforms	  are	  having	  on	  de	  jure	  and	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  Many	  experts	  claim	  that	  problems	  with	  countries’	  political	  structures	  are	  due	  to	  poorly	  written	  or	  outdated	  constitutions	  (Smith	  1995;	  Massrseveen	  and	  Ger	  van	  der	  Tang	  1978;	  Gill	  2002;	  Arato	  1993).	  However,	  if	  constitutional	  provisions	  do	  not,	  in	  fact,	  help	  rebuild	  political	  institutions,	  then	  promoters	  of	  democracy	  and	  constitutionalists	  should	  focus	  instead	  on	  economic,	  political,	  and	  so-­‐cial	  structures.	  The	  analysis	  contained	  herein	  will	  therefore	  help	  policy	  makers	  and	  promoters	  of	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democracy,	  who	  are	  considering	  constitutional	  design	  as	  a	  way	  to	  improve	  de	  facto	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence,	  provide	  a	  clear,	  empirical	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  constitutions,	  specifically	  constitutional	  provisions,	  matter.	  
Why	  Judicial	  Independence?	  	  There	  are	  several	  important	  reasons	  for	  studying	  determinants	  of	  judicial	  independence.	  First,	  for	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  to	  exist,	  judicial	  independence	  is	  necessary	  (United	  Nations	  1985;	  Rio-­‐Figueroa	  and	  Staton	  2009).	  Second,	  independent	  courts	  are	  free	  to	  protect	  individual	  rights.	  Judicial	  independence	  also	  allows	  for	  the	  safeguarding	  of	  the	  constitution	  against	  governmental	  abuses.	  Fi-­‐nally,	  the	  importance	  of	  studying	  judicial	  independence	  increases	  as	  the	  judicialization	  of	  politics	  in	  developing	  countries	  and	  overreliance	  on	  the	  courts	  increase.	  
In	  order	  to	  exercise	  rule	  of	  law	  there	  must	  be	  judicial	  independence.	  In	  an	  evaluation	  report	  for	  the	  United	  States	  Agency	  for	  International	  Development,	  Blue	  (1999)	  explains	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  “embodies	  the	  basic	  principles	  of	  equal	  treatment	  of	  all	  people	  before	  the	  law,	  fairness,	  and	  both	  constitutional	  and	  actual	  guarantees	  of	  basic	  human	  rights;	  it	  is	  founded	  on	  a	  predictable,	  transpar-­‐ent	  legal	  system	  with	  fair	  and	  effective	  judicial	  institutions	  to	  protect	  citizens	  against	  the	  arbitrary	  use	  of	  state	  authority	  and	  lawless	  acts	  of	  both	  organizations	  and	  individuals”	  (13).	  Thus,	  independ-­‐ent	  courts	  are	  insulated	  from	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  the	  government	  and	  use	  the	  law	  to	  adjudicate	  cases.	  	  
The	  biggest	  threat	  to	  courts	  is	  the	  government,	  especially	  in	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  government	  has	  a	  clear	  stake	  in	  the	  outcome.	  As	  regulators	  and	  controllers	  of	  government	  power,	  only	  inde-­‐pendent	  courts	  can	  restrain	  potentially	  tyrannical	  actions.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  that	  judges	  are	  impartial.	  The	  principle	  of	  “equal	  treatment	  of	  all	  people	  before	  the	  law”	  re-­‐quires	  independent	  judiciaries.	  Independent	  judges	  adjudicate	  cases	  by	  applying	  the	  law	  rather	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than	  considering	  their	  personal	  policy	  preferences	  (see	  e.g.,	  Segal	  and	  Spaeth	  1993,	  2002).	  In	  prac-­‐tice,	  judicial	  independence	  means	  courts	  and	  judges	  function	  free	  from	  outside	  influences.	  	  	  
A	  final	  reason	  for	  investigating	  the	  determinants	  of	  judicial	  independence	  is	  the	  recent	  in-­‐crease	  in	  the	  judicialization	  of	  politics.	  Judicialization	  of	  politics	  involves	  the	  reliance	  on	  the	  courts	  to	  resolve	  conflicts	  that	  were	  historically	  the	  role	  of	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  the	  government,	  i.e.,	  ex-­‐ecutive	  and	  legislative	  (Sieder,	  Schjolden,	  and	  Angell	  2005).	  It	  is	  the	  displacement	  of	  politics	  from	  the	  political	  arena	  to	  the	  legal	  system	  (Taylor	  2008;	  Iaryczower,	  Spiller,	  &	  Tommasi	  2002;	  Rios-­‐Figureroa	  &	  Taylor	  2006;	  Santiso	  2003).	  This	  phenomenon	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  mistrust	  of	  these	  emerging	  countries	  on	  their	  political	  system.	  Coupled	  with	  the	  expansion	  of	  constitutional	  rights	  and	  remedies	  to	  protect	  these	  rights,	  the	  judicialization	  of	  politics	  includes	  the	  courts	  in	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process.	  Thus,	  examining	  judicial	  independence	  helps	  us	  to	  understand	  the	  increasing	  judi-­‐cialization	  of	  politics.	  
Do	  Constitutions	  Matter?	  This	  study	  investigates	  whether	  explicit	  constitutional	  guarantees	  can	  protect	  judges	  and	  courts	  from	  political	  influences.	  Scholars	  of	  constitutions	  and	  constitutional	  arrangements	  argue	  that	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence,	  i.e.,	  removal	  and	  appointment	  procedures,	  protect	  courts	  from	  arbitrarily	  external	  influences	  (see	  Verner	  1984;	  Dahl	  1957).	  	  Thus,	  they	  posit	  that	  formal	  judicial	  structures,	  outlined	  in	  constitutions,	  provide	  the	  primary	  foundation	  for	  judicial	  independence.	  	  
Scholars	  maintain	  that	  constitutions	  matter	  for	  many	  reasons.	  They	  claim	  that	  constitutions	  shape	  the	  economic	  structure	  of	  a	  country	  (Hayek	  1978;	  Gwartney	  and	  Wagner	  1988).	  They	  sug-­‐gest	  that	  constitutions	  are	  the	  source	  of	  human	  liberty	  and	  freedom.	  Moreover,	  these	  rights	  are	  the	  foundation	  for	  individuals’	  fulfillment	  of	  their	  other	  wants	  through	  economic	  activity.	  Similarly,	  in	  discussing	  the	  role	  constitutional	  reform	  plays	  in	  strengthening	  government,	  Dressel	  (2005)	  argues	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that	  “a	  constitution	  defines	  and	  protects	  citizens’	  rights	  from	  governmental	  abuse.	  It	  also	  limits	  and	  balances	  government	  powers	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  other	  players	  and	  institutions,	  thereby	  safeguarding	  minori-­‐ty	  rights.	  The	  constitution	  is	  the	  touchstone	  for	  the	  legality	  of	  all	  other	  laws	  and	  the	  basis	  for	  re-­‐viewing	  executive	  and	  legislative	  actions”	  (1).	  	  
Moreover,	  promoters	  of	  democracy	  in	  authoritarian	  countries	  argue	  that	  constitutions	  set	  the	  standard	  for	  the	  new	  political	  regime.	  According	  to	  constitutionalists	  (Buchanan	  1983;	  Epstein	  1988;	  George	  1979;	  Gwartney,	  Wagner,	  and	  Program	  1988;	  Hayek	  1978;	  Barros	  2002;	  Olson	  1982;	  Pilon	  1988),	  constitutions	  control	  arbitrary	  takings	  by	  the	  state,	  set	  individuals’	  human	  rights,	  cre-­‐ate	  systems	  of	  property	  ownership	  and	  limit	  transaction	  costs	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  efficiency,	  and	  maintain	  the	  “social	  contract”	  established	  between	  politicians	  and	  citizens.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  indispensable	  to	  explore	  the	  relationship	  between	  de	  jure	  and	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  and	  the	  impact	  con-­‐stitutions	  have	  in	  a	  country	  transitioning	  from	  a	  dictatorship.	  Constitutionalists	  and	  political	  ex-­‐perts	  suggest	  constitutional	  reforms	  to	  achieve	  structural	  changes.	  Thus,	  if	  constitutions	  are	  im-­‐portant	  for	  the	  survival	  of	  new	  democracies,	  then	  they	  must	  also	  guarantee	  that	  judges	  and	  courts	  can	  independently	  perform	  their	  functions.	  However,	  if	  constitutional	  provisions	  are	  insufficient	  to	  ensure	  judicial	  independence,	  promoters	  of	  democracy	  and	  constitutionalist	  should	  focus	  on	  re-­‐structuring	  social,	  economic,	  and	  political	  structures	  (Herron	  and	  Randazzo	  2003).	  
As	  some	  scholars	  point	  out,	  there	  are	  shortcomings	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  and	  what	  happens	  in	  practice.	  Duverger	  (1980),	  for	  instance,	  argues	  that	  differences	  between	  constitutional	  powers	  of	  the	  executive	  branch	  and	  what	  presidents	  actually	  exercise	  in	  practice	  are	  disjointed.	  Duverger	  points	  out	  that	  presidents	  often	  overstep	  the	  powers	  provided	  by	  the	  constitution.	  Thus,	  in	  some	  countries,	  presidents	  often	  exercise	  functions	  provided	  to	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  the	  gov-­‐ernment,	  such	  as	  legislative	  and	  judicial	  powers.	  Moreover,	  de	  Vanssay	  and	  Spindler	  (1994)	  explore	  the	  economic	  effects	  of	  the	  entrenchment	  of	  specific	  rights	  written	  in	  constitutions.	  They	  argue	  that	  government	  often	  spends	  too	  much	  time	  making	  laws,	  when	  instead	  they	  should	  focus	  on	  raising	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the	  country’s	  per	  capita	  GDP,	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  economic	  changes.	  Furthermore,	  the	  use	  of	  con-­‐stitutional	  provisions	  to	  build	  better	  structure	  is	  viewed	  as	  time-­‐consuming	  and	  inefficient.	  Posner	  (1986),	  for	  instance,	  argues	  that	  because	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process	  takes	  time	  and	  is	  not	  cost-­‐effective,	  changes	  should	  come	  from	  judicial	  or	  administrative	  processes.	  Thus,	  instead	  of	  spending	  time	  and	  money	  in	  rewriting	  constitutions,	  energy	  should	  be	  channeled	  to	  implementing	  the	  exist-­‐ing	  laws.	  	  
Furthermore,	  some	  scholars	  argue	  that	  writing	  or	  rewriting	  constitutions	  might	  not	  provide	  protection	  in	  practice.	  	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  courts,	  some	  scholars	  argue	  that	  constitutional	  provi-­‐sions	  may	  not	  isolate	  courts	  and	  judges	  from	  external	  influences.	  Herron	  and	  Randazzo’s	  (2003)	  study	  of	  formal	  institutions,	  i.e.,	  written	  constitutions	  and	  statutes,	  explores	  the	  impact	  of	  constitu-­‐tional	  provisions	  on	  courts	  after	  Communism.	  In	  their	  study,	  the	  authors	  conclude	  that	  in	  post-­‐Communist	  countries	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  did	  not	  capture	  the	  reali-­‐ties	  of	  courts	  exercise	  of	  their	  power.	  They	  found	  that	  formal	  institutions	  very	  often	  were	  unable	  to	  protect	  courts	  and	  guarantee	  their	  judicial	  independence.	  Similarly,	  Rosenn	  (1987),	  discussing	  judi-­‐cial	  independence	  in	  Latin	  America,	  argues	  that	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  are	  rarely	  enforced.	  According	  to	  Rosenn,	  “most	  Latin	  American	  courts	  are	  staffed	  by	  career	  judges	  with	  no	  independent	  political	  base	  or	  contracts	  and	  with	  relatively	  narrow	  experience.	  Asking	  them	  to	  perform	  this	  function	  [judicial	  review]	  (particularly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  exercising	  the	  power	  to	  de-­‐clare	  statutes	  unconstitutional	  erga	  omnes)	  is	  to	  plunge	  them	  into	  a	  political	  role	  for	  which	  they	  are	  ill-­‐prepared	  by	  both	  temperament	  and	  experience”	  (1987:	  32).	  
This	  study	  seeks	  to	  add	  to	  this	  debate	  by	  looking	  at	  Latin	  American	  countries’	  constitutions.	  In	  Latin	  America,	  constitutional	  guarantees	  of	  judicial	  independence	  are	  readily	  available.	  The	  courts’	  independence,	  however,	  is	  not	  always	  guaranteed	  due	  to	  repeated	  violations	  of	  these	  consti-­‐tutions.	  Political	  actors	  have	  been	  known	  to	  fill	  the	  courts	  (court	  packing)	  with	  ideologically	  similar	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justices,	  to	  remove	  sitting	  justices	  who	  decide	  against	  government	  actions,	  and	  to	  force	  the	  resigna-­‐tion	  of	  justices	  through	  political	  pressure	  (Helmke	  2005;	  Chavez	  2004).	  	  
Violations	  of	  judicial	  independence	  are	  not	  exclusive	  to	  Latin	  American	  courts.	  Italian,	  Japa-­‐nese,	  and	  even	  American	  courts	  have	  experienced	  threats	  to	  their	  judicial	  independence.	  A	  promi-­‐nent	  example	  of	  attempted	  court	  packing	  in	  American	  courts	  is	  the	  Judicial	  Reform	  Bill	  of	  1937.	  Frustrated	  by	  an	  old	  and	  conservative	  Supreme	  Court	  that	  struck	  down	  numerous	  pieces	  of	  New	  Deal	  legislation,	  President	  Roosevelt	  introduced	  the	  Judicial	  Procedures	  Reform	  Bill	  of	  1937.	  To	  have	  his	  way	  and	  change	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  courts,	  Roosevelt	  asked	  Congress	  to	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  Supreme	  Court	  justices	  to	  twelve.	  In	  addition	  to	  that,	  he	  also	  proposed	  mandatory	  re-­‐tirement	  to	  those	  who	  had	  reached	  the	  age	  of	  70.	  Although	  he	  did	  not	  succeed	  in	  his	  attempt	  to	  change	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  Court,	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  Roosevelt	  was	  targeting	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  justices	  who	  would	  not	  align	  to	  his	  ideology.	  And,	  in	  what	  is	  called	  the	  “switch	  in	  time	  that	  saved	  nine,”	  not	  long	  after	  introducing	  this	  legislation,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  reversed	  course	  and	  be-­‐gan	  upholding	  key	  pieces	  of	  legislation	  proposed	  by	  Roosevelt	  (Quinn	  and	  Ho	  2009:	  2).	  	  
All	  these	  threats	  to	  judicial	  independence	  raise	  questions	  about	  discrepancies	  between	  for-­‐mal	  rules	  and	  judges’	  and	  courts’	  exercise	  of	  judicial	  independence.	  Formal	  judicial	  structures	  pro-­‐vide	  guarantees	  for	  judicial	  independence.	  This	  study	  proposes	  that	  courts	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  for-­‐mal	  guarantees	  of	  independence	  should	  have	  more	  opportunities	  to	  act	  in	  an	  independent	  manner.	  Yet	  significant	  debate	  remains	  over	  how	  much	  and	  under	  what	  conditions	  constitutions	  influence	  political	  processes	  and	  outcomes.	  	  
This	  study	  adds	  to	  the	  extant	  literature	  by	  analyzing	  the	  relationship	  between	  constitutional	  provisions	  designed	  to	  guarantee	  judiciaries’	  independence	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  judicial	  independence	  courts	  and	  judges	  exercise	  in	  practice.	  Previous	  studies	  fail	  to	  investigate	  whether	  all	  or	  only	  some	  of	  these	  constitutional	  guarantees	  protect	  judges’	  and	  courts’	  independence.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	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study,	  this	  paper	  seeks	  to	  identify	  which	  provisions	  systematically	  influence	  de	  facto	  independence,	  and	  which	  ones	  do	  not.	  To	  that	  end,	  I	  gather	  data	  on	  the	  formal,	  or	  de	  jure,	  provisions	  for	  judicial	  independence	  provided	  in	  the	  constitutions	  of	  19	  Latin	  American	  countries,	  and	  then	  use	  them	  to	  predict	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  Since	  existing	  conclusions	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  de	  
jure	  and	  de	  facto	  independence	  are	  largely	  based	  on	  single-­‐country	  case	  studies,	  they	  are	  not	  well	  suited	  to	  distinguishing	  more	  generally	  which	  de	  jure	  factors	  matter	  and	  to	  what	  degree.	  	  
Data	  and	  Methods	  I	  test	  the	  effect	  of	  de	  jure	  judicial	  independence	  on	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  in	  19	  countries	  in	  Latin	  America.1	  I	  utilize	  a	  cross-­‐section	  time-­‐series	  data	  of	  19	  Latin	  American	  countries	  constitutions	  from	  1984	  to	  2009.	  The	  Latin	  American	  region	  provides	  a	  useful	  case	  for	  assessing	  the	  variance	  in	  the	  levels	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  The	  Latin	  American	  countries	  used	  in	  this	  study	  have	  a	  common	  legal	  system.	  All	  19	  countries	  are	  civil	  law	  countries.	  They	  also	  have	  same	  regime	  type,	  but	  carry	  different	  political,	  social,	  and	  juridical	  structures	  (Pozas-­‐Loyo	  and	  Ríos-­‐Figueroa	  2010).	  
Moreover,	  these	  countries	  were	  selected	  based	  on	  their	  constitutional	  design.	  During	  the	  democratization	  process	  in	  Latin	  American	  countries,	  the	  first	  step	  in	  the	  transition	  from	  authori-­‐tarianism	  to	  democracy	  was	  to	  draft	  new	  constitutions.	  These	  constitutions	  were	  supposed	  to	  out-­‐line	  the	  structures	  of	  the	  government,	  their	  functions,	  and	  limitations	  and	  to	  safeguard	  emerging	  democratic	  regimes.	  As	  a	  result,	  many	  of	  the	  constitutions	  of	  Latin	  American	  countries	  provide	  nu-­‐merous	  provisions	  intended	  to	  safeguard	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  courts.	  Moreover,	  there	  are	  a	  lot	  of	  variations	  in	  the	  types	  of	  provisions	  as	  well	  as	  the	  observance	  of	  these	  provisions	  in	  practice.	  In	  Latin	  American	  countries,	  many	  of	  these	  provisions	  are	  either	  violated	  or	  not	  fully	  implemented.	  Thus,	  I	  explore	  whether	  these	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  can	  guarantee	  courts	  de	  facto	  independence	  in	  Latin	  American	  countries.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  countries	  included	  in	  this	  analysis	  are:	  Argentina,	  Bolivia,	  Brazil,	  Chile,	  Colombia,	  Costa	  Rica,	  Dominican	  Republic,	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Furthermore,	  although	  this	  study	  focus	  on	  a	  particular	  region,	  its	  findings	  are	  useful	  for	  other	  regions	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  most	  countries	  in	  the	  world	  use	  a	  civil	  law	  system	  or	  a	  combi-­‐nation	  of	  civil	  and	  common	  law	  systems	  (Central	  Intelligence	  Agency	  2013).	  	  Thus,	  these	  civil	  law	  countries	  rely	  heavily	  on	  formal	  institutions,	  i.e.,	  constitutions,	  to	  arrange	  their	  government	  sys-­‐tems,	  to	  delineate	  functions,	  and	  to	  identify	  rights	  and	  protections	  against	  arbitrary	  government	  actions.	  	  In	  studying	  Latin	  American	  countries’	  constitutions,	  this	  study	  can	  generalize	  its	  findings	  to	  a	  number	  of	  countries	  that	  uses	  the	  same	  system.	  Second,	  the	  fact	  that	  Latin	  American	  countries	  used	  formal	  institutions	  to	  transition	  from	  authoritarian	  to	  democratic	  regime	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  this	  process	  should	  be	  replicated	  in	  countries	  going	  through	  the	  democratic	  process.	  	  If	  the	  inclusion	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  independence	  protects	  courts	  in	  Latin	  America,	  promoters	  of	  democracy	  and	  constitutionalist	  should	  focus	  on	  these	  provision	  to	  create	  independent	  courts	  in	  these	  emerging	  countries.	  However,	  if	  de	  jure	  judicial	  independence	  does	  not	  matter	  for	  development	  of	  independent	  courts,	  then	  energy	  and	  time	  should	  be	  spent	  in	  other	  are-­‐as,	  i.e.,	  economic,	  social,	  and	  political	  arenas.	  	  
Dependent	  Variable	  The	  dependent	  variable	  for	  this	  study	  is	  a	  country’s	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  The	  de	  facto	  measure	  has	  corresponding	  indicators	  to	  de	  jure	  measures.	  Despite	  their	  correspond-­‐ing	  indicators,	  these	  variables	  capture	  different	  measures	  of	  judicial	  independence.	  De	  jure	  judicial	  independence	  is	  measured	  using	  a	  dichotomous	  variable.	  Thus,	  I	  look	  at	  whether	  a	  specific	  consti-­‐tutional	  provision,	  i.e.,	  removal	  procedure,	  length	  of	  judgeship,	  is	  provided	  in	  the	  constitution.	  If	  the	  constitutional	  provision	  related	  to	  judicial	  independence	  is	  present	  in	  the	  constitution,	  I	  coded	  1,	  otherwise,	  0.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  variable,	  the	  measure	  captures	  whether	  that	  constitutional	  provision	  is	  observed	  in	  practice.	  For	  instance,	  some	  constitutions	  provide	  for	  removal	  proceedings	  to	  oust	  judges	  from	  their	  positions.	  A	  de	  facto	  measure	  capture	  whether	  these	  proceedings	  are	  observed	  in	  practice.	  Thus,	  if	  judges	  are	  going	  through	  the	  appropriate	  process	  to	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be	  removed	  from	  their	  position,	  the	  constitutional	  provision	  is	  observed	  in	  practice;	  otherwise,	  if	  external	  actors	  are	  arbitrarily	  removing	  judges,	  then	  constitutional	  provisions	  are	  being	  violated.	  	  
Many	  scholars	  use	  similar	  indicators	  because	  they	  want	  to	  determine	  if	  constitutional	  guar-­‐antees	  are	  followed.	  This	  study	  departs	  from	  these	  studies	  by	  investigating	  possible	  differences	  be-­‐tween	  de	  jure	  and	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  (Feld	  &	  Voigt	  2003;	  Kaufman	  1979,	  1980;	  La	  Porta	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Larkins	  1996).	  To	  do	  so,	  I	  look	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  de	  jure	  provisions	  on	  levels	  of	  de	  facto	  ju-­‐dicial	  independence.	  	  
I	  utilize	  the	  same	  measure	  of	  judicial	  independence	  as	  Cingranelli	  and	  Richards’s	  (2008)	  de-­‐rived	  from	  the	  United	  States	  State	  Department’s	  country	  reports.	  It	  is	  an	  ordinal	  measure	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  and	  contains	  three	  categories:	  countries	  coded	  0	  are	  considered	  dependent,	  countries	  coded	  1	  are	  partially	  independent,	  and	  countries	  coded	  2	  are	  fully	  independent.2	  The	  data	  is	  available	  from	  1981	  to	  2010	  in	  their	  website.	  
According	  to	  Ríos-­‐Figueroa	  and	  Staton’s	  (2009)	  examination	  of	  eight	  distinct	  measures,	  the	  CIRI	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  reliable	  existing	  measures	  of	  judicial	  independence.3	  Although	  this	  measure	  relies	  on	  United	  States	  State	  Department	  country	  reports,	  all	  existing	  measures	  of	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence	  with	  country-­‐year	  as	  the	  unit	  of	  analysis	  are	  constructed	  from	  two	  sources:	  expert	  or	  survey	  reports	  and	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  reports.	  Moreover,	  despite	  the	  shortcomings	  existent	  in	  both	  sources,	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  reports	  are	  more	  reliable	  and	  less	  problematic	  than	  country	  experts	  (Ríos-­‐Figueroa	  and	  Staton	  2009).	  In	  addition,	  recent	  studies	  (see	  Poe,	  Carey,	  and	  Vazquez	  2001)	  argue	  that	  the	  biases	  that	  affected	  the	  reports	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  have	  been	  corrected	  and	  are	  not	  apparent	  in	  more	  recent	  years.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The	  data	  is	  readily	  available	  on	  their	  website:	  http://ciri.binghamton.edu	  	  3	  The	  other	  one	  is	  Howard	  and	  Carey’s	  measure.	  This	  measure,	  however,	  is	  highly	  collinear	  with	  my	  other	  variables.	  I	  have	  tested	  it	  as	  well.	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The	  Cingranelli	  and	  Richard’s	  measure	  categorizes	  as	  fully	  independent	  judiciaries	  that	  fulfill	  the	  following	  criteria:	  1)	  judicial	  review;	  2)	  length	  of	  judgeship	  is	  seven	  years	  for	  the	  highest	  level	  courts;	  3)	  judges	  cannot	  be	  removed	  by	  the	  president	  or	  ministers	  of	  justice;	  4)	  the	  other	  two	  branches	  can	  be	  checked	  through	  courts	  proceedings	  5)	  all	  proceedings	  are	  public;	  and	  6)	  profes-­‐sional	  judgeships.	  	  
Since	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	  a	  trichotomous	  ordering,	  linear	  regression	  models	  are	  not	  sufficient	  (Long	  and	  Freese	  2005).	  I	  therefore	  employ	  an	  ordered	  probit	  analysis.	  This	  analysis	  uses	  a	  time-­‐series	  cross-­‐sectional	  data	  from	  1984	  to	  2009.	  	  
Building	  the	  Model	  
De	  Jure	  Judicial	  Independence	  The	  premise	  of	  this	  study	  is	  that	  courts	  with	  greater	  formal	  guarantees	  of	  independence	  should	  be	  fully	  independent.	  This	  notion	  is	  tested	  using	  two	  approaches.	  First,	  I	  create	  a	  de	  jure	  measure	  of	  judicial	  independence.	  This	  variable	  is	  based	  on	  my	  readings	  of	  the	  constitutions	  of	  19	  Latin	  American	  countries;	  panel	  data	  from	  1979	  to	  2005	  provided	  by	  Linda	  Keith;	  the	  Comparative	  Constitutions	  project	  which	  compiles	  information	  from	  all	  constitutions	  around	  the	  world;4	  and	  the	  Elkins,	  Ginsburg,	  and	  Melton	  dataset	  (2006).5	  My	  measure,	  named	  De	  Jure	  Judicial	  Independence,	  is	  an	  additive	  scale	  of	  relevant	  constitutional	  provisions6.	  	  
This	  de	  jure	  judicial	  independence	  measure	  assumes	  that	  constitutional	  provisions	  work	  in	  unison,	  with	  one	  influencing	  the	  other.	  However,	  the	  use	  of	  an	  additive	  scale	  does	  not	  explain	  how	  much	  each	  provision	  contributes	  to	  the	  increase	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  To	  assess	  their	  individual	  influence,	  I	  test	  each	  of	  them	  in	  a	  separate	  model.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/Downloads.aspx	  	  5	  Elkins,	  Zachary,	  Tom	  Ginsburg,	  and	  James	  Melton.	  2010.	  Chronology	  of	  Constitutional	  Events,Version	  1.1.	  Comparative	  Constitutions	  Project.	  Last	  modified:	  May	  12,	  2010.	  Available	  at:	  http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/index.htm	  6	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  theoretical	  reasoning	  to	  include	  these	  constitutional	  provisions,	  I	  tested	  these	  indicators	  using	  an	  ex-­‐planatory	  factor	  analysis.	  The	  purpose	  of	  running	  this	  test	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  these	  9	  provisions	  are	  a	  single	  common	  factor	  of	  my	  explanatory	  variable	  –	  de	  jure	  judicial	  independence.	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The	  additive	  scale	  is	  created	  based	  on	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  Latin	  American	  countries.	  To	  create	  the	  scale,	  I	  focus	  on	  whether	  these	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  are	  explicitly	  stated	  in	  the	  constitution.	  Thus,	  if	  a	  constitution	  guarantees,	  for	  instance,	  clearly	  provides	  for	  removal	  proceedings	  to	  oust	  judges	  from	  their	  position,	  I	  coded	  1.	  However,	  if	  the	  provision	  is	  not	  clearly	  expressed	  in	  the	  constitution,	  I	  coded	  it	  0.	  Notwithstanding	  the	  particularities	  of	  the	  text,	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  constitutional	  provision	  related	  to	  judicial	  independence	  should	  prevent	  arbitrary	  actions	  against	  the	  courts.	  Thus,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  provision	  provides	  for	  more	  or	  less	  pro-­‐tection,	  I	  argue	  that	  de	  jure	  judicial	  independence	  should	  be	  observed	  in	  practice.	  If	  political	  actors	  are	  likely	  to	  violate	  constitutional	  provisions,	  they	  will	  do	  it	  regardless	  if	  a	  provision	  makes	  it	  more	  or	  less	  difficult	  to	  violate	  it.	  	  
The	  following	  list	  details	  the	  specific	  de	  jure	  judicial	  independence	  provisions	  included	  in	  the	  scale.	  These	  provisions	  were	  chosen	  based	  on	  the	  extant	  literature	  of	  judicial	  independence	  and	  the	  theoretical	  reasoning	  for	  using	  them:	  
Selection	  Procedure	  of	  Justices	  The	  literature	  offers	  two	  reasons	  for	  why	  the	  selection	  process	  of	  judges	  is	  related	  to	  the	  in-­‐dependence	  of	  the	  courts.	  The	  selection	  process	  insulates	  judges	  from	  political	  influences	  (Apodaca,	  2003;	  Berkowitz	  and	  Clay	  2006;	  Cingranelli	  and	  Richards,	  2008;	  Cross	  1999;	  Despouy	  2009;	  Fiss	  1993).	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  the	  selection	  process	  should	  create	  impartial	  and	  autonomous	  courts.	  	  Looking	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  on	  human	  right	  protections,	  Keith	  (2002)	  argues	  that	  constitutional	  provisions,	  including	  selection,	  judgeship	  length,	  and	  removal	  processes,	  protect	  courts	  from	  external	  influences.	  She	  argues	  that	  these	  constitutional	  provisions	  allow	  judg-­‐es	  to	  freely	  exercise	  their	  function,	  thus	  protect	  human	  rights.	  Keith	  concludes	  that	  constitutional	  guarantees	  of	  judicial	  independence	  affect	  judicial	  protection	  of	  human	  rights.	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  constitutional	  provision	  regarding	  a	  procedure	  for	  the	  selection	  of	  judges	  in	  the	  higher	  courts	  increases	  their	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  If	  a	  provision	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regarding	  removal	  procedures	  was	  included	  I	  coded	  1;	  otherwise,	  0.	  
Length	  of	  Judgeship	  As	  with	  the	  constitutional	  provision	  of	  selection	  process,	  a	  constitutionally-­‐determined	  ten-­‐ure	  provision	  ensures	  judges’	  and	  courts’	  independence	  from	  external	  influences.	  Setting	  the	  length	  of	  judgeship	  protects	  judges	  from	  being	  removed	  before	  their	  term	  has	  ended	  or	  through	  appropri-­‐ate	  removal	  procedure	  (Keith	  2002).	  Thus,	  I	  expect	  high	  levels	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  in	  countries	  where	  constitutions	  formally	  guarantees	  judges’	  tenure	  in	  office	  for	  the	  higher	  courts.	  This	  indicator	  was	  coded	  1,	  for	  constitutions	  that	  provided	  for	  any	  length	  of	  judgeship,	  and	  0	  if	  there	  is	  no	  provision	  regarding	  how	  long	  a	  judge	  should	  exercise	  its	  functions.	  	  
Removal	  Procedures	  	  The	  process	  of	  removal	  is	  crucial	  to	  judicial	  independence.	  A	  constitutional	  provision	  that	  provides	  a	  removal	  process	  has	  two	  goals.	  First,	  the	  constitutional	  process	  binds	  political	  actors,	  prohibiting	  them	  from	  removing	  judges	  without	  the	  appropriate	  due	  process.	  Second,	  this	  provision	  shields	  judges	  from	  political	  pressure	  (Keith	  2002).	  The	  presence	  of	  a	  removal	  procedure,	  regard-­‐less	  of	  how	  these	  procedures	  take	  place,	  assesses	  whether	  political	  actors	  observe	  the	  constitution	  at	  all	  to	  discipline	  judges.	  Therefore,	  I	  expect	  more	  judicial	  independence	  in	  countries	  where	  there	  is	  a	  constitutionally	  specified	  removal	  procedure	  for	  higher	  court	  justices	  than	  in	  countries	  without	  one.	  This	  indicator	  was	  coded	  1,	  for	  countries	  with	  a	  removal	  procedure,	  and	  0	  for	  countries	  with-­‐out	  any	  removal	  procedure.	  	  
Accessibility	  Limited	  access	  to	  courts	  can	  affect	  their	  judicial	  independence.	  Courts	  that	  are	  accessible	  by	  every	  citizen	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  remedy	  government	  violations.	  An	  increase	  in	  accessibility	  to	  the	  courts	  by	  a	  broad	  number	  of	  agents	  can	  increase	  a	  court’s	  independence	  through	  its	  judicial	  review	  power.	  According	  to	  Arantes	  (2005),	  the	  increasing	  number	  of	  people	  with	  standing	  authorized	  to	  use	  remedies	  to	  protect	  constitutional	  rights	  in	  Brazil	  had	  a	  great	  impact	  on	  the	  Brazilian	  judiciary	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system.	  	  After	  1988,	  the	  number	  of	  agents	  rose	  to	  more	  than	  75.	  The	  effect	  was	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  judicial	  review	  action	  to	  200	  per	  year	  (Castro	  1993).	  As	  courts	  are	  being	  called	  upon	  to	  review	  government	  actions,	  they	  act	  as	  policy-­‐makers,	  increasing	  their	  power	  and	  thus	  their	  inde-­‐pendence.	  I	  posit	  that	  a	  constitutional	  provision	  that	  guarantees	  access	  to	  the	  courts	  as	  a	  constitu-­‐tional	  right	  will	  increase	  courts’	  and	  judges’	  independence.	  This	  indicator	  was	  coded	  1	  for	  provi-­‐sions	  that	  guarantees	  access	  to	  courts;	  otherwise,	  I	  coded	  it	  0.	  
Number	  of	  Justices	  in	  the	  Higher	  Court	  A	  constitutional	  provision	  that	  determines	  the	  number	  of	  justices	  in	  the	  higher	  court	  has	  one	  important	  goal:	  prevent	  political	  actors	  from	  changing	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  courts	  arbitrarily.	  In	  attempting	  to	  pack	  the	  courts,	  political	  actors	  can	  change	  the	  number	  of	  justices	  in	  order	  to	  eschew	  their	  decisions	  (Rasmusen	  1994).	  Thus,	  the	  higher	  court	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  protected	  if	  the	  num-­‐ber	  of	  justices	  is	  determined	  in	  the	  constitution.	  I	  expect	  higher	  independence	  in	  countries	  where	  the	  constitution	  sets	  the	  number	  of	  justices	  on	  the	  higher	  court.	  I	  coded	  1	  for	  constitutions	  that	  pro-­‐vided	  a	  number	  of	  justices	  in	  the	  higher	  courts,	  and	  0	  if	  no	  number	  was	  provided.	  	  	  
Judicial	  Review	  	  In	  the	  1990s,	  the	  democratization	  process	  of	  a	  vast	  majority	  of	  constitutions	  entailed	  the	  in-­‐clusion	  of	  the	  provision	  of	  judicial	  review.	  According	  to	  Larkins,	  independent	  courts	  “has	  the	  power	  to	  regulate	  the	  legality	  of	  government	  behavior	  and	  determine	  significant	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  values”	  (1996:	  611).	  Judicial	  review	  measures	  the	  power	  judges	  and	  courts	  have	  to	  adjudicate	  the	  law.	  The	  introduction	  of	  new	  rights	  and	  longer	  constitutions	  makes	  this	  provision	  even	  more	  im-­‐portant	  (Van	  Cott	  2000;	  Nolte	  and	  Schilling-­‐Vacaflor	  2012;	  Arantes	  2005)	  because	  it	  increases	  the	  chance	  that	  courts	  will	  be	  called	  to	  check	  on	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  the	  government	  actions	  in	  alleg-­‐edly	  violations	  of	  these	  rights.	  I	  thus	  expect	  high	  levels	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  in	  coun-­‐tries	  where	  the	  constitution	  guarantees	  such	  power	  to	  the	  higher	  courts	  (Feld	  &	  Voigt	  2003;	  Kauf-­‐man	  1979,	  1980;	  La	  Porta	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Larkins	  1996).	  This	  indicator	  is	  coded	  1	  if	  there	  is	  a	  provision	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regarding	  judicial	  review	  and	  0	  if	  no	  provision	  provided	  for	  judicial	  review	  power.	  
Separation	  of	  Power	  This	  provision	  provides	  judicial	  autonomy,	  political	  insularity,	  and	  transparency.	  The	  lack	  of	  a	  separation	  of	  power	  provision	  is	  incompatible	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  independent	  court.	  It	  is	  im-­‐portant	  that	  the	  branches	  of	  the	  government	  have	  distinct	  roles	  and	  functions	  before	  the	  law.	  I	  posit	  that	  judicial	  independence	  will	  be	  higher	  where	  separation	  of	  power	  provision	  is	  explicit	  in	  the	  con-­‐stitution	  (La	  Porta,	  Lopez-­‐de-­‐Silanes,	  Pop-­‐Eleches,	  &	  Shleifer	  2004;	  Keith	  2001;	  La	  Porta,	  Silanes,	  Pop-­‐Eleches,	  &	  Shleifer	  2002).	  This	  indicator	  is	  coded	  1	  for	  constitutions	  with	  explicit	  provisions	  of	  separation	  of	  power	  and	  0	  if	  there	  is	  no	  such	  provision.	  
Budget	  The	  discretion	  in	  determining	  the	  budget	  of	  the	  courts	  may	  also	  affect	  their	  independence.	  If	  political	  actors	  have	  the	  power	  to	  decide	  a	  court’s	  budget,	  then	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  court	  is	  questionable.	  Political	  actors	  can	  use	  the	  budget	  to	  manipulate	  courts.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  poorly	  fi-­‐nanced	  courts	  fall	  prey	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  political	  actors.	  Thus,	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  a	  judiciary	  will	  have	  higher	  judicial	  independence	  in	  countries	  where	  it	  has	  financial	  autonomy	  (Despouy	  2009;	  Feld	  &	  Voigt	  2003).	  This	  indicator	  was	  coded	  1	  if	  a	  provision	  regarding	  financial	  autonomy	  is	  in	  the	  constitution;	  otherwise	  0	  if	  no	  provision	  is	  provided.	  	  
Qualifications	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  selection	  process,	  some	  constitutions	  establish	  minimum	  qualification	  levels	  for	  the	  profession	  of	  judgeship.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  professionalization	  of	  judgeship	  is	  Brazil’s	  focus	  on	  including	  the	  qualification	  of	  judges	  in	  the	  constitution.	  Amendment	  number	  45	  (2004)	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  Constitution	  allows	  the	  Judicial	  branch	  the	  power	  to	  select,	  train,	  and	  improve	  the	  judgeship	  position.	  It	  also	  describes	  the	  integrity,	  ability,	  and	  efficiency	  of	  judges.	  Additionally,	  the	  Brazilian	  constitution	  includes	  the	  Magistrate	  School,	  which	  is	  responsible	  for	  training	  and	  im-­‐provement	  of	  judges.	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The	  reason	  for	  such	  minimum	  qualifications	  is	  that	  they	  give	  some	  guarantee	  that	  judges	  are	  qualified	  to	  effectively	  and	  efficiently	  perform	  their	  job,	  are	  knowledgeable	  about	  the	  law,	  and	  competent	  to	  make	  decisions.	  According	  to	  Keith	  (2002),	  “this	  provision	  should	  lead	  to	  judges	  who	  are	  more	  competent	  and	  who	  have	  been	  socialized	  to	  the	  norms	  of	  judicial	  independence,	  making	  them	  more	  capable	  of	  countering	  incursions	  upon	  human	  rights	  from	  other	  branches”	  (197).	  I	  cod-­‐ed	  1	  if	  there	  is	  a	  provision	  providing	  qualification	  for	  judgeship	  for	  the	  higher	  courts,	  and	  otherwise	  0	  if	  no	  provision	  was	  provided.	  	  
Alternative	  Explanations	  Although	  the	  literature	  on	  judicial	  independence	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  formal	  rules,	  i.e.,	  selection	  procedures,	  judicial	  review,	  removal	  proceedings,	  to	  prevent	  arbitrariness	  against	  the	  judiciary,	  they	  also	  recognize	  that	  there	  are	  other	  potential	  explanations	  for	  the	  varia-­‐tion	  in	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  Some	  scholars	  argue	  that	  while	  constitutions	  may	  promise	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  independence,	  judges	  and	  courts	  are	  also	  influenced	  by	  the	  interactions	  between	  institutional,	  economic,	  and	  contextual	  features.	  This	  study	  tests	  alternative	  independent	  variables	  to	  explain	  variance	  in	  the	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  The	  addition	  of	  these	  variables	  may	  tell	  us	  to	  what	  degree	  constitutional	  guarantees	  can	  protect	  courts	  and	  judges	  and	  what	  is	  left	  to	  external	  factors	  to	  guarantee	  their	  functions.	  
An	  additional	  explanatory	  variable	  to	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  is	  the	  num-­‐ber	  of	  veto	  players.	  Veto	  players	  are	  power	  holders	  who	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  bring	  about	  change.	  This	  ability	  of	  bringing	  about	  change	  is	  inversely	  proportional	  to	  the	  number	  of	  veto	  players.	  	  This	  is	  be-­‐cause	  a	  high	  number	  of	  power	  holders	  can	  create	  obstacles	  to	  change	  the	  status	  quo	  (Tsebelis	  1995).	  For	  the	  courts,	  this	  creates	  incentive	  for	  them	  to	  freely	  exercise	  their	  functions.	  Veto	  players	  will	  need	  to	  convince	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  other	  players	  to	  bring	  about	  any	  change,	  rending	  the	  pro-­‐cess	  slow	  and	  less	  efficient.	  I	  assume	  that	  the	  higher	  the	  number	  of	  veto	  players,	  the	  higher	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  will	  be,	  since	  the	  cost	  to	  interfere	  with	  courts	  and	  judges	  functions	  is	  higher	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as	  well.	  This	  variable	  is	  operationalized	  using	  the	  number	  of	  veto	  players	  in	  a	  political	  system.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  the	  higher	  the	  number	  of	  actors	  to	  check	  on	  other	  actors,	  the	  lower	  the	  number	  of	  con-­‐stitutional	  violations,	  particularly	  against	  courts	  and	  judges.	  I	  use	  Beck,	  Clarke,	  Groff,	  Keefer,	  &	  Walsh	  (2000)	  measure.	  The	  variable	  is	  measured	  in	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  to	  6.	  
Three	  of	  the	  alternative	  explanatory	  variables	  are	  related	  to	  the	  government	  structure.	  Fed-­‐eralism,	  bicameralism,	  and	  type	  of	  electoral	  systems	  are	  possible	  explanations	  for	  the	  variance	  in	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  federalism,	  it	  is	  difficult	  for	  political	  actors	  to	  interfere	  with	  courts’	  and	  judges’	  independence.	  In	  federal	  systems,	  decentralization	  of	  power	  increases	  the	  accountability	  process.	  Federalism	  allocates	  responsibilities	  and	  power	  to	  different	  layers	  of	  government,	  allowing	  various	  groups	  to	  gain	  political	  leverage	  (Meyerson	  2009).	  Conse-­‐quently,	  there	  is	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  power	  holders	  who	  can	  influence	  political	  outcomes.	  Changes	  can	  only	  occur	  if	  these	  power	  holders	  can	  reach	  some	  consensus.	  However,	  in	  a	  strong	  fed-­‐eralism	  where	  tension	  exists	  between	  the	  central	  government	  and	  the	  subnational	  and	  local	  gov-­‐ernment,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  reach	  a	  majority	  to	  bring	  about	  change,	  rendering	  the	  process	  slow	  and	  cost-­‐effective.	  Thus,	  federalism	  affects	  the	  judiciary’s	  independence	  by	  decreasing	  the	  likelihood	  that	  a	  majority	  coalition	  will	  form	  and	  intervene	  in	  the	  courts’	  functions,	  i.e.,	  overturning	  their	  deci-­‐sions,	  starting	  a	  removal	  process,	  and	  shaping	  the	  composition	  of	  courts	  through	  selection	  process.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  expected	  to	  see	  higher	  levels	  of	  judicial	  independence	  in	  countries	  with	  federal	  form	  of	  government.	  I	  use	  Institutions	  and	  Elections	  Project	  (IAEP)	  (Regan	  and	  Clark	  2010)	  measure	  of	  this	  variable.	  The	  variable	  is	  coded	  1	  for	  federal	  systems	  and	  0	  for	  unitary	  systems.	  
In	  addition	  to	  federalism,	  the	  type	  of	  the	  electoral	  system	  has	  an	  effect	  in	  the	  level	  of	  de	  fac-­‐
to	  judicial	  independence.	  Depending	  upon	  the	  type	  of	  electoral	  system,	  the	  number	  of	  political	  par-­‐ties	  can	  increase	  or	  decrease.	  Proportional	  systems	  tend	  to	  produce	  a	  multi-­‐party	  structure,	  where-­‐as	  plurality	  systems	  generally	  foster	  a	  two-­‐party	  system	  (Duverger	  1954;	  Downs	  1957;	  Sartori	  1976;	  Cox	  1987).	  Thus,	  in	  two-­‐party	  systems,	  there	  are	  few	  negotiations,	  bestowing	  policy	  changes	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less	  costly	  and	  more	  likely	  to	  occur.	  	  In	  a	  proportional	  system,	  where	  a	  coalition	  is	  often	  needed,	  the	  number	  of	  actors	  is	  higher,	  making	  it	  more	  costly	  to	  successfully	  change	  policies.	  If	  we	  apply	  this	  logic	  to	  the	  judiciary’s	  independence,	  in	  majoritarian	  systems	  it	  may	  be	  easier,	  for	  instance,	  to	  over-­‐rule	  judicial	  decisions	  than	  in	  proportional	  systems.	  In	  this	  case,	  in	  the	  majoritarian	  systems,	  it	  is	  only	  needed	  to	  convince	  the	  majority	  party	  in	  government	  to	  overrule	  judicial	  decisions	  whereas	  in	  proportional	  system	  a	  coalition	  is	  necessary.	  Thus,	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  in	  proportional	  systems,	  judges	  and	  courts	  are	  more	  independent	  than	  in	  majoritarian	  systems.	  I	  use	  the	  Institutions	  and	  Elections	  Project	  (IAEP)	  (Regan	  and	  Clark	  2010)	  measure.	  This	  measure	  is	  coded	  1	  for	  proportional	  systems	  and	  0	  for	  all	  other	  systems.	  
The	  third	  governmental	  structure	  included	  in	  the	  alternative	  explanation	  is	  bicameralism.	  Similarly	  to	  the	  other	  two	  governmental	  structures,	  bicameralism	  affects	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judi-­‐cial	  independence.	  The	  number	  of	  legislative	  chambers	  influences	  the	  courts	  due	  to	  the	  type	  of	  po-­‐litical	  structure	  it	  creates.	  Contrary	  to	  unicameral	  system,	  in	  bicameral	  system	  a	  bill	  is	  passed	  after	  it	  is	  deliberated	  on	  the	  two	  houses.	  This	  creates	  a	  system	  of	  checks	  of	  one	  chamber	  over	  another.	  In	  bicameral	  system,	  this	  oversight	  allows	  courts’	  decisions	  to	  be	  preserved,	  making	  it	  difficult	  for	  po-­‐litical	  actors	  to	  override	  it.	  Moreover,	  with	  more	  individuals	  to	  monitor	  each	  other’s	  actions,	  politi-­‐cal	  actors	  attempt	  to	  arbitrarily	  influence	  courts	  and	  judges	  is	  difficult	  at	  best.	  Consequently,	  courts	  and	  judges	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  act	  independently.	  Thus,	  in	  bicameral	  system,	  the	  judiciary	  has	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  than	  in	  unicameral	  system.	  I	  use	  Beck,	  Clark,	  Groff,	  Keefer,	  and	  Walsh	  (2000)	  measure.	  The	  measure	  is	  coded	  1	  for	  bicameral	  systems	  and	  0	  for	  uni-­‐cameral	  systems.	  
Furthermore,	  other	  explanations	  for	  the	  variance	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  are	  assessed.	  Another	  possible	  determinant	  is	  the	  age	  of	  constitution.	  The	  longer	  institutions	  are	  in	  place,	  the	  more	  likely	  rules	  are	  to	  be	  implemented,	  observed,	  and	  followed.	  According	  to	  Carey	  (2000),	  institutions	  can	  generate	  shared	  expectations	  about	  how	  others	  will	  behave.	  These	  expecta-­‐
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tions	  exist	  when	  formal	  institutions	  are	  embedded	  in	  the	  actions	  of	  power	  holders.	  The	  embedment	  process	  takes	  time	  thus	  I	  expect	  to	  find	  that	  younger	  constitutions	  have	  not	  been	  fully	  institutional-­‐ized	  to	  create	  sufficient	  expectation	  to	  enhancing	  judicial	  independence.	  I	  create	  a	  variable	  of	  the	  years	  all	  the	  constitutions	  from	  1984	  to	  2009.	  
All	  those	  variables	  exist	  in	  different	  government	  regimes.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  in-­‐clude	  in	  which	  type	  of	  regime	  those	  features	  take	  place.	  I	  then	  expect	  that	  judicial	  independence	  will	  be	  higher	  in	  democratic	  regimes.	  Here,	  political	  institutions	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  obey	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  game	  under	  democracy.	  In	  democratic	  regimes,	  the	  constitution	  is	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  game	  and	  po-­‐litical	  actors	  who	  decide	  to	  violate	  it	  can	  have	  reduced	  his	  or	  her	  chances	  to	  be	  reelected.	  It	  is	  also	  under	  democratic	  regimes	  that	  procedures	  are	  followed,	  therefore,	  political	  actors	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  follow	  the	  process	  of	  judicial	  appointment	  and	  removal,	  guarantee	  the	  judiciary’s	  budget	  and	  re-­‐frain	  from	  diminish	  judges	  and	  courts	  protections.	  I	  use	  here	  a	  measure	  that	  combines	  average	  val-­‐ues	  of	  the	  Freedom	  House	  scores	  and	  Polity.	  Scale	  ranges	  from	  0-­‐10	  where	  0	  is	  least	  democratic	  and	  10	  most	  democratic.	  Hadenius	  and	  Teorell	  (2005)	  show	  that	  this	  average	  index	  performs	  better	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  validity	  and	  reliability	  than	  its	  constituent	  parts.	  Also	  say	  that	  democracy	  here	  is	  not	  measured	  whether	  it	  is	  democratic	  or	  not,	  but	  degree	  of	  democracy.	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  alternative	  explanations,	  I	  control	  for	  population	  size	  and	  GDP	  per	  capita.	  I	  use	  the	  Unites	  Nations	  country	  population	  report	  to	  measure	  population	  size.	  For	  GDP	  per	  capita,	  I	  use	  the	  IMF	  country	  year	  report.	  	  
Assessing	  the	  Achievement	  of	  Judicial	  Independence	  This	  essay	  investigates	  whether	  constitutions	  matter.	  More	  specifically,	  I	  ask	  whether	  con-­‐stitutional	  provisions	  concerning	  judicial	  independence	  protect	  courts	  and	  judges	  against	  undue	  political	  influence.	  I	  use	  an	  Ordered	  Probit	  Model	  since	  the	  dependent	  variable,	  de	  facto	  judicial	  in-­‐dependence,	  is	  an	  ordered,	  trichotomous	  variable.	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Two	  models	  are	  shown	  here.	  The	  first	  model	  tests	  the	  de	  jure	  independence	  measure,	  an	  additive	  scale	  of	  nine	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  Latin	  American	  constitutions.	  The	  de	  jure	  judicial	  independence	  measure	  assumes	  that	  constitutional	  provisions	  work	  in	  unison,	  one	  influencing	  the	  other.	  However,	  this	  scale	  does	  not	  account	  for	  how	  much	  each	  provision	  contributes	  individually	  to	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  enjoyed	  by	  courts	  and	  judges.	  The	  second	  model	  pre-­‐sented	  examines	  the	  effect	  of	  each	  constitutional	  provision	  used	  in	  the	  de	  jure	  judicial	  independ-­‐ence	  measure.	  This	  latter	  model	  also	  provides	  promoters	  of	  democracy	  as	  well	  as	  constitutionalist	  a	  list	  of	  constitutional	  guarantees	  that	  are	  important	  to	  include	  in	  the	  constitution	  to	  protect	  courts’	  and	  judges’	  independence.	  	  
Do	  De	  Jure	  Constitutional	  Provisions	  Matter?	  Traditional	  diagnostics	  show	  that	  Model	  1	  performs	  well.	  Table	  1	  compares	  how	  close	  the	  model’s	  predictions	  are	  to	  the	  actual	  outcomes,	  using	  the	  predicted	  probability	  of	  each	  level	  of	  de	  
facto	  judicial	  independence.	  	  
Table	  1.1:	  Predicted	  Probability	  of	  de	  facto	  Judicial	  Independence	  
De	  facto	  Judicial	  Independ-­‐
ence	  
Predicated	  Probability	   Actual	  Outcome	  
Dependent	   .23	  (0.1572,	  0.3034)	   .20	  
Partially	   .65	  (0.6128,	  0.6872)	   .57	  
Independent	   .12	  (0.0696,	  0.1699)	   .22	  *Categorical	  variables	  were	  set	  at	  their	  mode;	  all	  other	  variables	  at	  their	  mean.	  Table	  1.1	  illustrates	  that	  the	  model	  predicts	  23%	  of	  category	  dependent,	  65%	  of	  partially	  in-­‐
dependent,	  and	  12%	  of	  independent	  courts	  and	  judges.	  Comparing	  to	  the	  actual	  outcome	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence,	  the	  statistical	  model	  used	  in	  this	  paper	  can	  be	  said	  to	  perform	  well.	  Examin-­‐ing	  predicted	  probabilities	  within	  the	  sample	  and	  comparing	  these	  with	  actual	  outcomes	  provide	  an	  initial	  check	  of	  the	  model.	  	  Table	  1.2	  presents	  the	  parameter	  estimates	  for	  this	  model.	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Table	  1.2:	  Parameter	  Estimates	  for	  de	  facto	  Judicial	  Independence	  
Variables	   Coefficient	   Std.	  Errors	   z	   p-­‐value	  
De	  Jure	  Judicial	  Independ-­‐
ence	   .087	   .033	   2.61	   .009	  
Age	  of	  Constitution	   .002	   .002	   .90	   .366	  
Number	  of	  Veto	  Players	   -­‐.215	   .047	   -­‐4.58	   .000	  
Level	  of	  Democracy	   .363	   .039	   9.37	   .000	  
Government	  System	   -­‐.306	   .124	   -­‐2.46	   .014	  
Bicameral	   .363	   .122	   2.91	   .004	  
Type	  of	  Electoral	  System	   .354	   .118	   3.00	   .003	  
Population	   3.33e-­‐09	   1.65e-­‐09	   2.02	   .043	  
GDP/pc	   -­‐.000	   .000	   -­‐1.26	   .206	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Log	  Likelihood	  =	  -­‐406.395	   	   	   	   	  
Chi-­‐Square	  (9)	  =	  144.80	  
N	  =	  490	   	   	   	   	  	   As	  seen	  in	  Table	  1.2,	  all	  independent	  variables	  are	  statistically	  significant	  except	  for	  Age	  of	  the	  Constitution	  and	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  per	  capita.	  Given	  the	  relative	  immaturity	  of	  Latin	  American	  constitutions	  (the	  average	  age	  is	  only	  29	  years),	  these	  results	  suggest	  that	  what	  really	  matters	  is	  the	  content	  of	  the	  constitution	  rather	  than	  its	  relative	  age.	  Alternatively,	  de	  jure	  judicial	  independence,	  the	  type	  of	  electoral	  system,	  the	  type	  of	  government	  system,	  and	  whether	  the	  legisla-­‐ture	  is	  bicameral	  are	  all	  constitutional	  provisions	  that	  affect	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independ-­‐ence.	  I	  go	  on	  to	  explore	  the	  substantive	  and	  contextual	  implications	  of	  these	  estimation	  results.	  
Do	  Constitutional	  Provisions	  Matter?	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  assess	  whether	  constitutional	  provisions	  matter.	  The	  conven-­‐tional	  wisdom	  is	  that	  constitutional	  provisions	  affect	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  judges	  and	  courts	  exercise.	  Thus,	  my	  initial	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  de	  jure	  judi-­‐cial	  independence	  has	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  I	  test	  this	  hy-­‐pothesis	  in	  two	  ways:	  the	  impact	  of	  maximizing	  the	  number	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  incremental	  changes	  of	  de	  jure	  judicial	  independence.	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The	  first	  test	  gives	  us	  an	  overall	  impact	  of	  de	  jure	  judicial	  independence.	  If	  we	  add	  9	  provi-­‐sions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  in	  the	  constitution	  of	  a	  given	  country,	  for	  example,	  then	  what	  impact	  would	  those	  9	  provisions	  have	  on	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  of	  courts	  and	  judges.	  The	  second	  test	  allows	  us	  to	  look	  at	  the	  impact	  of	  incremental	  changes	  of	  the	  number	  of	  de	  jure	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence	  on	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  These	  changes	  help	  us	  understand	  what	  impact	  an	  ad-­‐ditional	  constitutional	  provision	  has	  on	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  Knowing	  this,	  we	  can	  find	  the	  point	  at	  which	  additional	  constitutional	  provisions	  start	  to	  matter	  and	  when	  they	  fail	  to	  impact	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  	  Table	  1.3	  is	  a	  depiction	  of	  the	  overall	  change	  in	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  when	  the	  number	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  independence	  changes	  from	  the	  minimum	  (0	  provision)	  to	  the	  maximum	  (9	  provisions).	  	  
Table	  1.3:	  Predicted	  Probabilities	  of	  de	  facto	  Judicial	  Independence	  when	  Changing	  from	  No	  
Provision	  to	  9	  Provisions	  of	  de	  jure	  Judicial	  Independence	  *	  
Categories	   9	  Provisions	   No	  Provision	   Change	   Conf.	  Interval	  Dependent	   0.1200	   0.3509	   -­‐0.2309	   -­‐0.4301,	  -­‐0.0316	  Partially	   0.6506	   0.5864	   0.0641	   0.0303,	  0.0979	  Independent	   0.2294	   0.0627	   0.1667	   0.0693,	  0.2642	  *Veto	  player,	  bicameral,	  government	  system,	  and	  proportional	  set	  at	  their	  mode;	  all	  other	  variables	  set	  at	  their	  mean.	  	   Table	  1.3	  uses	  the	  95%	  confidence	  interval	  to	  assess	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  predicted	  prob-­‐abilities.	  If	  the	  95%	  confidence	  interval	  crosses	  zero,	  more	  specifically,	  the	  parameter	  value	  speci-­‐fied	  in	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  is	  within	  the	  95%	  interval,	  then	  the	  effect	  is	  not	  significant	  at	  the	  0.05	  level.	  Conversely,	  if	  zero	  is	  not	  within	  the	  interval,	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  can	  be	  rejected.	  According	  to	  Table	  1.3,	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  de	  jure	  judicial	  independence	  from	  the	  minimum	  to	  the	  maxi-­‐mum	  number	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  has	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  all	  courts	  de	  facto	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence.	  	  This	  table	  reveals	  that	  my	  hypothesis	  that	  constitutions	  matter	  holds	  true.	  The	  biggest	  im-­‐pact	  is	  on	  de	  facto	  dependent	  courts.	  According	  to	  the	  table,	  holding	  all	  the	  dichotomous	  variables	  at	  their	  model	  and	  all	  other	  variables	  at	  their	  mean,	  there	  is	  23%	  less	  chance	  to	  find	  de	  facto	  depend-­‐
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ent	  courts	  when	  9	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  independence	  is	  added	  to	  the	  constitution.	  Con-­‐versely,	  there	  is	  an	  increase	  in	  16.7%	  chance	  in	  finding	  de	  facto	  fully	  independent	  courts	  when	  add-­‐ing	  these	  9	  provisions.	  The	  results	  also	  reveal	  that	  there	  is	  a	  6%	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  partially	  
independent	  courts	  when	  adding	  9	  de	  jure	  provisions.	  	  An	  analysis	  of	  the	  results	  of	  table	  1.3	  shows	  that	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence	  matter	  to	  create	  more	  de	  facto	  independent	  courts.	  This	  impact	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  when	  looking	  at	  courts	  that	  are	  de	  facto	  dependent.	  By	  adding	  9	  provisions	  where	  courts	  are	  not	  free	  to	  exercise	  their	  functions	  and	  often	  influenced	  by	  politicians,	  there	  is	  a	  23%	  chance	  that	  courts	  will	  become	  less	  dependent.	  The	  magnitude	  of	  the	  change	  shows	  that	  these	  constitutional	  provi-­‐sions	  have	  a	  great	  impact	  in	  these	  de	  facto	  dependent	  courts.	  It	  suggests	  that	  if	  we	  want	  to	  see	  less	  
de	  facto	  dependent	  courts,	  9	  constitutional	  provisions	  should	  be	  added	  to	  the	  constitution.	  The	  ad-­‐dition	  of	  9	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  independence	  also	  reveals	  that	  there	  is	  an	  increasing	  in	  predicting	  de	  facto	  independent	  courts.	  	  This	  finding	  suggests	  that	  promoters	  of	  democracy	  and	  constitutional	  designers	  should	  fo-­‐cus	  on	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  to	  build	  independent	  courts.	  It	  shows	  that	  constitutional	  provisions	  can	  guarantee	  courts	  and	  judges	  from	  external	  influences,	  allowing	  them	  to	  freely	  exercise	  their	  functions.	  This	  finding	  also	  suggests	  that	  courts	  seem	  to	  be	  more	  protected	  when	  provisions	  regarding	  judicial	  independence	  are	  in	  the	  constitution.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  formal	  institutions	  like	  written	  constitutions	  as	  opposed	  to	  ordinary	  laws	  have	  the	  power	  to	  curtail	  politi-­‐cal	  actors	  from	  violating	  these	  provisions.	  This	  is	  because	  once	  included	  in	  the	  constitutions	  these	  provisions	  are	  under	  higher	  scrutiny.	  Political	  actors	  actions	  are	  under	  more	  supervision	  and	  viola-­‐tions	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  identified	  than	  violations	  of	  ordinary	  laws.	  	  Moreover,	  this	  finding	  contributes	  to	  the	  judicial	  independence	  literature	  for	  two	  reasons.	  It	  shows	  that	  formal	  institutions	  matter,	  in	  particular,	  written	  constitutions.	  Scholars	  have	  disagreed	  on	  whether	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  matter.	  This	  finding	  sheds	  light	  to	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this	  debate,	  showing	  that	  including	  constitutional	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  independence	  pro-­‐tect	  courts	  from	  external	  influences	  and	  allow	  them	  to	  function	  in	  an	  independent	  manner.	  This	  find	  also	  improves	  on	  the	  measure	  of	  de	  jure	  judicial	  independence,	  using	  a	  comprehensive	  number	  of	  indicators.	  By	  looking	  at	  them	  as	  part	  of	  de	  jure	  variable,	  I	  show	  that	  not	  one	  or	  few	  of	  these	  con-­‐stitutional	  provisions	  matter.	  In	  fact,	  as	  table	  1.3	  shows,	  these	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  matter	  in	  a	  collective	  nature.	  	  Next,	  I	  examine	  the	  impact	  of	  incremental	  changes	  on	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independ-­‐ence.	  The	  following	  graph	  illustrates	  the	  effect	  of	  marginal	  changes	  in	  the	  de	  jure	  judicial	  independ-­‐ence	  measure	  on	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  under	  specific	  conditions.	  Thus,	  Graph	  1.1	  predicts	  the	  marginal	  effect	  of	  de	  jure	  judicial	  independence	  under	  the	  following	  conditions:	  changes	  on	  the	  level	  of	  democracy	  from	  low	  (.66)	  to	  high	  (10),	  a	  bicameral	  legislature	  (1),	  a	  federal	  system	  (1),	  a	  proportional	  system	  (1),	  and	  with	  4	  veto	  players.	  These	  conditions	  were	  selected	  based	  on	  the	  literature.	  According	  to	  the	  major	  literature	  regarding	  each	  of	  these	  provisions,	  de	  fac-­‐
to	  judicial	  independence	  is	  higher	  under	  high	  levels	  of	  judicial	  independence,	  where	  there	  are	  a	  federal,	  a	  bicameral	  system	  and	  a	  proportional	  system,	  and	  a	  relative	  high	  number	  of	  veto	  players.	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Overall,	  we	  find	  that,	  under	  the	  conditions	  specified	  above,	  an	  additional	  provision	  of	  de	  jure	  judicial	  independence	  has	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  exercised	  by	  courts	  and	  judges	  in	  Latin	  America.	  Graph	  1.1	  illustrates	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  con-­‐stitutional	  provisions	  relating	  to	  judicial	  independence	  decreases	  the	  likelihood	  of	  de	  facto	  depend-­‐
ent	  courts	  and	  increases	  the	  chance	  of	  having	  a	  de	  facto	  partially	  independent	  court.	  Graph	  1.1	  also	  shows	  that	  the	  minimum	  number	  of	  provisions	  necessary	  to	  see	  a	  shift	  from	  de	  facto	  dependent	  to	  
de	  facto	  partially	  independent	  courts	  under	  these	  conditions	  is	  three	  provisions.	  This	  means	  that,	  given	  these	  conditions,	  every	  additional	  provision	  to	  the	  minimum	  three,	  will	  likely	  predict	  de	  facto	  
partially	  independent	  courts.	  This	  finding	  may	  provide	  a	  threshold	  to	  constitutionalists,	  constitu-­‐tional	  designers,	  and	  democracy	  promoters	  to	  transform	  dependent	  courts	  into	  at	  least	  partially	  in-­‐
dependent	  courts.	  	  These	  results	  increase	  our	  understanding	  of	  judicial	  independence	  in	  two	  ways.	  First,	  under	  the	  given	  conditions,	  the	  graph	  shows	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  has	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  de	  facto	  level	  of	  judicial	  independence.	  Thus,	  the	  results	  reveal	  that	  adding	  constitutional	  provisions	  that	  protect	  courts	  and	  guarantee	  their	  judicial	  independence	  increases	  their	  chance	  to	  be,	  at	  least,	  partially	  independent.	  Second,	  the	  graph	  also	  illustrates	  that	  there	  is	  a	  threshold	  where	  we	  see	  the	  shift	  from	  de	  facto	  dependent	  courts	  to	  de	  facto	  
partially	  independent	  courts.	  In	  order	  words,	  under	  federalism,	  a	  bicameral	  legislature,	  a	  propor-­‐tional	  electoral	  system,	  an	  increasing	  level	  of	  democracy,	  and	  a	  relative	  high	  number	  of	  veto	  play-­‐ers,	  an	  addition	  of	  one	  constitution	  decreases	  the	  chance	  to	  have	  de	  facto	  dependent	  courts	  and	  in-­‐creases	  the	  chance	  to	  create	  de	  facto	  partially	  independent	  courts.	  This	  is	  important	  because	  it	  al-­‐lows	  constitutionalists,	  constitutional	  designers,	  and	  democracy	  promoters	  to	  build	  constitutions	  that	  would	  foster	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  It	  guides	  them	  to	  promote	  constitutional	  provi-­‐sions	  that	  create	  a	  federal	  system,	  a	  bicameral	  legislature,	  and	  an	  electoral	  system	  that	  would	  allow	  independence	  courts	  to	  come	  about,	  at	  least	  de	  facto	  partially	  independent	  courts.	  Additionally,	  it	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suggests	  that	  to	  see	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  courts	  independence,	  more	  than	  3	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independ-­‐ence	  should	  be	  included	  in	  the	  constitution.	  	  	  	  In	  light	  of	  these	  findings,	  the	  next	  section	  will	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  each	  constitutional	  provi-­‐sion	  and	  focus	  on	  two	  goals.	  First,	  as	  my	  initial	  findings	  explain,	  de	  jure	  constitutional	  provisions	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  However,	  what	  these	  findings	  do	  not	  define	  is	  how	  much	  each	  provision	  impacts	  the	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  Second,	  the	  initial	  findings	  show	  that	  there	  may	  be	  provisions	  that	  are	  necessary	  to	  create	  an	  independent	  court.	  Thus,	  an	  investiga-­‐tion	  of	  which	  provisions	  are	  important	  to	  sustain	  already	  independent	  courts	  may	  help	  define	  the	  necessary	  provisions	  to	  create	  independent	  courts	  or	  to	  guarantee	  independence	  to	  dependent	  courts.	  	  
Which	  Specific	  Provisions	  Matter	  the	  Most?	  The	  support	  that	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  impact	  courts	  and	  judg-­‐es	  functions	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  deserves	  a	  detailed	  investigation.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  look	  at	  each	  constitutional	  provision	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  The	  goal	  is	  to	  answer	  two	  questions.	  First,	  how	  much	  does	  each	  constitutional	  provision	  contribute	  to	  the	  level	  of	  
















Table	  1.4:	  Parameter	  Estimates	  for	  de	  facto	  Judicial	  Independence	  
Variables	   Coef.	   Std.	  Err.	   z	   p-­‐value	  
Selection	  Procedure	  of	  
the	  Judges	  
0.20	   0.21	   0.99	   0.323	  
Length	  of	  Judgeship	   -­‐0.49	   0.25	   -­‐1.99	   0.047	  
Removal	  Procedures	   0.76	   0.17	   4.61	   0.000	  
Budget	   -­‐0.33	   0.15	   -­‐2.11	   0.035	  
Accessibility	   1.93	   0.50	   3.84	   0.000	  
Separation	  of	  Power	   -­‐0.73	   0.19	   -­‐3.66	   0.000	  
Judicial	  Review	   -­‐0.91	   0.37	   -­‐2.47	   0.222	  
Number	  of	  Justices	  in	  
the	  Higher	  Court	  
0.11	   0.14	   0.75	   0.396	  
Qualifications	   -­‐0.66	   0.53	   -­‐1.23	   0.786	  
Age	  of	  Constitution	   0.00	   0.00	   -­‐0.8	   0.468	  
Number	  of	  Veto	  Player	   -­‐0.25	   0.05	   -­‐4.88	   0.000	  
Level	  of	  Democracy	   0.36	   0.04	   8.61	   0.000	  
Government	  System	   -­‐0.69	   0.15	   -­‐4.69	   0.000	  
Bicameral	   0.48	   0.17	   2.9	   0.004	  
Type	  of	  Electoral	  system	   0.36	   0.14	   2.62	   0.009	  
GDP/pc	   0.00	   0.00	   -­‐1.52	   0.128	  
Population	   0.00	   0.00	   2.15	   0.032	  	  
	  
Table	  1.5:	  Predicted	  Probability	  for	  de	  facto	  Judicial	  Independence	  
De	  Facto	  Judicial	  
Independence	  
Dependent	   Partially	  Independent	   Fully	  Independent	  
	   0.2106	  (0.1266,	  0.2945)	   0.6914	  (0.6553,	  0.7276)	   0.0980	  (0.0464,	  0.1497)	  *Veto	  player,	  bicameral,	  government	  system,	  and	  proportional	  set	  at	  their	  mode;	  all	  other	  variables	  at	  their	  mean.	  	  To	  facilitate	  interpretation,	  we	  calculate	  the	  predicted	  probabilities	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence	  when	  each	  individual	  de	  jure	  judicial	  independence	  provision	  is	  in	  place	  in	  the	  constitu-­‐tion.	  These	  predicted	  probabilities	  give	  a	  detailed	  picture	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  all	  those	  provisions	  on	  the	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  Additionally,	  the	  negative	  coefficient	  on	  some	  of	  the	  parameter	  estimates	  may	  be	  a	  function	  of	  the	  trichotomous	  dependent	  variable.	  Thus,	  to	  cor-­‐rectly	  determine	  the	  impact	  of	  each	  variable,	  we	  must	  calculate	  the	  predicted	  probabilities.	  The	  re-­‐sults	  indicate	  that	  there	  is	  a	  69%	  probability	  that	  courts	  will	  be	  partially	  independent	  if	  all	  those	  provisions	  are	  in	  place.	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Finally,	  we	  look	  at	  how	  much	  each	  individual	  variable	  contributes	  to	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence.	  Table	  1.6	  shows	  the	  result.	  
Table	  1.6:	  Individual	  Variable	  Impact	  on	  de	  facto	  Judicial	  Independence	  
	   Dependent	   Partially	  Independent	   Fully	  Independent	  
Tenure	   0.4294	  (0.0894,	  0.7694)	   0.5431	  (0.5299,	  0.5564)	   0.0275	  (-­‐0.0274,	  0.0823)	  
Removal	   0.0710	  (-­‐0.0364,	  0.1784)	   0.6644	  (0.5959,	  0.7328)	   0.2646	  (0.0143,	  0.5150)	  
Budget	   0.3975	  (0.0717,	  0.7233)	   0.5694	  (0.5540,	  0.5848)	   0.0331	  (-­‐0.0290,	  0.0951)	  
Accessibility	   0.0021	  (-­‐0.0072,	  0.0114)	   0.2204	  (0.1581,	  0.2827)	   0.7775	  (0.3720,	  1.1830)	  
Separation	   0.5546	  
(0.2641,	  0.8452)	   0.4326	  (0.4258,	  0.4395)	   0.0127	  (-­‐0.0117,	  0.0372)	  
Judicial	  Review	   0.6154	  
(0.2931,	  0.9377)	   0.3762	  (0.3714,	  0.3810)	   0.0084	  (-­‐0.0111,	  0.0279)	  	  Table	  1.6	  illustrates	  how	  individual	  variables	  impact	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  To	  cal-­‐culate,	  I	  ran	  predicted	  probabilities	  for	  each	  judicial	  independence	  provision,	  setting	  all	  the	  other	  judicial	  independence	  provisions	  to	  zero.	  This	  way	  I	  can	  track	  which	  judicial	  independence	  varia-­‐bles	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  predict	  which	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  The	  table	  shows	  what	  variable	  is	  a	  significant	  influence	  under	  each	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  	  Table	  1.6	  can	  be	  interpreted	  in	  twofold.	  First,	  it	  shows	  how	  each	  of	  the	  de	  jure	  constitutional	  provision	  influence	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  The	  bolded	  numbers	  identifies	  the	  de	  jure	  judi-­‐cial	  independence	  provisions	  that	  are	  significant	  in	  each	  type	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independent	  courts.	  For	  instance,	  separation	  of	  power	  is	  highly	  predicted	  in	  countries	  with	  courts	  that	  are	  de	  
facto	  dependent	  courts.	  However,	  they	  seem	  to	  have	  no	  impact	  on	  de	  facto	  fully	  independent	  courts.	  	  Moreover,	  table	  1.6	  also	  shows	  that	  some	  constitutional	  provisions	  matter	  to	  create	  de	  facto	  
partially	  independent	  and	  fully	  independent	  courts.	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  is	  a	  high	  probability	  to	  cre-­‐ate	  de	  facto	  fully	  independent	  courts	  where	  constitutions	  provide	  for	  removal	  procedures	  and	  ac-­‐cessibility	  provisions	  Moreover,	  to	  construct	  at	  a	  minimum	  a	  de	  facto	  partially	  independent	  court,	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promoters	  of	  democracy	  and	  constitutional	  designers	  should	  include	  length	  of	  judgeship,	  removal	  procedure	  and	  financial	  autonomy	  in	  a	  country’s	  constitution.	  	  This	  might	  be	  surprising	  for	  some	  because	  judicial	  review	  is	  emphasized	  in	  most	  of	  the	  lit-­‐erature	  that	  promotes	  judicial	  independence	  (Feld	  &	  Voigt	  2003;	  Kaufman	  1979,	  1980;	  La	  Porta	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Larkins	  1996).	  In	  my	  opinion,	  this	  departure	  from	  common	  literature	  can	  be	  explained	  as	  follows.	  The	  data	  set	  deals	  with	  Latin	  America	  where	  most	  constitutions	  contain	  some	  sort	  of	  provi-­‐sion	  establishing	  judicial	  review.	  In	  addition,	  the	  table	  does	  not	  show	  that	  judicial	  review	  is	  not	  im-­‐portant;	  it	  shows	  that	  it	  is	  sufficient	  to	  predict	  de	  facto	  dependent	  and	  partially	  independent	  courts.	  However,	  we	  are	  likely	  to	  predict	  de	  facto	  independent	  courts,	  or	  at	  least	  partially	  independent	  ones,	  when	  removal	  procedures	  and	  accessibility	  provisions	  are	  included	  in	  the	  constitution.	  According	  to	  Arantes	  (2005),	  a	  broad	  accessibility	  to	  courts	  gives	  them	  more	  power.	  Accessibility	  allows	  the	  courts	  increased	  opportunities	  to	  say	  what	  the	  law	  is,	  giving	  courts	  the	  power	  to	  create	  policy	  (judi-­‐cialization	  of	  politics).	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  removal	  procedures,	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  provision	  in	  this	  dataset	  may	  re-­‐veal	  a	  particular	  characteristic	  of	  Latin	  America	  countries.	  Case	  studies	  in	  Latin	  America	  (Chavez	  2004;	  Helmke	  2005)	  reveal	  that	  presidents	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  use	  their	  power	  to	  remove	  judges	  from	  their	  position	  if	  a	  court’s	  decisions	  contradict	  the	  president’s	  political	  agenda.	  This	  is	  an	  ex-­‐ample	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  having	  a	  provision	  that	  guarantees	  the	  removal	  of	  a	  judge	  only	  under	  the	  appropriate	  procedure.	  	  Overall	  my	  findings	  are	  that	  length	  of	  judgeship,	  removal	  procedures,	  budget,	  and	  accessi-­‐bility	  predict	  de	  facto	  partially	  independent	  and	  fully	  independent	  judicially	  independent	  courts	  and	  judges	  in	  Latin	  America.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  those	  provisions	  alone	  contribute	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  courts	  and	  judges.	  In	  fact,	  an	  additive	  scale	  of	  only	  those	  variables	  is	  tested	  and	  our	  findings	  show	  that	  it	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  This	  means	  that	  those	  provisions	  are	  necessary	  but	  not	  suffi-­‐cient	  to	  protect	  courts	  and	  judges.	  Moreover,	  our	  findings	  show	  that	  the	  de	  jure	  judicial	  independ-­‐
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ence	  provisions	  that	  are	  not	  statistically	  significant	  are	  in	  fact	  important	  to	  construct	  the	  additive	  scale.	  Therefore,	  although	  they	  do	  not	  have	  significance	  on	  their	  own,	  they	  do	  in	  a	  collective	  nature.	  
Conclusion	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  explore	  the	  effect	  of	  constitutional	  provision	  of	  judicial	  independence	  on	  de	  
facto	  judicial	  independence.	  I	  argue	  that	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  are	  a	  function	  of	  the	  level	  of	  judicial	  independence	  courts	  and	  judges	  exercise	  in	  practice.	  I	  use	  19	  Latin	  American	  countries	  to	  test	  this	  hypothesis.	  	  The	  data	  shows	  that	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  do	  affect	  the	  level	  of	  independence	  courts	  and	  judges	  exercise	  in	  practice.	  In	  particular,	  the	  findings	  show	  that	  nine	  con-­‐stitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  were	  sufficient	  to	  predict	  a	  change	  in	  the	  level	  of	  de	  
facto	  judicial	  independence	  courts	  in	  Latin	  America.	  	  More	  specifically,	  I	  show	  that	  nine	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  in	  the	  constitution	  reduces	  the	  chances	  of	  having	  de	  facto	  dependent	  courts	  and	  increases	  the	  chance	  to	  create	  more	  de	  facto	  fully	  independent	  courts.	  This	  finding	  contributes	  to	  the	  extant	  literature	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  formal	  institutions.	  Conventional	  wisdom	  posits	  that	  formal	  institutional,	  i.e.	  written	  constitutions,	  matters.	  They	  shape	  governmental,	  economic,	  and	  social	  structures.	  This	  study	  shows	  that	  these	  formal	  institutions	  also	  affect	  the	  courts	  judicial	  independ-­‐ence.	  	  Despite	  disagreements	  on	  whether	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  matter,	  this	  finding	  sheds	  light	  to	  this	  debate,	  showing	  that	  including	  constitutional	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  independence	  protect	  courts	  from	  external	  influences	  and	  allow	  them	  to	  function	  in	  an	  in-­‐dependent	  manner.	  Additionally,	  this	  study	  also	  improves	  on	  the	  measure	  of	  de	  jure	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence,	  using	  a	  comprehensive	  number	  of	  indicators.	  By	  looking	  at	  them	  as	  part	  of	  de	  jure	  varia-­‐ble,	  I	  show	  that	  not	  one	  or	  few	  of	  these	  constitutional	  provisions	  matter.	  In	  fact,	  as	  table	  1.3	  shows,	  these	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  matter	  in	  a	  collective	  nature.	  	  This	  study	  suggests	  that	  promoters	  of	  democracy	  and	  constitutional	  designers	  should	  focus	  on	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  to	  build	  independent	  courts.	  I	  argue	  that	  con-­‐
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stitutional	  provisions	  can	  guarantee	  courts	  and	  judges	  from	  external	  influences,	  allowing	  them	  to	  freely	  exercise	  their	  functions.	  Moreover,	  this	  study	  also	  suggests	  that	  courts	  seem	  to	  be	  more	  pro-­‐tected	  when	  provisions	  regarding	  judicial	  independence	  are	  in	  the	  constitution.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  formal	  institutions	  like	  written	  constitutions	  as	  opposed	  to	  ordinary	  laws	  have	  the	  power	  to	  curtail	  political	  actors	  from	  violating	  these	  provisions.	  This	  is	  because	  once	  included	  in	  the	  constitutions	  these	  provisions	  are	  under	  higher	  scrutiny.	  Political	  actors	  actions	  are	  under	  more	  supervision	  and	  violations	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  identified	  than	  violations	  of	  ordinary	  laws.	  	   This	  study	  provides	  evidence	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  related	  to	  judi-­‐cial	  independence	  to	  create	  de	  facto	  independence	  courts.	  This	  is	  likely	  to	  help	  constitutionalist	  and	  promoters	  of	  democracy	  in	  building	  new	  constitutions	  for	  transitioning	  countries.	  This	  study	  also	  raises	  questions	  for	  future	  research.	  Future	  studies	  should	  focus	  asking	  some	  of	  the	  following	  ques-­‐tions:	  why	  do	  violations	  still	  occur	  in	  countries	  with	  constitutional	  provisions	  that	  protect	  the	  courts?	  What	  provisions	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  violated?	  Under	  what	  conditions	  are	  violations	  likely	  to	  oc-­‐cur?	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Summary	  statistics	  for	  the	  Model	  	  
Variables	   Mean	   Std.	  Deviation	   Minimum	   Maximum	  
De	  Facto	  Judicial	  Independence	   2.022	   .653	   1	   3	  
De	  Jure	  Judicial	  Independence	   7.12	   1.67	   3	   9	  
Age	  of	  Constitution	   29.01	   34.30	   1	   157	  
Number	  of	  Veto	  Players	   3.26	   1.34	   1	   7	  
Level	  of	  Democracy	   7.50	   1.89	   .67	   10	  
Government	  System	   .69	   .46	   0	   1	  
Bicameralism	   .57	   .49	   0	   1	  
Type	  of	  Electoral	  System	   .48	   .50	   0	   1	  
Population	   2.48e+07	   3.95e+07	   2129970	   1.94e+08	  
GDP	  per	  capita	   2296.246	   1805.417	   246.3823	   11404.01	  
N	  =	  494	  	  
Summary	  Statistics	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Provisions	  (de	  jure	  Judicial	  Independence)	  
Constitutional	  Provisions	   Mean	   Std.	  Deviation	   Minimum	   Maximum	  
Selection	  Process	   .88	   .32	   0	   1	  
Tenure	   .87	   .33	   0	   1	  
Removal	  Proceedings	   .57	   .49	   0	   1	  
Budget	   .53	   .50	   0	   1	  
Accessibility	   .91	   .28	   0	   1	  
Separation	  of	  Power	   .85	   .35	   0	   1	  
Judicial	  Review	   .94	   .23	   0	   1	  
Number	  of	  Justices	  in	  the	  Highest	  
Court	  
.59	   .49	   0	   1	  










Budget	   Access	   Separa-­‐
tion	  
Review	   Number	   Qualif	  
Argentina	   1994	   1994	   1984	   X	   1984	   1984	   1984	   X	   1984	  
Bolivia	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	  
Brazil	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	  
Chile	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1990	   1984	  
Colombia	   X	   1984	   X	   X	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1992	   1984	  
Costa	  Ri-­‐
ca	  




1984-­‐2003	   X	   X	   X	   1984-­‐1993	   1984	   X	   1984	   1984	  
Ecuador	   1984-­‐1998	   1984-­‐1998/	  2007-­‐2009	  




1984	   1984	   2000	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984-­‐1999	   1984	  
Guatema-­‐
la	  
1984	   1984	   X	   1984	   1994	   X	   1985	   1984	   1984	  
Haiti	   1984	   1984	   1984	   X	   X	   1984	   1984	   X	   X	  
Honduras	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	  
Mexico	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1994	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	  
Nicara-­‐
gua	  
1987	   1984	   X	   1984	   1984	   2004	   1984	   X	   1984	  
Panama	   1984	   1984	   X	   1984	   1984	   2004	   1984	   X	   1984	  
Paraguay	   1984	   1984	   1992	   1992	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	  
Peru	   1984	   1984-­‐1992	   1984-­‐1992	   1984-­‐1992	   1984	   1984	   1984	   X	   1984	  
Uruguay	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1984	   1985	   1985	   1984	   1984	  
Venezue-­‐
la	  
1984	   1984	   1999	   1999	   1984	   1984	   1984	   X	   1984	  *The	  year	  identifies	  the	  constitution	  where	  the	  provision	  appears.	  *	  X	  means	  it	  is	  not	  present	  in	  the	  constitution	  from	  1984	  to	  2009.	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Abstract	  This	  paper	  explores	  the	  effect	  of	  three	  constitutional	  provisions	  on	  de	  facto	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence.	  Conventional	  wisdom	  holds	  that	  federalism,	  electoral	  design,	  and	  the	  number	  of	  cham-­‐bers	  in	  the	  legislature	  shape	  the	  structures	  of	  the	  government	  and	  their	  outcomes.	  I	  argue	  that	  the-­‐se	  three	  institutional	  frameworks	  can	  foster	  judicial	  independence.	  More	  specifically,	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  countries	  under	  a	  federal	  system,	  with	  a	  bicameral	  federal	  legislature,	  and	  a	  proportional	  elec-­‐toral	  rule	  create	  a	  structure	  where	  courts	  are	  likely	  to	  act	  independently.	  I	  test	  this	  hypothesis	  on	  19	  Latin	  American	  countries.	  The	  results	  are	  two	  fold.	  First,	  the	  findings	  show	  that	  proportional	  and	  bicameral	  systems	  are	  likely	  to	  predict	  independent	  courts.	  Conversely,	  the	  results	  show	  that	  under	  federalism,	  courts	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  de	  facto	  dependent.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  hypothesis	  does	  not	  hold	  true	  with	  regard	  to	  federalism	  because	  of	  the	  type	  of	  federalism	  existent	  in	  Latin	  American	  countries.	  In	  Latin	  American	  countries,	  only	  few	  countries	  have	  a	  true	  federal	  system,	  i.e.,	  Brazil,	  Mexico,	  and	  Ar-­‐gentina.	  All	  other	  countries	  in	  Latin	  America	  are	  unitary	  or	  exercise	  a	  pseudo-­‐federalism.	  In	  the	  lat-­‐ter	  instances,	  federalism	  is	  a	  constitutional	  arrangement	  provided	  in	  the	  constitution;	  however,	  subnational	  governments	  excessively	  rely	  on	  the	  federal	  government,	  depending	  on	  financial	  trans-­‐fers.	  This	  overreliance	  allows	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  pressure	  subnational	  governments	  to	  align	  to	  the	  central	  government	  needs.	  Thus,	  in	  this	  pseudo-­‐federalism	  or	  unitary	  systems,	  without	  less	  oversight	  from	  the	  subnational	  governments,	  the	  central	  government	  has	  more	  power	  to	  pressure	  courts	  to	  align	  to	  their	  preferences,	  threatening	  the	  level	  of	  their	  independence.	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Introduction	  Do	  constitutional	  provisions	  unrelated	  to	  the	  functions	  of	  courts,	  such	  as	  the	  type	  of	  elec-­‐toral	  system,	  governmental	  regime,	  or	  the	  number	  of	  houses	  in	  the	  legislature,	  affect	  the	  level	  of	  de	  
facto	  judicial	  independence	  courts	  and	  judges	  exercise?	  The	  conventional	  wisdom	  is	  that	  in	  carry-­‐ing	  out	  the	  basic	  and	  more	  permanent	  elements	  of	  political	  governance,	  written	  constitutions	  have	  a	  great	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  economic,	  social,	  and	  political	  structure	  of	  a	  country.	  Constitutions	  im-­‐pact	  countries’	  economic	  systems	  through	  provisions	  about	  taxation	  and	  government	  interference	  with	  property	  rights	  (Epstein	  1982;	  Pilon	  1988).	  They	  can	  also	  shape	  social	  and	  cultural	  structures	  such	  as	  religious	  practices,	  establish	  basic	  rights,	  and	  provide	  general	  education.	  	  For	  example,	  until	  2008,	  Bolivia’s	  Constitution	  recognized	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  as	  the	  official	  state	  religion.	  Moreover,	  constitutions	  can	  alter	  the	  political	  structure	  of	  a	  country	  through	  provisions	  concerning	  federalism,	  separation	  of	  powers,	  and	  the	  judicial	  system	  (Riker	  1964;	  Epstein	  2011).	  This	  paper	  focuses	  on	  the	  latter:	  the	  judiciary.	  	  Research	  argues	  that	  institutional	  frameworks	  shape	  the	  organization,	  structure,	  and	  politi-­‐cal	  outcomes	  of	  a	  country.	  With	  respect	  to	  federalism,	  studies	  point	  out	  that	  it	  accommodates	  re-­‐gional	  diversity,	  fosters	  policy	  innovation	  and	  political	  participation,	  and	  increases	  accountability,	  (Gordon	  2001).	  Studies	  show	  that	  by	  creating	  a	  decentralized	  structure,	  federalism	  gives	  voice	  to	  the	  differences	  between	  each	  subnational	  state	  needs	  and	  wants	  (Wheare	  1963;	  Franck	  1968).	  Moreover,	  in	  shaping	  the	  organization	  and	  structure	  of	  a	  country,	  federalism	  creates	  a	  decentral-­‐ized	  structure	  of	  governing	  that	  fosters	  policy	  innovation,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  accommodate	  the	  di-­‐verse	  preferences	  of	  the	  different	  regions	  (Heywood	  1999).	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  said	  that	  because	  federalism	  is	  suitable	  for	  more	  political	  participation,	  policy	  innovation	  is	  encouraged	  (Gibson	  2001).	   Followed	  by	  federalism,	  bicameralism	  also	  affects	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  government.	  Whereas	  federalism	  has	  a	  broad	  impact	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  government,	  bicameralism	  impacts	  particular-­‐
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ly	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process.	  It	  functions	  as	  a	  check	  and	  balances	  system.	  The	  lower	  house,	  which	  is	  usually	  proportionality	  to	  population	  for	  each	  state,	  district	  or	  region,	  accommodates	  various	  inter-­‐ests	  and	  preferences,	  enhancing	  representation	  of	  subnational	  governments.	  Conversely,	  the	  upper	  house,	  usually	  composed	  by	  few	  members,	  provides	  a	  more	  aristocratic	  view	  that	  is	  less	  dependent	  on	  party	  preferences	  (Wheare	  1987).	  These	  differences	  in	  composition	  between	  both	  chambers	  in-­‐crease	  supervision	  of	  one	  chamber	  over	  another.	  Generally,	  the	  upper	  chamber	  tries	  to	  balance	  the	  diversity,	  and	  often	  unpredictability,	  of	  the	  lower	  chamber	  policy	  outcomes.	  Thus,	  as	  Riker	  (1992:	  101)	  argues,	  bicameralism	  “slows	  down	  the	  legislative	  process,	  renders	  abrupt	  change	  difficult,	  forces	  myopic	  legislators	  to	  have	  second	  thoughts,	  and	  thereby	  minimizes	  arbitrariness	  and	  injus-­‐tice	  in	  government	  action.”	  Finally,	  similarly	  to	  the	  bicameral	  system,	  electoral	  systems	  shape	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  legislature,	  creating	  more	  or	  less	  political	  parties.	  According	  to	  Duverger	  (1955)	  the	  plurality,	  or	  majoritarian	  rule,	  foster	  a	  two-­‐party	  system,	  while	  proportional	  electoral	  rules	  favors	  a	  multi-­‐party	  system.	  The	  reasons	  for	  choosing	  one	  over	  the	  other	  are	  threefold.	  In	  shaping	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  legislature,	  electoral	  system	  impacts	  the	  number	  of	  votes	  per	  seat	  (Lijpart	  1984;	  Gallagher,	  La-­‐ver	  and	  Mair	  1995),	  the	  production,	  or	  lack	  thereof,	  of	  coalition	  (Blais	  and	  Carty	  1987;	  Laver	  and	  Shepsle	  1995;	  Norris	  1996),	  and	  the	  representation	  of	  minority	  groups	  (Lovenduski	  and	  Norris	  1993;	  Norris	  1995).	  	  All	  these	  effects	  on	  government	  suggest	  that	  institutional	  frameworks	  matter.	  They	  shape	  government	  structures	  impacting	  social,	  political,	  economic,	  and	  policy	  outcomes.	  Moreover,	  as	  the	  above	  arguments	  suggest,	  these	  institutional	  structures	  matter	  as	  a	  whole.	  They	  influence	  the	  exec-­‐utive,	  legislative,	  and	  judicial	  branches.	  	  It	  is	  depending	  upon	  the	  number	  of	  chambers	  in	  the	  legisla-­‐ture,	  for	  instance,	  that	  policy-­‐making	  can	  be	  either	  a	  very	  strenuous	  and	  complex	  process,	  where	  laws	  are	  hardly	  changed,	  or	  an	  easy	  one,	  where	  only	  a	  simple	  majority	  can	  make	  decisions.	  Or,	  for	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example,	  it	  can	  centralize	  power	  on	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  president,	  in	  unitary	  systems,	  or	  decentralize	  it	  to	  subnational	  regimes	  own	  political	  structure.	  	  This	  article	  explores	  the	  impact	  of	  these	  institutional	  features	  on	  the	  judiciary.	  More	  specifi-­‐cally,	  federalism,	  bicameralism,	  and	  the	  number	  of	  chambers	  in	  the	  legislature	  affect	  the	  independ-­‐ence	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  If	  these	  structures	  impact	  the	  government	  as	  a	  whole,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  say	  that	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another	  they	  will	  also	  foster,	  or	  not,	  an	  independent	  judiciary.	  In	  other	  words,	  these	  structures	  can,	  for	  instance,	  create	  an	  environment	  where	  courts’	  decisions	  are	  not	  routinely	  ignored	  or	  poorly	  implemented,	  fostering	  judicial	  independence.	  The	  extant	  literature	  on	  judicial	  independence	  has	  yet	  to	  give	  systematically	  attention	  to	  the	  link	  between	  the	  aforementioned	  insti-­‐tutional	  features	  and	  judicial	  independence.	  Therefore,	  this	  paper	  seeks	  to	  fill	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  judicial	  independence	  and	  constitutional	  design	  that	  focuses	  primarily	  on	  constitutional	  guaran-­‐tees	  of	  the	  courts,	  i.e.,	  judicial	  review,	  removal	  procedures,	  and	  judicial	  selection	  (Verner	  1984;	  Dahl	  1957;	  Feld	  &	  Voigt	  2003;	  Kaufman	  1979,	  1980;	  La	  Porta	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Larkins	  1996).	  	  I	  posit	  that	  many	  constitutional	  provisions	  affect	  the	  structure	  of	  government	  as	  a	  whole,	  including	  the	  judici-­‐ary.	  However,	  the	  extant	  literature	  focuses	  exclusively	  on	  provisions	  that	  directly	  concern	  the	  courts,	  obscuring	  the	  potential	  significance	  of	  other	  constitutional	  provisions.	  Thus,	  I	  explore	  the	  effect	  of	  three	  constitutional	  provisions	  on	  courts’	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence:	  federalism,	  type	  of	  electoral	  system,	  and	  the	  number	  of	  federal	  legislative	  chambers.	  This	  article	  further	  explores	  additional	  findings	  of	  my	  previous	  study.	  In	  this	  study	  I	  tested	  the	  effect	  of	  de	  jure	  judicial	  independence	  on	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  in	  19	  Latin	  American	  countries.	  Overall,	  I	  found	  that	  constitutional	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  independence	  have	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  courts’	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  The	  data	  also	  reveals,	  and	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  paper,	  that	  three	  other	  constitutional	  provisions	  –	  federalism,	  bicameralism,	  and	  elec-­‐toral	  systems	  –	  were	  highly	  significant.	  Using	  predicted	  probabilities,	  my	  initial	  test	  reveals	  that	  with	  regard	  to	  bicameralism	  and	  proportional	  systems,	  partially	  and	  fully	  independent	  courts	  were	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positively	  affected	  by	  these	  structures,	  as	  expected.	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  countries	  with	  bicameral	  sys-­‐tems	  and	  proportional	  electoral	  system,	  courts	  were	  at	  a	  minimum	  partially	  independent.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  federalism,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  findings	  show	  that	  this	  institutional	  framework	  was	  more	  likely	  to	  predict	  dependent	  courts,	  contrary	  to	  my	  expectations.	  As	  it	  will	  be	  further	  explained	  in	  this	  paper,	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  a	  particular	  characteristic	  of	  the	  dataset	  used	  in	  my	  previous	  study.	  Thus,	  the	  purpose	  here	  is	  to	  replicate	  the	  findings	  of	  my	  previous	  study,	  focusing	  on	  investigating	  why	  these	  constitutional	  provisions	  unrelated	  to	  the	  courts	  foster	  judicial	  independence.	  	  The	  paper	  consists	  of	  three	  parts.	  In	  the	  first	  part,	  I	  discuss	  the	  role	  of	  constitutions	  in	  shap-­‐ing	  the	  political,	  social,	  and	  economic	  structure	  of	  a	  government.	  In	  particular,	  I	  explore	  the	  litera-­‐ture	  written	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  federalism,	  bicameralism,	  and	  electoral	  rules	  on	  political	  and	  econom-­‐ic	  outcomes.	  Additionally,	  I	  look	  at	  the	  theoretical	  explanation	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  provisions	  of	  federal-­‐ism,	  bicameralism	  and	  electoral	  rules	  on	  judicial	  independence.	  Federalism,	  electoral	  design,	  and	  bicameralism,	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another,	  impact	  the	  courts	  by	  rendering	  it	  difficult	  to	  interfere	  with	  courts’	  and	  judges’	  independence.	  The	  literature	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  various	  constitutional	  features	  in	  shaping	  government	  structure	  tells	  us	  that	  there	  is	  a	  relationship	  between	  the	  two.	  Whether	  they	  have	  a	  positive	  or	  negative	  effect,	  federalism,	  bicameralism,	  and	  electoral	  rules	  influence	  public	  stability,	  policy	  creation,	  and	  power-­‐sharing	  in	  government	  (Riker	  1992;	  Tsebelis	  1995;	  Lijphart	  1984).	  Notwithstanding	  these	  studies,	  this	  paper	  seeks	  to	  include	  in	  this	  literature	  the	  impact	  of	  these	  features	  on	  the	  level	  of	  judicial	  independence	  courts	  exercise	  in	  practice.	  Building	  from	  Tsebelis	  (1995)	  study,	  courts	  will	  more	  freely	  exercise	  their	  functions	  if	  they	  exist	  in	  a	  system	  in	  which	  their	  independence	  cannot	  be	  easily	  diminished.	  These	  structures	  guarantee,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  time	  it	  takes	  to	  produce	  any	  change,	  that	  courts	  will	  have	  their	  independence	  safeguarded.	  As	  Tsebelis	  points	  out	  “if	  courts	  and	  bureaucracies	  are	  interested	  in	  seeing	  their	  decisions	  stand,	  and	  not	  being	  overruled	  by	  the	  political	  actors,	  they	  will	  be	  more	  important	  and	  independent	  in	  systems	  with	  multiple	  incongruent	  and	  cohesive	  veto	  players”	  (1995:	  323).	  The	  third	  section	  replicates	  my	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previous	  study	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  on	  the	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  In	  doing	  that,	  I	  show	  that	  the	  institutional	  provisions	  explored	  in	  this	  article	  affect	  de	  facto	  judicial	  in-­‐dependence.	  I	  utilize	  a	  large-­‐n	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  Latin	  American	  constitutions	  to	  illustrate	  the	  main	  argument	  of	  this	  paper.	  I	  find	  that,	  in	  addition	  to	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence	  guaranteed	  to	  the	  courts,	  provisions	  related	  to	  the	  institutional	  framework	  of	  govern-­‐ment	  also	  affect	  the	  level	  of	  judicial	  independence	  courts	  and	  judges	  exercise.	  The	  last	  section	  sets	  forth	  my	  conclusion	  and	  suggests	  future	  research	  
Do	  Constitutions	  Shape	  Government?	  Conventional	  wisdom	  holds	  that	  formal	  institutions	  matter.	  Formal	  institutions,	  such	  as	  constitutions,	  shape	  the	  economic,	  social,	  and	  political	  structure	  of	  a	  government.	  They	  fashion	  the	  political	  structure	  of	  a	  country	  through	  provisions	  regarding	  government	  frameworks,	  separation	  of	  power,	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  judiciary	  (Riker	  1964;	  Epstein	  2011).	  Constitutions	  also	  impact	  countries’	  economic	  systems	  through	  provisions	  about	  financial	  regulations	  and	  limits	  on	  property	  rights	  (Epstein	  1988;	  Pilon	  1988).	  Finally,	  they	  mold	  social	  and	  cultural	  structures	  such	  as	  religious	  practices,	  establish	  basic	  rights,	  and	  provide	  general	  education.	  This	  paper	  explores	  these	  impacts	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  regarding	  government	  frameworks	  on	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  independence	  courts	  and	  judges	  exercise.	  I	  specifically	  focus	  on	  three	  institutional	  provisions,	  federalism,	  electoral	  rules,	  and	  bicameralism.	  	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  current	  literature	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  these	  provisions	  on	  the	  government	  structure.	  I	  also	  investigate	  the	  link	  of	  these	  provisions	  on	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  ju-­‐diciary.	  	  
Federalism	  According	  to	  Dahl	  (1986),	  federalism	  is	  “the	  system	  in	  which	  some	  matters	  are	  exclusively	  within	  the	  competence	  of	  certain	  local	  units	  –	  cantons,	  states	  and	  provinces	  –	  and	  are	  constitution-­‐ally	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  national	  government,	  and	  where	  certain	  other	  matters	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are	  constitutionally	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  smaller	  units.	  […]	  In	  federal	  systems	  a	  national	  state	  majority	  cannot	  prevail	  over	  a	  minority	  that	  happens	  to	  constitute	  a	  majority	  in	  one	  of	  the	  local	  units	  that	  is	  constitutionally	  privileged”	  (114-­‐126).	  This	  definition	  avoids	  defining	  fed-­‐eralism	  as	  merely	  a	  “decentralization	  of	  power.”	  On	  the	  contrary,	  it	  defines	  it	  as	  separation	  of	  power	  between	  federal	  and	  local	  governments.	  The	  importance	  of	  this	  argument	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  possibil-­‐ity	  that	  unitary	  states	  are	  decentralized	  and	  federal	  states	  are	  not.	  	  These	  constitutional	  delimitations	  of	  authority	  have	  great	  consequences	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  country.	  Provisions	  on	  federalism	  affect	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process,	  political	  power	  distribution,	  and	  economic	  structures	  of	  a	  country	  (Riker	  1964;	  Chandler	  1987;	  Weingast	  1995;	  Dyck	  1997;	  Ste-­‐pan	  1999;	  Davoodi	  and	  Zou	  1998;	  Manor	  1998;	  Ross	  2000).	  Federalism	  is	  often	  linked	  to	  economic	  growth	  (Oates	  1993,	  1999),	  to	  foster	  policy	  innovation	  and	  political	  participation,	  and	  to	  accommo-­‐date	  regional	  diversity.	  	  An	  extent	  literature	  on	  government	  framework	  suggests	  that	  federalism	  promotes	  econom-­‐ic	  growth	  (Rodden	  2002;	  Brzinski,	  Lancaster,	  and	  Tuschhoff	  1999;	  Coffee	  1986;	  Dye	  1990;	  Oates	  1993,	  1999).	  Oates	  (1993)	  argues	  that	  “the	  basic	  economic	  case	  for	  fiscal	  decentralization	  is	  the	  en-­‐hancement	  of	  economic	  efficiency:	  the	  provision	  of	  local	  outputs	  that	  are	  differentiated	  according	  to	  local	  tastes	  and	  circumstances	  results	  in	  higher	  levels	  of	  social	  welfare	  than	  centrally	  determined	  and	  more	  uniform	  levels	  of	  outputs	  across	  all	  jurisdictions”	  (240).	  Research	  findings	  support	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	  impacts	  of	  federalism	  on	  economic	  growth	  (Kim	  1995;	  Huther	  and	  Shah	  1996	  for	  positive	  impact;	  Xie,	  Zou,	  and	  Davoodi	  1999;	  Rodden	  2002	  for	  a	  negative	  impact).	  Where	  feder-­‐alism	  works,	  fiscal	  autonomy	  and	  scope	  of	  authority	  are	  clear,	  and	  subnational	  and	  local	  govern-­‐ments	  are	  likely	  to	  function	  independently	  from	  the	  central	  government.	  In	  countries	  where	  subna-­‐tional	  governments	  are	  weak	  and	  often	  rely	  on	  the	  federal	  government	  for	  funds	  and	  grants,	  the	  economic	  structure	  of	  subnational	  government	  are	  dictated	  by	  the	  central	  government	  (Gibson	  2004).	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Furthermore,	  politically,	  federalism	  allows	  minority	  groups	  to	  gain	  political	  leverage	  (My-­‐erson	  2009;	  Lijphart	  1984).	  Studies	  suggest	  that	  ethnically	  and	  religiously	  diverse	  countries	  should	  adopt	  federalism	  as	  a	  form	  of	  government	  to	  allow	  minority	  groups	  to	  gain	  voice	  in	  the	  national	  arena	  (Cameron	  2001;	  Global	  Intelligence	  Update	  1999;	  O’Leavy	  2002;	  Myerson	  2009).	  Studies	  point	  out	  that	  federalism	  integrates	  regional	  diversity,	  fosters	  policy	  innovation	  and	  political	  partic-­‐ipation,	  and	  increases	  accountability	  (Gordon	  2001).	  Studies	  show	  that	  through	  decentralized	  structures,	  federalism	  accommodates	  differences	  between	  each	  subnational	  state	  needs	  and	  wants	  (Wheare	  1963;	  Franck	  1968).	  In	  shaping	  a	  decentralized	  organization	  and	  structure	  of	  a	  country,	  federalism	  fosters	  policy	  innovation,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  accommodate	  the	  diverse	  preferences	  of	  the	  different	  regions	  (Heywood	  1999).	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  said	  that	  because	  federalism	  is	  suitable	  for	  more	  political	  participation,	  policy	  innovation	  is	  encouraged	  (Gibson	  2001).	  With	  respect	  to	  courts,	  federalism	  renders	  it	  difficult	  for	  political	  actors	  to	  interfere	  with	  courts’	  and	  judges’	  independence.	  In	  federal	  systems,	  decentralization	  of	  power	  increases	  the	  ac-­‐countability	  process.	  Federalism	  allocates	  responsibilities	  and	  power	  to	  different	  layers	  of	  govern-­‐ment,	  allowing	  various	  groups	  to	  gain	  political	  leverage	  (Meyerson	  2009).	  Consequently,	  there	  is	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  power	  holders	  who	  can	  influence	  political	  outcomes.	  Changes	  can	  only	  occur	  if	  these	  power	  holders	  can	  reach	  some	  consensus.	  However,	  in	  a	  strong	  federalism	  where	  tension	  exists	  between	  the	  central	  government	  and	  the	  subnational	  and	  local	  governments,	  it	  is	  dif-­‐ficult	  to	  reach	  a	  majority	  to	  bring	  about	  change,	  rendering	  the	  process	  slow	  and	  cost-­‐effective.	  	  In	  this	  system,	  changes	  do	  not	  happen	  quickly	  and	  the	  status	  quo	  is	  easily	  preserved	  (Tsebelis	  1995).	  	  Federalism	  affects	  courts	  and	  judges’	  independence	  by	  decreasing	  the	  likelihood	  that	  a	  majority	  coalition	  will	  form	  and	  intervene	  in	  the	  courts	  function,	  i.e.,	  overturning	  their	  decisions,	  starting	  a	  removal	  process,	  and	  shaping	  the	  composition	  of	  courts	  through	  selection	  process.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  ex-­‐pected	  to	  see	  higher	  levels	  of	  judicial	  independence	  in	  countries	  with	  federal	  form	  of	  government.	  	  	  	  
Electoral	  Design	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Like	  federalism,	  electoral	  design	  shapes	  governmental	  frameworks.	  Electoral	  rules	  can	  in-­‐fluence	  the	  number	  of	  political	  parties	  in	  the	  political	  arena,	  promoting	  diversity.	  According	  to	  Du-­‐verger	  (1955)	  the	  plurality,	  or	  majoritarian	  rule,	  foster	  a	  two-­‐party	  system,	  while	  proportional	  elec-­‐toral	  rules	  favors	  a	  multi-­‐party	  system.	  The	  reasons	  for	  choosing	  one	  over	  the	  other	  are	  fourfold.	  In	  shaping	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  legislature,	  electoral	  system	  impacts	  the	  number	  of	  votes	  per	  seat	  (Lijpart	  1994;	  Gallagher,	  Laver	  and	  Mair	  1995),	  the	  production,	  or	  lack	  thereof,	  of	  coalition	  (Blais	  and	  Carty	  1987;	  Laver	  and	  Shepsle	  1995;	  Norris	  1996),	  and	  the	  representation	  of	  minority	  groups	  in	  the	  legislature	  (Lovenduski	  and	  Norris	  1993;	  Norris	  1995).	  	  In	  electoral	  system	  different	  party	  government	  can	  be	  created,	  i.e.,	  a	  coalition,	  a	  minority	  or	  a	  single	  party	  government	  	  (Duverger	  1954;	  Rae	  1967;	  Taagera	  and	  Shugart	  1989;	  Lijpart	  1994).	  Each	  of	  these	  different	  makeups	  of	  legislative	  composition	  affects	  the	  process	  of	  policy-­‐making.	  For	  instance,	  in	  coalition	  type	  of	  government,	  the	  process	  of	  policy-­‐making	  is	  often	  sluggish.	  Time	  is	  of-­‐ten	  spent	  in	  compromising,	  lobbying,	  and	  articulating	  strategies	  to	  bring	  about	  policy	  change.	  Thus,	  in	  countries	  where	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process	  requires	  coalition,	  policy	  change	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  oc-­‐cur,	  or	  requires	  more	  effort	  to	  bring	  about	  change.	  	  The	  impact	  of	  electoral	  design	  on	  the	  composition	  of	  legislatures	  has	  also	  shaped	  the	  judici-­‐ary	  and	  its	  level	  of	  independence.	  Depending	  upon	  the	  type	  of	  electoral	  system,	  the	  number	  of	  polit-­‐ical	  parties	  can	  increase	  or	  decrease.	  Proportional	  systems	  tend	  to	  produce	  a	  multi-­‐party	  structure,	  whereas	  plurality	  systems	  generally	  foster	  a	  two-­‐party	  system	  (Duverger	  1954;	  Downs	  1957;	  Sar-­‐tori	  1976;	  Cox	  1987).	  Thus,	  in	  two-­‐party	  systems,	  there	  are	  few	  negotiations,	  bestowing	  policy	  changes	  less	  costly	  and	  more	  likely	  to	  occur.	  In	  a	  proportional	  system,	  where	  a	  coalition	  is	  often	  needed,	  the	  number	  of	  actors	  is	  higher,	  making	  it	  more	  costly	  to	  successfully	  change	  policies.	  If	  we	  apply	  this	  logic	  to	  courts’	  and	  judges’	  independence,	  in	  majoritarian	  systems	  it	  may	  be	  easier,	  for	  instance,	  to	  overrule	  judicial	  decisions	  than	  in	  proportional	  systems.	  In	  this	  case,	  in	  the	  majoritarian	  system,	  it	  is	  only	  needed	  to	  convince	  the	  majority	  party	  in	  government	  to	  overrule	  judicial	  decisions	  
48 
whereas	  in	  proportional	  system	  a	  coalition	  is	  necessary.	  Thus,	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  proportional	  sys-­‐tems	  of	  electoral	  rules	  enhance	  judges	  and	  courts	  judicial	  independence,	  as	  opposed	  to	  plurality	  or	  majority	  rule.	  	  
Bicameralism	  The	  third	  constitutional	  feature	  that	  I	  explore	  in	  this	  article	  is	  bicameralism.	  This	  constitu-­‐tional	  framework	  shapes	  political	  and	  economic	  structures.	  According	  to	  scholars,	  bicameralism	  can	  bring	  about	  government	  stability	  (Llanos	  and	  Nolte	  2003;	  Riker	  1992).	  Bicameralism	  brings	  stability	  by	  making	  it	  difficult	  for	  changes	  to	  occur,	  particularly	  in	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process.	  The	  reason	  being,	  in	  legislatures	  with	  two	  chambers	  a	  majority	  is	  needed	  in	  both	  houses	  to	  pass	  laws.	  Conversely,	  legislatures	  with	  one	  chamber	  are	  likely	  to	  need	  only	  a	  simple	  majority.	  An	  example	  of	  bicameralism	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  policy-­‐making	  process	  is	  Weingast’s	  (1991)	  study.	  Weingast	  argues	  that	  Congress	  could	  not	  pass	  antislavery	  legislation	  during	  the	  republic.	  He	  argues	  that	  bicameral-­‐ism	  was	  fundamental	  to	  protect	  slave	  states	  by	  preventing	  any	  anti-­‐slavery	  legislation	  to	  pass	  the	  Senate	  house,	  which	  was	  dominated	  by	  slave	  states.	  Thus,	  in	  bicameral	  system,	  the	  law-­‐making	  process	  has	  to	  pass	  through	  two	  houses,	  slowing	  down	  the	  legislative	  process	  or	  even	  impeding	  some	  legislation	  to	  pass	  all	  together.	  This	  process	  makes	  it	  difficult	  for	  political	  actors	  to	  change	  laws	  arbitrarily	  or	  without	  an	  agreement	  from	  both	  houses	  (Riker	  1992).	  	  	  Third,	  the	  number	  of	  legislative	  chambers	  may	  influence	  the	  degree	  of	  independence	  courts	  and	  judges	  exercise.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  political	  structure	  bicameralism	  creates.	  In	  bicameral	  sys-­‐tems,	  twofold	  structures	  are	  observed.	  First,	  there	  is	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  veto	  players	  (Riker	  1992).	  Contrary	  to	  unicameral	  system	  where	  a	  simple	  majority	  is	  likely	  to	  emerge,	  in	  a	  bi-­‐cameral	  system,	  a	  coalition	  is	  often	  necessary	  not	  only	  within	  each	  house	  but	  also	  between	  the	  two	  houses	  in	  order	  to	  pass	  legislation.	  Additionally,	  it	  creates	  a	  check	  system	  of	  one	  chamber	  on	  the	  other.	  To	  courts	  and	  judges,	  this	  structure	  creates	  a	  shield	  that	  protects	  courts	  and	  judges	  from	  po-­‐litical	  influence.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  right	  to	  assume	  that	  bicameral	  systems	  allow	  courts’	  decisions	  to	  be	  pre-­‐
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served,	  making	  it	  difficult	  for	  political	  actors	  to	  override	  it.	  Second,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  of	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  power	  holders,	  bicameralism	  increases	  checks	  on	  the	  political	  actors.	  With	  more	  in-­‐dividuals	  to	  monitor	  each	  other’s	  actions,	  political	  actors	  attempt	  to	  arbitrarily	  influence	  courts	  and	  judges	  is	  difficult	  at	  best.	  Consequently,	  courts	  and	  judges	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  act	  independently.	  	  
These	  hypotheses	  are	  supported	  by	  Tsebelis’	  (1995)	  idea	  of	  political	  institutions	  and	  their	  effect	  on	  government	  structures.	  In	  comparing	  different	  political	  institutions,	  i.e.,	  parliamentarism,	  presidentialism,	  two-­‐party,	  multi-­‐party	  systems,	  unicameral,	  and	  bicameral	  legislatures,	  Tsebelis	  argues	  that	  these	  institutions	  should	  be	  assessed	  based	  on	  their	  effect	  on	  the	  status	  quo	  and	  their	  capacity	  to	  bring	  about	  policy	  change	  (Tsebelis	  1995:	  292).	  Thus,	  Tsebelis	  (1995)	  asserts	  that	  “it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  those	  who	  dislike	  the	  status	  quo	  will	  prefer	  a	  political	  system	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  make	  changes	  quickly,	  while	  advocates	  of	  the	  status	  quo	  will	  prefer	  a	  system	  that	  produces	  policy	  stability”	  (294).	  The	  easiness	  or	  difficulties	  in	  changing	  the	  status	  quo	  has	  consid-­‐erable	  consequence	  to	  courts	  judicial	  independence.	  Consider	  what	  courts	  do.	  They	  interpret	  the	  law	  and	  make	  decisions	  that	  impact	  government	  structure.	  Dissatisfaction	  among	  political	  actors	  can	  initiate	  a	  process	  to	  overrule	  these	  decisions,	  change	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  courts,	  or	  remove	  judges	  with	  different	  ideological	  position.	  Political	  institutions	  that	  make	  it	  difficult	  for	  political	  ac-­‐tors	  to	  influence	  courts	  in	  any	  way	  possible	  increase	  their	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  	  	  This	  overview	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  each	  of	  these	  key	  features—federalism,	  electoral	  system,	  and	  bicameralism—details	  their	  capacity	  to	  produce	  changes	  in	  economic,	  political	  and	  social	  struc-­‐tures	  and	  thus	  it	  is	  only	  logical	  to	  analyze	  their	  effect	  on	  the	  judicial	  system.	  This	  paper	  seeks	  to	  fill	  the	  gap	  in	  the	  literature	  by	  modeling	  the	  effect	  of	  those	  constitutional	  provisions	  regarding	  gov-­‐ernment	  frameworks	  on	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  courts	  and	  judges	  exercise.	  	  
Model	  and	  Analysis	  This	  paper	  develops	  and	  tests	  three	  hypotheses	  relating	  to	  these	  constitutional	  provisions.	  First,	  a	  constitutional	  provision	  that	  creates	  a	  bicameral	  system-­‐-­‐two	  chambers	  in	  the	  federal	  legis-­‐
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lature	  –	  increases	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  courts	  exercise.	  This	  is	  because	  there	  are	  more	  checks	  and	  balances	  in	  bicameral	  systems	  and	  the	  danger	  of	  influences	  by	  a	  single	  cham-­‐ber	  on	  the	  courts	  decreases.	  For	  instance,	  in	  bicameral	  systems,	  as	  Riker	  argues,	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process	  is	  complex	  and	  requires	  a	  longer	  time	  to	  occur	  in	  comparison	  to	  unicameral	  systems.	  This	  characteristic	  affects	  the	  courts	  because	  it	  delay	  or	  limits	  a	  possible	  attempt	  by	  the	  political	  branch	  to	  overturn	  courts	  decisions.	  It	  delays	  because	  it	  requires	  that	  for	  the	  law	  to	  be	  approved,	  the	  law	  pass	  through	  both	  houses.	  However,	  it	  can	  also	  limit	  any	  interference	  against	  courts’	  decision	  be-­‐cause	  the	  legislative	  branch	  might	  only	  have	  partial	  success	  in	  overturning	  the	  decision.	  	  The	  second	  hypothesis	  posits	  that	  a	  constitutional	  provision	  that	  creates	  a	  proportional	  electoral	  system	  increases	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  This	  is	  because	  proportional	  systems	  encourage	  the	  creation	  of	  multi-­‐party	  systems,	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  political	  actors	  (Duverger	  1954).	  Chances	  are	  that	  the	  higher	  the	  number	  of	  political	  parties	  the	  harder	  it	  is	  to	  make	  changes,	  since	  coalitions	  are	  often	  needed.	  In	  this	  case,	  courts	  would	  be	  protected	  because	  of	  possible	  delays	  in	  the	  political	  process.	  Moreover,	  a	  multi-­‐party	  system	  can	  also	  protect	  courts	  from	  arbitrary	  changes	  in	  their	  structure,	  organization,	  and	  scope.	  In	  multi-­‐party	  systems,	  a	  supermajori-­‐ty	  is	  usually	  needed	  to	  nominate,	  or	  to	  remove,	  justices,	  requiring	  creating	  coalitions	  and	  more	  con-­‐sensus-­‐building.	  In	  contrast,	  strong	  majoritarian	  electoral	  system	  could	  easily	  stack	  courts	  or	  pun-­‐ish	  judges	  who	  do	  not	  go	  along	  with	  the	  government	  party’s	  wishes.	  Thus,	  I	  expect	  that,	  in	  propor-­‐tional	  systems,	  courts	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  act	  independently	  from	  political	  influences	  than	  in	  non-­‐proportional	  systems.	  	  Finally,	  my	  third	  hypothesis	  conceives	  that,	  in	  federalist	  countries,	  courts	  have	  a	  higher	  lev-­‐el	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  There	  are	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  federalism	  fosters	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence.	  First,	  because	  federalism	  accommodates	  regional	  diversity,	  incentivizes	  political	  partici-­‐pation,	  and	  increases	  accountability,	  it	  creates	  an	  environment	  in	  which	  political	  actors	  might	  have	  difficulties	  in	  manipulating	  and	  influencing	  courts’	  decisions,	  or	  changing	  their	  structure	  and	  organ-­‐
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ization.	  In	  other	  words,	  federal	  systems	  create	  more	  checks	  and	  balances	  between	  federal	  and	  local	  and	  subnational	  governments	  thus	  courts	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  arbitrarily	  influenced.	  Second,	  in	  fed-­‐eral	  system,	  tensions	  between	  federal	  and	  subnational	  governments	  often	  occur.	  Federal	  and	  sub-­‐national	  governments	  are	  often	  in	  conflict	  with	  each	  other.	  These	  conflicts	  are	  likely	  regarding	  the	  separation	  of	  power	  among	  layer	  of	  the	  government.	  There	  are	  many	  instances	  in	  which	  subnation-­‐al	  governments	  claim	  that	  the	  national	  government	  has	  overstep	  their	  functions,	  and	  vise-­‐versa.	  Since	  matters	  of	  separation	  of	  power	  dispute	  is	  likely	  a	  constitutional	  issue,	  courts	  are	  asked	  to	  de-­‐cide	  on	  these	  conflicts.	  I	  argue	  that	  as	  courts	  are	  asked	  to	  decide	  on	  these	  conflicts	  they	  gain	  inde-­‐pendence	  since	  both	  layers,	  national	  and	  subnational	  governments	  are	  checking	  on	  each	  other	  to	  make	  sure	  the	  courts	  decide	  independently.	  	  I	  test	  the	  influence	  of	  federalism,	  bicameralism,	  and	  electoral	  system	  on	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  courts	  and	  judges	  exercise	  in	  nineteen	  countries	  in	  Latin	  America.7	  First,	  I	  replicate	  my	  previous	  findings	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence	  on	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  The	  first	  analysis	  is	  a	  parameter	  estimates	  of	  the	  varia-­‐bles	  used	  in	  my	  previous	  study.	  It	  shows	  that	  the	  three	  governmental	  structures	  investigated	  in	  the	  current	  study	  are	  statistically	  significant.	  Following	  the	  parameter	  estimates	  I	  show	  the	  predicted	  probabilities	  of	  each	  governmental	  structure	  and	  their	  respective	  effect	  on	  all	  three	  de	  facto	  levels	  of	  judicial	  independence.	  	  	  For	  this	  paper,	  Latin	  American	  countries	  possess	  relevant	  variations	  in	  their	  political	  and	  judicial	  structure	  to	  test	  this	  paper’s	  hypotheses.	  Within	  Latin	  American	  region,	  there	  are	  federal	  and	  unitary	  countries,	  bicameral	  and	  unicameral	  legislatures,	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  electoral	  systems.	  The	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  these	  provisions	  in	  the	  constitution	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  the	  level	  of	  judicial	  independence	  courts	  and	  judges	  exercise	  in	  practice.	  Thus,	  Latin	  American	  countries	  provide	  a	  use-­‐ful	  laboratory	  for	  finding	  answers	  for	  the	  differing	  levels	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The	  countries	  included	  in	  this	  analysis	  are:	  Argentina,	  Brazil,	  Bolivia,	  Uruguay,	  Paraguay,	  Peru,	  Venezuela,	  Chile,	  Colom-­‐bia,	  Costa	  Rica,	  Dominican	  Republic,	  Ecuador,	  El	  Salvador,	  Haiti,	  Honduras,	  Mexico,	  Nicaragua,	  Panama,	  and	  Guatemala.	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Dependent	  Variable	  The	  dependent	  variable	  is	  a	  country’s	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  Specifically,	  I	  utilize	  the	  same	  measure	  of	  judicial	  independence	  as	  Cingranelli	  and	  Richards’s	  (2008).	  Their	  measure	  is	  based	  on	  the	  United	  States	  State	  Department’s	  country	  reports.	  This	  measure	  is	  ordinal	  and	  contains	  three	  categories:	  countries	  coded	  0	  are	  considered	  dependent,	  countries	  coded	  1	  are	  partially	  independent,	  and	  countries	  coded	  2	  are	  fully	  independent.8	  The	  data	  ranges	  from	  1981	  to	  2009.	  
The	  Cingranelli	  and	  Richard’s	  measure	  (CIRI)	  defines	  a	  judicial	  system	  as	  fully	  independent	  when	  the	  following	  parameters	  exist:	  1)	  judicial	  review;	  2)	  length	  of	  judgeship	  is	  seven	  years	  for	  the	  highest	  level	  courts;	  3)	  judges	  cannot	  be	  removed	  by	  the	  president	  or	  ministers	  of	  justice;	  4)	  the	  other	  two	  branches	  can	  be	  checked	  through	  courts	  proceedings;	  5)	  all	  proceedings	  are	  public;	  and	  6)	  professional	  judgeships.	  	  
According	  to	  Ríos-­‐Figueroa	  and	  Staton’s	  (2009)	  examination	  of	  eight	  distinct	  measures,	  the	  CIRI	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  reliable	  existing	  measures	  of	  judicial	  independence.9	  Although	  this	  measure	  relies	  on	  United	  States	  State	  Department	  country	  reports,	  all	  existing	  measures	  of	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence	  with	  country-­‐year	  as	  the	  unit	  of	  analysis	  are	  constructed	  from	  two	  sources:	  expert	  or	  survey	  reports	  and	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  reports.	  Despite	  the	  shortcomings	  existing	  in	  both	  sources,	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  reports	  are	  more	  reliable	  and	  less	  problematic	  than	  country	  ex-­‐perts	  (Ríos-­‐Figueroa	  and	  Staton	  2009).	  In	  addition,	  Poe,	  Carey,	  and	  Vazquez	  (2001)	  argue	  that	  the	  bias	  that	  affected	  the	  reports	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  have	  been	  corrected	  and	  are	  not	  appar-­‐ent	  in	  more	  recent	  years.	  	  
Explanatory	  Variables	  Federalism,	  type	  of	  electoral	  system,	  and	  bicameralism	  are	  all	  coded	  as	  dichotomous	  varia-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  The	  data	  is	  readily	  available	  on	  their	  website:	  http://ciri.binghamton.edu	  	  9	  The	  other	  one	  is	  Howard	  and	  Carey’s	  measure.	  This	  measure,	  however,	  is	  highly	  collinear	  with	  my	  other	  variables.	  I	  have	  tested	  it	  as	  well.	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bles.	  For	  federalist	  countries	  I	  coded	  1	  for	  federal	  and	  0	  for	  unitary.	  I	  use	  the	  Institutions	  and	  Elec-­‐tions	  Project’s	  (IAEP)	  (Regan	  and	  Clark	  2010)	  measure	  of	  government	  system.	  Bicameral	  countries	  are	  coded	  1	  and	  countries	  with	  only	  one	  federal	  chamber	  of	  legislature	  are	  coded	  0.	  I	  use	  data	  avail-­‐able	  from	  Beck	  et	  al.	  (2000)	  for	  this	  variable.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  electoral	  system,	  I	  also	  use	  the	  IAEP’s	  measure.	  This	  variable	  is	  coded	  1	  for	  proportional	  system	  and	  0	  for	  all	  other	  types	  of	  elec-­‐toral	  systems.	  
Other	  Explanatory	  Variables	  	  The	  following	  variables	  are	  also	  recognized	  in	  the	  literature	  to	  affect	  de	  facto	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence.	  Thus,	  the	  addition	  of	  these	  variables	  may	  tell	  us	  variance	  in	  the	  degree	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  is	  due	  to	  other	  influences.	  	  
De	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  variance,	  according	  to	  my	  previous	  study,	  is	  a	  function	  of	  de	  
jure	  judicial	  independence.	  According	  to	  this	  previous	  study,	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  affect	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  courts	  and	  judges	  exercise.	  Thus,	  the	  higher	  the	  number	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  in	  the	  constitutions,	  the	  higher	  the	  level	  of	  inde-­‐pendence	  courts	  exercise	  in	  practice.	  I	  constructed	  this	  variable	  using	  19	  Latin	  American	  countries	  constitutions	  from	  1984	  to	  2009.	  It	  is	  an	  additive	  scale	  ranging	  from	  0	  to	  9.	  	  	  
An	  additional	  explanatory	  variable	  to	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  is	  the	  num-­‐ber	  of	  veto	  players.	  Veto	  players	  are	  power	  holders	  who	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  bring	  about	  change.	  This	  ability	  of	  bringing	  about	  change	  is	  inversely	  proportional	  to	  the	  number	  of	  veto	  players.	  	  This	  is	  be-­‐cause	  a	  high	  number	  of	  power	  holders	  can	  create	  obstacles	  to	  change	  the	  status	  quo	  (Tsebelis	  1995).	  For	  the	  courts,	  this	  creates	  incentive	  for	  them	  to	  freely	  exercise	  their	  functions.	  Veto	  players	  will	  need	  to	  convince	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  other	  players	  to	  bring	  about	  any	  change,	  rending	  the	  pro-­‐cess	  slow	  and	  less	  efficient.	  I	  assume	  that	  the	  higher	  the	  number	  of	  veto	  players,	  the	  higher	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  will	  be,	  since	  the	  cost	  to	  interfere	  with	  courts	  and	  judges	  functions	  is	  higher	  as	  well.	  This	  variable	  is	  operationalized	  using	  the	  number	  of	  veto	  players	  in	  a	  political	  system.	  The	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idea	  is	  that	  the	  higher	  the	  number	  of	  actors	  to	  check	  on	  other	  actors,	  the	  lower	  the	  number	  of	  con-­‐stitutional	  violations,	  particularly	  against	  courts	  and	  judges.	  I	  use	  Beck,	  Clarke,	  Groff,	  Keefer,	  &	  Walsh	  (2000)	  measure.	  The	  variable	  is	  measured	  in	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  to	  6.	  
Another	  possible	  determinant	  in	  the	  variance	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  is	  the	  age	  of	  constitution.	  The	  longer	  institutions	  are	  in	  place,	  the	  more	  likely	  rules	  are	  to	  be	  implemented,	  ob-­‐served,	  and	  followed.	  According	  to	  Carey	  (2000),	  institutions	  can	  generate	  shared	  expectations	  about	  how	  others	  will	  behave.	  These	  expectations	  exist	  when	  formal	  institutions	  are	  embedded	  in	  the	  actions	  of	  power	  holders.	  The	  embedment	  process	  takes	  time	  thus	  I	  expect	  to	  find	  that	  younger	  constitutions	  have	  not	  been	  fully	  institutionalized	  to	  create	  sufficient	  expectation	  to	  enhancing	  ju-­‐dicial	  independence.	  I	  create	  a	  variable	  of	  the	  years	  all	  the	  constitutions	  from	  1984	  to	  2009.	  
All	  those	  variables	  exist	  in	  different	  government	  regimes.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  in-­‐clude	  in	  which	  type	  of	  regime	  those	  features	  take	  place.	  I	  then	  expect	  that	  judicial	  independence	  will	  be	  higher	  in	  democratic	  regimes.	  Here,	  political	  institutions	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  obey	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  game	  under	  democracy.	  In	  democratic	  regimes,	  the	  constitution	  is	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  game	  and	  po-­‐litical	  actors	  who	  decide	  to	  violate	  it	  can	  have	  reduced	  his	  or	  her	  chances	  to	  be	  reelected.	  It	  is	  also	  under	  democratic	  regimes	  that	  procedures	  are	  followed,	  therefore,	  political	  actors	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  follow	  the	  process	  of	  judicial	  appointment	  and	  removal,	  guarantee	  the	  judiciary’s	  budget	  and	  re-­‐frain	  from	  diminish	  judges	  and	  courts	  protections.	  I	  use	  here	  a	  measure	  that	  combines	  average	  val-­‐ues	  of	  the	  Freedom	  House	  scores	  and	  Polity.	  Scale	  ranges	  from	  0-­‐10	  where	  0	  is	  least	  democratic	  and	  10	  most	  democratic.	  Hadenius	  and	  Teorell	  (2005)	  show	  that	  this	  average	  index	  performs	  better	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  validity	  and	  reliability	  than	  its	  constituent	  parts.	  Also	  say	  that	  democracy	  here	  is	  not	  measured	  whether	  it	  is	  democratic	  or	  not,	  but	  degree	  of	  democracy.	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In	  addition	  to	  the	  alternative	  explanations,	  I	  control	  for	  population	  size	  and	  GDP	  per	  capita.	  I	  use	  the	  Unites	  Nations	  country	  population	  report	  to	  measure	  population	  size.	  For	  GDP	  per	  capita,	  I	  use	  the	  IMF	  country	  year	  report.	  	  
Assessing	  the	  Impact	  of	  Political	  Institutions	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  the	  type	  of	  electoral	  system,	  the	  number	  of	  chambers	  in	  the	  federal	  legis-­‐lature,	  and	  the	  type	  of	  government	  system	  provide	  an	  additional	  stimuli	  to	  the	  level	  of	  independ-­‐ence	  courts	  and	  judges	  exercise	  in	  practice.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  first	  replicate	  my	  previous	  findings	  on	  the	  influence	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  on	  the	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  I	  use	  an	  Ordered	  Probit	  Model	  since	  the	  dependent	  variable,	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence,	  is	  an	  ordered,	  trichoto-­‐mous	  variable.	  Following	  the	  Ordered	  Probit	  Model,	  I	  use	  SPost.	  SPost	  (Long	  and	  Freese	  2001)	  are	  commands	  in	  STATA	  generated	  to	  help	  interpret	  categorical	  dependent	  variable	  models.	  I	  use	  pre-­‐dict	  probabilities,	  which	  models	  the	  probability	  of	  an	  event	  to	  occur.	  Thus,	  I	  look	  at	  the	  probability	  of	  these	  political	  institutions—federalism,	  bicameralism,	  and	  proportional	  system—to	  produce	  de	  
facto	  independent,	  partially	  independent	  and	  dependent	  courts.	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  is	  the	  likeli-­‐hood	  to	  find	  a	  de	  facto	  independent	  court	  in	  a	  federally	  divided,	  bicameral,	  proportional	  system?	  	  	  















Table	  2.1:	  Parameter	  Estimates	  for	  de	  facto	  Judicial	  Independence	  
Variables	   Coefficient	   Std.	  Errors	   z	   p-­‐value	  
De	  Jure	  Judicial	  Independ-­‐
ence	   .087	   .033	   2.61	   .009	  
Age	  of	  Constitution	   .002	   .002	   .90	   .366	  
Number	  of	  Veto	  Players	   -­‐.215	   .047	   -­‐4.58	   .000	  
Level	  of	  Democracy	   .363	   .039	   9.37	   .000	  
Government	  System	   -­‐.306	   .124	   -­‐2.46	   .014	  
Bicameral	   .363	   .122	   2.91	   .004	  
Type	  of	  Electoral	  System	   .354	   .118	   3.00	   .003	  
Population	   3.33e-­‐09	   1.65e-­‐09	   2.02	   .043	  
GDP/pc	   -­‐.000	   .000	   -­‐1.26	   .206	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Log	  Likelihood	  =	  -­‐406.395	   	   	   	   	  
Chi-­‐Square	  (9)	  =	  144.80	  
N	  =	  490	   	   	   	   	  	  As	  seen	  in	  Table	  2,	  all	  independent	  variables	  are	  statistically	  significant	  except	  for	  Age	  of	  the	  Constitution	  and	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  per	  capita.	  Given	  the	  relative	  immaturity	  of	  Latin	  Ameri-­‐can	  constitutions	  (the	  average	  age	  is	  only	  28.61	  years),	  these	  results	  suggest	  that	  what	  really	  mat-­‐ters	  is	  the	  content	  of	  the	  constitution	  rather	  than	  its	  relative	  age.	  Alternatively,	  de	  jure	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence,	  the	  type	  of	  electoral	  system,	  the	  type	  of	  government	  system,	  and	  whether	  the	  legislature	  is	  bicameral	  are	  all	  constitutional	  provisions	  that	  affect	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  	  
Do	  Constitutions	  Shape	  the	  Government?	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  assess	  whether	  constitutional	  provisions	  related	  to	  government	  framework	  matter.	  The	  conventional	  wisdom	  is	  that	  constitutional	  provisions	  affect	  the	  level	  of	  de	  
facto	  judicial	  independence	  judges	  and	  courts	  exercise.	  Thus,	  my	  test	  is	  that	  federally	  arranged	  sys-­‐tems	  increase	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  In	  federalist	  states,	  power	  is	  allocated	  to	  different	  layers	  of	  government,	  reducing	  political	  actors	  influences	  on	  courts.	  Second,	  I	  test	  the	  ef-­‐fect	  of	  two	  chambers	  in	  the	  federal	  legislature	  increase	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  exercised	  by	  the	  judiciary.	  Table	  3	  illustrates	  this	  hypothesis.	  Lastly,	  I	  posit	  that	  in	  proportional	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electoral	  systems	  courts	  and	  judges	  have	  higher	  judicial	  independence	  than	  in	  any	  other	  electoral	  system,	  i.e.,	  majoritarian	  systems.	  Proportional	  electoral	  rules	  contribute	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  multiple	  parties,	  therefore	  creating	  more	  veto	  players.	  In	  these	  electoral	  systems,	  coalitions	  have	  to	  be	  formed	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  about	  any	  change.	  	  The	  hypotheses	  test	  the	  impact	  of	  constitutional	  frameworks	  on	  courts	  and	  judges’	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  These	  constitutional	  frameworks—federalism,	  electoral	  design,	  and	  bicam-­‐eralism	  –shape	  the	  way	  the	  three	  branches	  of	  the	  government	  will	  interact	  with	  each	  other.	  This	  paper	  posits	  that	  a	  federal	  government	  system,	  with	  two	  legislative	  chambers,	  and	  a	  proportional	  electoral	  system	  allow	  courts	  to	  freely	  exercise	  their	  functions.	  	  The	  hypotheses	  tests	  are	  illustrated	  in	  three	  separate	  tables.	  They	  provide	  the	  predicted	  probabilities	  of	  finding	  different	  levels	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  given	  each	  of	  those	  institu-­‐tional	  features	  –	  federalism,	  bicameralism,	  and	  electoral	  system.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  demonstrate	  how	  likely	  we	  are	  to	  find,	  for	  instance,	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independent	  court	  in	  countries	  with	  federal-­‐ist	  systems.	  To	  interpret	  the	  three	  tables,	  I	  use	  the	  95%	  confidence	  interval	  to	  assess	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  predicted	  probabilities.	  If	  the	  95%	  confidence	  interval	  crosses	  zero,	  more	  specifically,	  the	  pa-­‐rameter	  value	  specified	  in	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  is	  within	  the	  95%	  interval,	  then	  the	  effect	  is	  not	  sig-­‐nificant	  at	  the	  0.05	  level.	  Conversely,	  if	  zero	  is	  not	  within	  the	  interval,	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  can	  be	  rejected.	  These	  tables	  also	  show	  the	  predicted	  probabilities	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  as	  changes	  in	  the	  explanatory	  variables	  occur.	  Thus,	  the	  results	  show	  change	  in	  predicting	  de	  facto	  ju-­‐dicial	  independence	  as	  the	  explanatory	  variables	  change	  from	  0	  to	  1.	  Table	  2.2	  illustrates	  this	  claim,	  looking	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  federalism	  on	  all	  three	  levels	  of	  de	  fac-­‐





Table	  2.2:	  Predicted	  Probabilities	  of	  de	  jure	  Judicial	  Independence	  using	  Change	  in	  the	  Gov-­‐
ernment	  System	  from	  Unitary	  to	  Federal*	  
Categories	   Federal	   Unitary	   Change	   Conf.	  Interval	  Dependent	   0.2110	   0.1331	   0.0779	   [0.0200,	  0.1358]	  Partially	   0.6558	   0.6557	   0.0001	   [-­‐0.0137,	  0.0138]	  Independent	   0.1332	   0.2112	   -­‐0.0780	   [-­‐0.1432,	  0.0127]	  *All	  other	  variables	  are	  kept	  at	  their	  mean.	  The	  findings	  presented	  above	  provide	  the	  impact	  of	  federalism	  on	  de	  facto	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence.	  According	  to	  table	  2.2,	  a	  change	  in	  the	  government	  system	  from	  unitary	  to	  federal	  is	  like-­‐ly	  to	  predict	  dependent	  and	  fully	  independent	  courts,	  but	  not	  partially	  independent	  courts.	  	  This	  result	  also	  shows	  a	  different	  impact	  than	  the	  one	  initially	  hypothesized.	  Federalism	  is	  likely	  to	  predict	  de	  facto	  dependent	  courts,	  but	  less	  likely	  to	  predict	  de	  facto	  fully	  independent	  courts.	  The	  data	  show	  that	  changing	  from	  unitary	  to	  federalist	  system	  increased	  the	  likelihood	  to	  find	  a	  de-­‐
pendent	  court	  7.8%	  of	  the	  time	  but	  less	  likely	  to	  equally	  find	  fully	  independent	  courts.	  Thus,	  in	  Latin	  America	  countries,	  changing	  from	  unitary	  to	  federalist	  systems,	  increased	  the	  chance	  to	  find	  de	  fac-­‐
to	  dependent	  courts.	  Here	  is	  the	  reason	  for	  this	  finding.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  in	  these	  countries	  with	  partially	  independ-­‐
ent	  and	  fully	  independent	  courts	  what	  we	  really	  observe	  is	  what	  I	  call	  pseudo-­‐federalism.	  By	  pseudo-­‐federalism,	  I	  mean	  their	  constitutions	  provide	  a	  government	  framework	  of	  a	  federal	  system,	  there-­‐fore	  the	  constitution	  allocates	  power	  to	  federal	  and	  local	  levels	  of	  government;	  however,	  they	  func-­‐tion	  de	  facto	  as	  centralized	  governments.	  Thus,	  the	  federal	  level	  of	  government	  is	  very	  strong	  and	  usually	  has	  the	  power	  over	  local	  and	  subnational	  government’s	  economic	  and	  political	  structures.	  In	  developing	  countries,	  particularly	  in	  Latin	  American	  countries,	  local	  and	  subnational	  govern-­‐ments	  rely	  on	  fiscal	  redistribution	  (Bahl	  2000;	  Stein	  1999;	  Castro	  1993).	  This	  fiscal	  dependency	  allows	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  control	  local	  government	  interests.	  So	  the	  question	  is,	  what	  is	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  pseudo-­‐federalism	  on	  courts	  and	  judges’	  judicial	  independence?	  If	  it	  is	  true	  that	  a	  federalist	  system	  expands	  interests	  therefore	  making	  it	  difficult	  to	  main-­‐tain	  the	  status	  quo	  (Tsebelis	  1995:	  313-­‐314)	  then	  a	  pseudo-­‐federalist	  system	  where	  the	  federal	  gov-­‐
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ernment	  has	  more	  power	  and	  controls	  policy	  change,	  courts	  will	  have	  lower	  levels	  of	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence.	  This	  is	  clear	  in	  Latin	  American	  countries	  where	  the	  federal	  government	  has	  control	  over	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  agenda	  of	  local	  and	  subnational	  government	  (Bahl	  2000),	  decreasing	  considerably	  the	  number	  of	  power	  holders	  who	  could	  initiate	  any	  conflict.	  Thus,	  what	  we	  see	  is	  courts	  that	  are	  susceptible	  to	  political	  influence,	  particularly	  by	  a	  centralized	  federal	  government.	  This	  result	  does	  not	  deny	  my	  initial	  hypothesis	  that	  federalism	  increases	  the	  level	  of	  judicial	  independence.	  However,	  it	  may	  suggest	  that	  the	  type	  of	  federalism	  existing	  in	  Latin	  American	  coun-­‐tries	  –	  a	  pseudo-­‐federalism	  –	  has	  the	  same	  impact	  on	  courts’	  judicial	  independence	  as	  unitary	  sys-­‐tems.	  	  Courts	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  their	  budget	  manipulated,	  their	  decisions	  overturned,	  and	  their	  structured	  shaped	  by	  few	  power	  holders	  in	  a	  unitary	  system	  where	  we	  see	  centralized	  power	  and	  less	  veto	  players.	  This	  finding	  is	  particularly	  important	  to	  countries	  that	  are	  building	  or	  rebuilding	  their	  gov-­‐ernment	  structure.	  The	  conventional	  recommended	  structure	  is	  the	  use	  of	  federalism	  (Linz	  1997;	  Meyerson	  2009).	  Violations	  of	  such	  separation	  create	  tensions	  between	  the	  federal	  and	  the	  local	  governments.	  This	  tension	  has	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  courts.	  As	  suggested	  by	  Tsebelis	  (1995,	  p.	  323),	  political	  systems	  with	  “multiple	  incongruent	  and	  cohesive	  veto	  players	  political	  systems”	  in	  over-­‐ruling	  court	  decision,	  thereby	  enhancing	  their	  independence.	  	  The	  findings	  of	  this	  study,	  however,	  caution	  that	  federalism	  should	  be	  fully	  implemented	  in	  order	  to	  work	  as	  desired.	  Latin	  American	  countries	  are	  an	  example	  of	  pseudo-­‐federalism	  because	  what	  we	  really	  see	  is	  a	  strong	  central	  gov-­‐ernment	  and	  weak	  and	  fiscally	  dependent	  local	  and	  subnational	  governments.	  	  	  Table	  2.3	  depicts	  the	  effect	  of	  bicameral	  systems	  on	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  	  	  
Table	  2.3:	  Predicted	  Probabilities	  of	  de	  jure	  Judicial	  Independence	  using	  Change	  on	  the	  
Number	  of	  Federal	  Chambers	  from	  Unicameral	  to	  Bicameral*	  
Categories	   Bicameral	   Unicameral	   Change	   Conf.	  Interval	  Dependent	   0.1517	   0.2336	   -­‐0.0819	   [-­‐0.1477,	  -­‐0.0162]	  Partially	   0.6603	   0.6488	   0.0114	   [-­‐0.0021,	  0.0249]	  Independent	   0.1881	   0.1176	   0.0705	   [0.0154,	  0.1256]	  *All	  other	  variables	  are	  kept	  at	  their	  mean.	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Table	  2.4:	  Predicted	  Probabilities	  of	  de	  jure	  Judicial	  Independence	  using	  Change	  on	  the	  Elec-­‐
toral	  System	  Non-­‐Proportional	  to	  Proportional*	  
Categories	   Proportional	   Non-­‐proportional	   Change	   Conf.	  Interval	  
Dependent	   0.1423	   0.2282	   -­‐0.0859	   [-­‐0.1458,	  	  -­‐0.0260]	  
Partially	   0.6584	   0.6488	   0.0077	   [-­‐0.0068,	  0.0223]	  
Independent	   0.1992	   0.1211	   0.0781	   [0.0223,	  0.1340]	  *All	  other	  variables	  are	  kept	  at	  their	  mean.	  The	  findings	  presented	  above	  provide	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  type	  of	  electoral	  system	  on	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  courts.	  According	  to	  table	  2.4,	  a	  change	  from	  non-­‐proportional	  to	  propor-­‐tional	  systems	  has	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  courts	  that	  are	  dependent	  and	  fully	  independent,	  but	  not	  those	  that	  are	  partially	  independent.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  we	  were	  to	  change	  the	  type	  of	  electoral	  sys-­‐tem	  of	  a	  country	  where	  courts	  are	  de	  facto	  partially	  independent,	  we	  would	  not	  see	  a	  significant	  im-­‐pact	  on	  the	  level	  of	  independence.	  	  The	  table	  also	  shows	  that	  proportional	  systems	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  predict	  de	  facto	  fully	  in-­‐
dependent	  courts.	  This	  finding	  is	  in	  agreement	  with	  the	  literature	  with	  regard	  to	  government	  capac-­‐ity	  to	  bring	  about	  changes	  in	  systems	  with	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  veto	  players	  (Tsebelis	  1995).	  In	  party	  systems	  where	  there	  are	  a	  high	  number	  of	  parties,	  changes	  can	  only	  occur	  by	  building	  coali-­‐tions.	  Proportional	  systems	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  protect	  courts	  from	  arbitrary	  political	  decisions,	  thus	  increasing	  courts	  independence.	  
Conclusion	  This	  paper	  seeks	  to	  explore	  the	  impact	  of	  three	  constitutional	  frameworks–federalism,	  elec-­‐toral	  system	  and	  bicameralism—on	  courts	  and	  judges’	  judicial	  independence.	  The	  findings	  suggest	  that	  proportional	  electoral	  systems	  with	  bicameral	  legislatures	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  produce	  inde-­‐pendent	  courts.	  With	  regard	  to	  federalism,	  the	  findings	  do	  not	  conform	  my	  hypothesis.	  This	  may	  be	  because	  of	  the	  particular	  characteristic	  of	  Latin	  American	  countries	  federalist	  structure.	  In	  these	  countries,	  what	  we	  see	  is	  a	  form	  of	  pseudo-­‐federalism	  in	  which	  sometimes	  local	  and	  subnational	  governments	  have	  some	  power,	  but	  often	  times	  they	  heavily	  rely	  on	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  function.	  This	  dynamic	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  courts	  and	  judges	  judicial	  independence.	  Courts	  are	  more	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likely	  to	  survive	  in	  systems	  where	  the	  status	  quo	  is	  not	  easily	  changed	  (Tsebelis	  1995).	  The	  reason	  being	  in	  a	  structure	  where	  there	  is	  a	  higher	  number	  of	  veto	  players,	  more	  check	  points	  lower	  arbi-­‐trary	  influences	  on	  the	  court.	  	  This	  paper	  contributes	  to	  the	  literature	  by	  expanding	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  constitutional	  gov-­‐ernment	  frameworks	  on	  courts	  and	  judges’	  judicial	  independence.	  Previous	  literature	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  these	  provisions	  on	  economic	  and	  political	  areas.	  However,	  they	  have	  fallen	  short	  in	  explaining	  the	  impact	  on	  courts.	  This	  study	  brings	  the	  courts	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  academic	  study,	  since	  they	  are	  a	  fundamental	  player	  in	  the	  political	  structure.	  It	  shows	  that	  political	  structures	  af-­‐fect	  courts	  independence,	  shaping	  their	  structure,	  organizations,	  and	  outcomes.	  Furthermore,	  the	  contribution	  of	  this	  paper	  goes	  beyond	  the	  theoretical	  understanding	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  and	  judicial	  independence.	  It	  suggests	  that	  we	  need	  to	  think	  thorough	  on	  what	  types	  of	  government	  structures	  should	  be	  build	  to	  create	  independent	  courts.	  In	  countries	  where	  constitutions	  are	  still	  being	  drafted	  or	  revised,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  create	  an	  environment	  that	  fosters	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  To	  do	  that,	  independent	  courts	  should	  exist	  so	  they	  can	  freely	  exercise	  their	  functions.	  This	  paper	  suggests	  that	  considering	  the	  countries	  social,	  economic,	  and	  legal	  character-­‐istics,	  a	  proportional	  electoral	  system	  with	  bicameral	  legislature	  foster	  judicial	  independence.	  Moreover,	  in	  looking	  at	  Latin	  American	  countries,	  their	  pseudo-­‐federalism	  and	  unitary	  systems	  cre-­‐ate	  de	  facto	  dependent	  courts.	  This	  suggests	  that	  constitutional	  arrangements	  should	  be	  in	  place	  to	  create	  a	  more	  decentralized	  power,	  building	  true	  federal	  systems.	  In	  sum,	  this	  paper	  provides	  to	  promoters	  of	  democracy	  and	  constitutional	  designers	  an	  outline	  of	  governmental	  frameworks	  that	  create	  more	  independent	  courts.	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Appendix	  A	  
	   Government	  System	   Electoral	  System	   Number	  of	  Chambers	  
Argentina	   Federal	   Proportional	   Bicameral	  
Bolivia	   Unitary	  (1984-­‐1994)	  Federal	  (1995-­‐2009)	   Non-­‐proportional	   Bicameral	  
Brazil	   Federal	   Non-­‐proportional	   Bicameral	  
Chile	   Unitary	  (1984-­‐1991)	  Federal	  (1992-­‐2009)	   Non-­‐proportional	   Bicameral	  
Colombia	   Unitary	  (1984-­‐1991)	  Federal	  (1992-­‐2009)	   Proportional	   Bicameral	  
Costa	  Rica	   Unitary	   Proportional	   Unicameral	  
Dominican	  Republic	   Federal	  (1984-­‐1994)	  Unitary	  (1995-­‐2009)	   Non-­‐proportional	   Bicameral	  
Ecuador	   Federal	   Proportional	   Unicameral	  
El	  Salvador	   Unitary	  (1984-­‐1994)	  Federal	  (1995-­‐2009)	   Proportional	   Unicameral	  
Guatemala	   Unitary	  (1984-­‐1986)	  Federal	  (1987-­‐2009)	   Non-­‐proportional	   Unicameral	  
Haiti	   Unitary	  (1984-­‐1994)	  Federal	  (1995-­‐2009)	   Non-­‐proportional	   Bicameral	  
Honduras	   Unitary	  (1984-­‐1994)	  Federal	  (1995-­‐2009)	   Non-­‐proportional	   Unicameral	  
Mexico	   Federal	   Non-­‐proportional	   Bicameral	  
Nicaragua	   Unitary	   Proportional	   Unicameral	  
Panama	   Unitary	  (1984-­‐1994)	  Federal	  (1995-­‐2009)	   Non-­‐proportional	   Unicameral	  
Paraguay	   Federal	   Proportional	   Bicameral	  
Peru	   Unitary	  (1984-­‐1993)	  Federal	  (1994-­‐2009)	   Non-­‐proportional	   Bicameral	  (1984-­‐1994)	  Unicameral	  (1995-­‐2009)	  
Uruguay	   Unitary	  (1984-­‐1985)	  Federal	  (1986-­‐2009)	   Proportional	   Bicameral	  
Venezuela	   Federal	   Non-­‐proportional	   Bicameral	  (1984-­‐1999)	  Unicameral	  (2000-­‐2009)	  *Non-­‐proportional	  includes	  all	  other	  electoral	  rules,	  such	  as	  plurality,	  majority,	  and	  mixed	  rules.	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Introduction	  During	  the	  democratization	  process	  in	  Latin	  American	  countries,	  the	  first	  step	  in	  the	  transi-­‐tion	  from	  authoritarianism	  to	  democracy	  was	  to	  draft	  a	  new	  constitution.	  These	  constitutions	  were	  supposed	  to	  outline	  the	  structures	  of	  the	  government,	  their	  functions,	  and	  limitations	  and	  to	  safe-­‐guard	  emerging	  democratic	  regimes.	  As	  a	  result,	  many	  of	  the	  constitutions	  of	  Latin	  American	  coun-­‐tries	  are	  long,	  detailed,	  and	  complex	  prescriptions	  for	  how	  to	  operate	  a	  democratic	  country.	  Brazil	  is	  a	  prototypical	  example.	  The	  1988	  Brazilian	  constitution	  covers	  almost	  everything	  and	  everybody.	  It	  specifies	  extensive	  constitutional	  rights,	  including	  individual,	  social,	  and	  cultural	  rights;	  and	  it	  reallocates	  a	  number	  of	  powers	  to	  Congress,	  removing	  them	  from	  the	  President.	  In	  addition,	  it	  pro-­‐vides	  numerous	  provisions	  intended	  to	  safeguard	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  federal	  judiciary.	  	  This	  paper	  explores	  the	  1988	  Brazilian	  Constitution,	  focusing	  on	  its	  role	  in	  protecting	  the	  Brazilian	  judiciary,	  and	  creating	  independent	  courts.	  Studies	  show	  that	  there	  is	  a	  relationship	  be-­‐tween	  constitutional	  provisions	  and	  judicial	  independence	  (Elster	  2000;	  Ferejohn,	  Rakove	  and	  Ri-­‐ley	  2001;	  Ferehohn	  1997;	  Lijphart	  and	  Waisman	  1996).	  In	  these	  studies,	  constitutions	  shield	  the	  judiciary	  by	  providing	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  independence.	  My	  study	  enters	  this	  investiga-­‐tion	  and	  seeks	  to	  further	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  judicial	  independence.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  case	  of	  Brazil,	  I	  explore	  how	  the	  1988	  Brazilian	  constitution	  protects	  the	  judiciary,	  allowing	  courts	  to	  freely	  exercise	  their	  functions.	  	  The	  investigation	  involves	  using	  my	  recent	  study	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  independence	  on	  the	  de	  facto	  level	  of	  judicial	  independence	  in	  19	  Latin	  American	  countries.	  Overall,	  I	  found	  that	  constitutional	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  independence	  have	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  courts’	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  I	  used	  two	  different	  models	  to	  investigate	  the	  impact	  of	  such	  de	  jure	  provisions:	  the	  first	  assessed	  the	  provisions	  in	  combination	  using	  an	  additive	  index,	  while	  the	  second	  looked	  at	  each	  provision	  independently.	  First,	  I	  find	  that	  the	  more	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  independence	  contained	  in	  a	  country’s	  constitution,	  the	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higher	  the	  degree	  of	  independence	  courts	  and	  judges	  exercise	  in	  practice.	  And,	  I	  also	  find	  that	  cer-­‐tain	  thresholds	  in	  terms	  of	  numbers	  of	  provisions	  work	  to	  guarantee	  that	  courts	  are	  either	  partially	  or	  fully	  independent.	  	  Second,	  looking	  at	  the	  individual	  provisions	  concerning	  judicial	  independence,	  I	  found	  that	  certain	  provisions	  were	  necessary	  to	  minimally	  guarantee	  partially	  independent	  courts.	  Specifically,	  I	  found	  that	  tenure,	  removal,	  fiscal	  autonomy,	  accessibility,	  separation	  of	  power,	  and	  judicial	  review	  provisions	  are	  necessary	  to	  keep	  courts	  from	  becoming	  dependent	  in	  practice.	  I	  also	  suggested	  that	  courts	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  fully	  independent	  if	  two	  of	  these	  provisions	  are	  in	  place	  –	  accessibility	  and	  removal	  procedures.	  	  This	  paper	  extends	  the	  analysis	  conducted	  in	  my	  study	  by	  offering	  a	  single-­‐country	  case	  study	  of	  Brazil.	  It	  explores	  the	  link	  between	  Brazilian	  constitutional	  provisions	  and	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence.	  In	  my	  previous,	  the	  goal	  was	  to	  explore	  whether	  there	  was	  a	  relationship	  between	  con-­‐stitutional	  provisions	  and	  judicial	  independence.	  Here,	  I	  investigate	  how	  this	  link	  happens.	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  it	  is	  specifically	  provided	  in	  these	  constitutional	  texts	  that	  protect	  courts	  against	  ex-­‐ternal	  influences.	  	  To	  investigate	  how	  the	  text	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  contributes	  to	  the	  judiciary	  inde-­‐pendence,	  the	  1988	  Brazilian	  constitution.	  I	  specifically	  investigate	  how	  six	  constitutional	  provi-­‐sions	  -­‐	  fiscal	  autonomy,	  the	  power	  of	  judicial	  review,	  accessibility	  to	  the	  courts,	  separation	  of	  pow-­‐er,	  and	  removal	  procedures	  and	  length	  of	  judgeship	  –	  operate	  in	  Brazil	  to	  ensure	  that	  courts	  can	  function	  without	  undue	  political	  influence.	  These	  particular	  provisions	  are	  investigated	  here	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  a	  number	  of	  previous	  studies	  of	  Brazilian	  courts	  (Taylor	  2008;	  Castro	  1993;	  Arantes	  2005;	  Santiso	  2003;	  Rios-­‐Figueroa	  and	  Taylor	  2006)	  have	  pointed	  out	  their	  importance	  in	  the	  protection	  of	  Brazilian	  courts.	  These	  studies	  suggest	  that	  the	  1998	  Constitution	  provided	  great	  protection	  to	  Brazilian	  courts.	  Second,	  as	  noted	  above,	  these	  provisions	  were	  those	  found	  by	  Dias	  (2013)	  to	  significantly	  influence	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  country’s	  courts	  being	  considered	  at	  least	  par-­‐
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tially	  independent.	  Second,	  as	  noted	  above,	  these	  provisions	  were	  those	  found	  by	  my	  previous	  study	  to	  significantly	  influence	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  country’s	  courts	  being	  considered	  at	  least	  partial-­‐ly	  independent.	  	  This	  paper	  is	  divided	  into	  three	  sections.	  First,	  I	  define	  judicial	  independence	  and	  discuss	  the	  importance	  of	  studying	  of	  judicial	  independence.	  Moreover,	  I	  examine	  previous	  studies	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  on	  courts	  and	  judges’	  independence,	  in-­‐cluding	  Dias	  (2013).	  The	  second	  section	  focuses	  on	  my	  previous	  study,	  linking	  my	  previous	  findings	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  on	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judi-­‐cial	  independence	  to	  the	  Brazilian	  case.	  To	  do	  that,	  the	  paper	  will	  use	  elite	  interviews	  as	  well	  as	  other	  sources	  to	  give	  context	  to	  these	  findings.	  I	  explore	  how	  the	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence	  in	  the	  1988	  Constitution	  guarantee	  independence	  to	  Brazilian	  courts.	  Section	  three	  con-­‐cludes	  and	  provides	  suggestions	  for	  future	  research	  
Defining	  Judicial	  Independence	  	  At	  the	  outset,	  a	  definition	  of	  judicial	  independence	  is	  important	  before	  exploring	  the	  link	  between	  judicial	  independence	  and	  constitutional	  provisions.	  What	  exactly	  is	  judicial	  independ-­‐ence?	  What	  does	  it	  mean	  for	  a	  judiciary	  to	  be	  independent?	  Constitutional	  provisions	  protect	  courts	  from	  interfering	  by	  other	  branches	  of	  government	  and	  public	  opinion;	  however,	  this	  is	  rarely	  static.	  Therefore,	  there	  are	  times	  when	  the	  courts	  are	  fully	  independent.	  At	  other	  times,	  despite	  constitu-­‐tional	  provisions,	  courts	  my	  act	  less	  independently.	  Because	  of	  this	  relativism	  and	  variations	  in	  structural	  and	  institutional	  design,	  judicial	  independence	  has	  been	  difficult	  to	  conceptualize.	  De-­‐spite	  its	  difficulties,	  judicial	  independence	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  relation	  to	  two	  dimensions:	  impar-­‐tiality	  and	  autonomy	  or	  political	  insularity	  (Fiss,	  1993;	  Rios-­‐Figueroa	  and	  Taylor,	  2006;	  Larkins,	  1996;	  Keith,	  Tate,	  and	  Poe	  2009).	  	  Although	  some	  scholars	  have	  defined	  judicial	  independence	  us-­‐ing	  only	  one	  of	  those	  components,	  others	  have	  suggested	  that	  a	  more	  accurate	  definition	  of	  judicial	  independence	  should	  assess	  both	  (Rios-­‐Figueroa	  and	  Taylor,	  2006;	  Larkins,	  1996).	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For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  will	  adopt	  a	  definition	  of	  judicial	  independence	  proposed	  by	  Larkins:	  	  
Judicial	  independence	  refers	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  judges	  who	  are	  not	  manipulated	  for	  
political	  gain,	  who	  are	  impartial	  toward	  the	  parties	  of	  a	  dispute,	  and	  who	  form	  a	  ju-­‐
dicial	  branch	  which	  has	  the	  power	  as	  an	   institution	  to	  regulate	  the	   legality	  of	  gov-­‐
ernment	   behavior,	   enact	   “neutral”	   justice,	   and	   determine	   significant	   constitutional	  
and	  legal	  values	  (Larkins,	  1996,	  611).	  	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  research,	  Larkins’s	  definition	  of	  judicial	  independence	  is	  the	  most	  appropriate	  because	  the	  definition	  gives	  a	  comprehensive	  explanation	  of	  what	  judicial	  independ-­‐ence	  means	  and	  how	  constitutional	  provisions	  foster	  judicial	  independence.	  	  Larkins	  definition	  is	  comprehensive	  because	  it	  refers	  to	  judges’	  behavior	  (impartiality),	  third	  parties’	  behavior	  toward	  the	  judges	  (autonomy),	  and	  courts	  as	  an	  institution	  (political	  insular-­‐ity).	  Thus,	  ‘the	  existence	  of	  judges	  who	  are	  not	  manipulated	  for	  political	  gains’	  is	  related	  to	  judges’	  autonomy	  and	  the	  level	  of	  influence	  political	  branches	  have	  over	  their	  decisions.	  Insularity	  requires	  that	  the	  judiciary	  be	  independent	  from	  the	  other	  political	  branches	  and	  the	  public	  in	  general.	  Politi-­‐cal	  insularity	  protects	  judges	  so	  they	  can	  hand	  in	  unpopular	  decisions.	  It	  also	  shields	  the	  courts	  from	  threats	  that	  might	  compromise	  impartiality	  (Fiss	  1993:	  58).	  Whereas	  impartiality	  is	  related	  to	  a	  judge’s	  independence	  ability	  to	  resolve	  disputes	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  law	  (Becker	  1970,	  1-­‐8),	  political	  insularity	  requires	  that	  the	  judiciary	  be	  free	  from	  any	  political	  influence.	  Moreover,	  politi-­‐cal	  insularity	  is	  related	  to	  the	  power	  of	  courts	  to	  have	  their	  decision	  implemented	  (Fiss	  1993;	  Rios-­‐Figueroa	  &	  Staton	  2009).	  Therefore,	  judicial	  independence	  requires	  that	  judicial	  decisions	  are	  re-­‐spected	  and	  implemented	  and	  that	  courts	  are	  free	  from	  government	  constraints	  and	  constitutional	  encroachments.	  Moreover,	  Larkins’	  definition	  hints	  at	  the	  role	  constitutions	  play	  in	  guaranteeing	  judges’	  impartiality.	  Constitutional	  provisions	  that	  intend	  to	  create	  impartial	  judges	  will	  not	  allow	  domi-­‐nant	  members	  of	  society	  to	  manipulate	  the	  judicial	  system	  to	  serve	  their	  own	  interests.	  Additional-­‐ly,	  judicial	  independence	  plays	  a	  critical	  role	  when	  the	  government	  is	  a	  party	  in	  the	  case.	  Constitu-­‐
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tional	  provisions	  should	  protect	  courts	  from	  fear	  manipulation,	  threats,	  or	  punishment	  for	  not	  rul-­‐ing	  in	  the	  government’s	  favor.	  Therefore,	  impartiality	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence	  because	  it	  captures	  the	  idea	  that	  judges	  will	  make	  their	  decision	  based	  on	  the	  law	  and	  that	  the	  courts	  will	  not	  be	  unduly	  influenced	  by	  the	  government	  or	  parties	  involved	  (Despouy,	  2009;	  Ferejohn,	  1998;	  Fiss,	  1993).	  	  Finally,	  Larkins’	  definition	  is	  instrumental	  to	  this	  research	  because	  it	  includes	  the	  judicial	  branch	  as	  an	  institution	  of	  government,	  which	  ‘has	  the	  power	  to	  regulate	  the	  legality	  of	  government	  behavior,	  enact	  ‘neutral’	  justice,	  and	  determine	  significant	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  values.’	  It	  em-­‐phasizes	  the	  position	  of	  the	  courts	  within	  the	  larger	  political	  system	  and	  their	  functional	  relation-­‐ship	  with	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  government.	  It	  is	  only	  by	  taking	  courts	  as	  a	  whole	  that	  we	  can	  in-­‐clude	  indicators	  such	  as	  institutional	  legitimacy	  or	  separation	  of	  powers	  to	  measure	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence.	  
Theoretical	  Framework	  This	  study	  investigates	  whether	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  can	  shield	  the	  judiciary	  from	  other	  political	  influences,	  using	  the	  1988	  Brazilian	  Constitution	  as	  its	  fo-­‐cus.	  Previous	  studies	  established	  a	  relationship	  between	  judicial	  independence	  and	  provisions	  re-­‐garding	  courts	  and	  judicial	  independence,	  i.e.,	  removal	  and	  appointment	  procedures	  (Verner	  1984;	  Dahl	  1958).	  Independent	  courts	  are	  free	  to	  protect	  individuals’	  rights.	  Judicial	  independence	  allows	  for	  the	  safeguarding	  of	  the	  constitution	  against	  government	  abuses.	  The	  importance	  of	  studying	  judicial	  independence	  increases	  as	  the	  judicialization	  of	  politics	  in	  developing	  countries	  and	  overre-­‐liance	  on	  the	  courts	  increase.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  exercise	  rule	  of	  law	  there	  must	  be	  judicial	  independence.	  In	  an	  evaluation	  report	  for	  the	  United	  States	  Agency	  for	  International	  Development,	  Blue	  (1999)	  explains	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  “embodies	  the	  basic	  principles	  of	  equal	  treatment	  of	  all	  people	  before	  the	  law,	  fairness,	  and	  both	  constitutional	  and	  actual	  guarantees	  of	  basic	  human	  rights;	  it	  is	  founded	  on	  a	  predictable,	  transpar-­‐
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ent	  legal	  system	  with	  fair	  and	  effective	  judicial	  institutions	  to	  protect	  citizens	  against	  the	  arbitrary	  use	  of	  state	  authority	  and	  lawless	  acts	  of	  both	  organizations	  and	  individuals”	  (13).	  Thus,	  independ-­‐ent	  courts	  are	  insulated	  from	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  the	  government	  and	  use	  the	  law	  to	  adjudicate	  cases.	  	  
The	  biggest	  threats	  to	  courts	  are	  the	  existing	  executive,	  legislative	  and	  bureaucratic	  struc-­‐tures.	  As	  regulators	  and	  controllers	  of	  government	  power,	  only	  independent	  courts	  can	  restrain	  potentially	  tyrannical	  actions.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  that	  judges	  are	  impar-­‐tial.	  The	  principle	  of	  “equal	  treatment	  of	  all	  people	  before	  the	  law”	  requires	  independent	  judiciaries.	  Independent	  judges	  adjudicate	  cases	  by	  adhering	  to	  or	  overthrowing	  precedent	  rather	  than	  consid-­‐ering	  personal	  interests	  in	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  case.	  In	  practice,	  judicial	  independence	  means	  courts	  and	  judges	  function	  free	  from	  outside	  influences.	  	  	  
A	  final	  reason	  for	  investigating	  the	  determinants	  of	  judicial	  independence	  is	  the	  recent	  in-­‐crease	  in	  the	  judicialization	  of	  politics.	  The	  increasing	  role	  of	  courts	  in	  the	  political	  system	  has	  raised	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  such	  involvement	  is	  due	  to	  an	  increasing	  independence.	  Judicializa-­‐tion	  of	  politics	  involves	  the	  reliance	  on	  the	  courts	  to	  resolve	  conflicts	  that	  were	  historically	  the	  role	  of	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  the	  government,	  i.e.,	  executive	  and	  legislative	  (Sieder,	  Schjolden,	  and	  Angell	  2005).	  It	  is	  the	  displacement	  of	  policy-­‐making	  process	  from	  politics	  to	  the	  legal	  system	  (Taylor	  2008;	  Iaryczower,	  Spiller,	  &	  Tommasi	  2002;	  Rios-­‐Figureroa	  &	  Taylor	  2006;	  Santiso	  2003).	  This	  phenomenon	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  mistrust	  of	  these	  emerging	  countries	  on	  their	  political	  system,	  coupled	  with	  and	  increased	  perception	  that	  courts	  are	  more	  independent	  thus	  more	  likely	  to	  hand	  fair	  decisions	  (Carvalho	  2009).	  Thus,	  the	  examination	  of	  judicial	  independence	  helps	  understand	  the	  increasing	  judicialization	  of	  politics.	  	  
In	  Latin	  America,	  the	  increasing	  reliance	  on	  courts	  makes	  an	  examination	  of	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence	  pertinent.	  If	  courts	  are	  to	  interpret	  the	  laws	  and	  participate	  more	  frequently	  in	  the	  pro-­‐
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cess	  of	  policy-­‐making,	  it	  is	  important	  that	  they	  are	  free	  from	  political	  interferences.	  Over	  the	  last	  few	  decades,	  the	  democratization	  process	  in	  Latin	  American	  countries	  involved	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  constitutions	  (Hirschl	  2006).	  This	  trend	  required	  more	  participation	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  More	  constitu-­‐tional	  rights,	  more	  political	  issues,	  more	  accessibility	  to	  courts	  expanded	  the	  role	  of	  judicial	  review.	  In	  this	  new	  scenario,	  judicial	  independence	  brings	  about	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  to	  prevent	  arbitrary	  ac-­‐tions	  by	  the	  government,	  and	  to	  foster	  the	  democratization	  process	  (Rios-­‐Figueroa	  and	  Taylor	  2006).	  	  
The	  question	  now	  is	  how	  can	  independent	  courts	  be	  created?	  This	  study	  argues	  that	  judicial	  independence	  comes	  from	  constitutions.	  Through	  constitutional	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  inde-­‐pendence,	  courts	  are	  isolated	  from	  external	  influences.	  	  
Do	  Constitutions	  Matter?	  Conventional	  wisdom	  holds	  that	  constitutional	  arrangement	  are	  automatically	  enforced,	  denoting	  that	  formal	  institutions,	  such	  as	  written	  constitutions,	  can	  shape	  the	  way	  others	  behave	  (Carey	  2000).	  While	  in	  developed	  countries	  constitutions	  are	  often	  enforced,	  the	  same	  cannot	  be	  said	  of	  developing	  countries	  (Larkins	  1996;	  Pozas-­‐Loyo	  and	  Ríos-­‐Figueroa	  2010;	  de	  Vanssay	  and	  Spindler	  1994).	  In	  developing	  countries,	  scholars	  suggest,	  these	  formal	  institutions	  are	  rarely	  ad-­‐hered	  to	  and,	  instead,	  are	  often	  violated	  (Levitsky	  and	  Murillo	  2009).	  Hence,	  the	  question	  arises,	  can	  some	  formal	  institutional	  conditions,	  i.e.,	  constitutional	  provisions,	  ensure	  the	  protection	  of	  ju-­‐dicial	  independence	  in	  new	  democracies	  more	  effectively	  than	  other	  conditions?	  
In	  Latin	  America	  constitutional	  guarantees	  are	  readily	  available.	  The	  courts’	  independence,	  however,	  is	  not	  always	  guaranteed	  due	  to	  repeated	  violations	  of	  these	  constitutions.	  Political	  actors	  have	  been	  known	  to	  fill	  the	  courts	  (court	  packing)	  with	  ideologically	  similar	  justices,	  to	  remove	  sit-­‐ting	  justices	  who	  decide	  against	  government	  actions,	  and	  to	  force	  the	  resignation	  of	  justices	  through	  political	  pressure	  (Helmke	  2005;	  Chavez	  2004;	  O’Donnell	  1993,	  1994).	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All	  these	  threats	  to	  judicial	  independence	  raise	  questions	  about	  discrepancies	  between	  for-­‐mal	  rules	  and	  judges’	  and	  courts’	  exercise	  of	  judicial	  independence.	  Formal	  judicial	  structures	  pro-­‐vide	  guarantees	  for	  judicial	  independence.	  This	  study	  proposes	  that	  courts	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  for-­‐mal	  guarantees	  of	  independence	  should	  have	  more	  opportunities	  to	  act	  in	  an	  independent	  manner.	  Yet	  significant	  debate	  remains	  over	  how	  constitutions	  protect	  courts	  and	  isolate	  them	  from	  political	  influences.	  	  
Scholars	  maintain	  that	  constitutions	  matter	  for	  many	  reasons.	  They	  claim	  that	  constitutions	  shape	  the	  economic	  structure	  of	  a	  country	  (Hayek	  1978:	  Gwartney	  and	  Wagner	  1988).	  They	  sug-­‐gest	  that	  constitutions	  are	  the	  source	  of	  human	  liberty	  and	  freedom.	  Moreover,	  these	  rights	  are	  the	  foundation	  for	  individuals’	  fulfillment	  of	  their	  other	  wants	  through	  economic	  activity.	  Similarly,	  in	  discussing	  the	  role	  constitutional	  reform	  plays	  in	  strengthening	  government,	  Dressel	  (2005)	  argues	  that	  “a	  constitution	  defines	  and	  protects	  citizens’	  rights	  from	  governmental	  abuse.	  It	  also	  limits	  and	  balances	  government	  powers	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  other	  players	  and	  institutions,	  thereby	  safeguarding	  minori-­‐ty	  rights.	  The	  constitution	  is	  the	  touchstone	  for	  the	  legality	  of	  all	  other	  laws	  and	  the	  basis	  for	  re-­‐viewing	  executive	  and	  legislative	  actions”	  (1).	  	  
Moreover,	  promoters	  of	  democracy	  in	  authoritarian	  countries	  argue	  that	  constitutions	  set	  the	  standard	  for	  the	  new	  political	  regime.	  According	  to	  constitutionalists	  (Buchanan	  1983;	  Epstein	  1988;	  George	  1979;	  Gwartney,	  Wagner,	  and	  Program	  1988;	  Hayek	  1978;	  Barros	  2002;	  Olson	  1982;	  Pilon	  1988),	  constitutions	  control	  arbitrary	  takings	  by	  the	  state,	  set	  individuals’	  human	  rights,	  cre-­‐ate	  systems	  of	  property	  ownership	  and	  limit	  transaction	  costs	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  efficiency,	  and	  maintain	  the	  “social	  contract”	  established	  between	  politicians	  and	  citizens.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  indispensable	  to	  explore	  the	  relationship	  between	  de	  jure	  and	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  and	  the	  impact	  con-­‐stitutions	  have	  in	  a	  country	  transitioning	  from	  a	  dictatorship.	  If	  constitutions	  are	  important	  for	  the	  survival	  of	  new	  democracies,	  then	  they	  must	  also	  guarantee	  that	  judges	  and	  courts	  can	  inde-­‐pendently	  perform	  their	  functions.	  Constitutionalists	  and	  political	  experts	  suggest	  constitutional	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reforms	  to	  achieve	  structural	  changes.	  However,	  if	  constitutional	  provisions	  are	  insufficient	  to	  en-­‐sure	  judicial	  independence,	  promoters	  of	  democracy	  and	  constitutionalist	  should	  focus	  on	  restruc-­‐turing	  social,	  economic,	  and	  political	  structures	  (Herron	  and	  Randazzo	  2003).	  
However,	  as	  some	  scholars	  argue,	  there	  are	  shortcomings	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  and	  what	  happens	  in	  practice.	  Some	  describe	  how	  constitutional	  provisions	  may	  not	  isolate	  courts	  and	  judges	  from	  external	  influences.	  Herron	  and	  Randazzo’s	  (2003)	  study	  of	  formal	  institutions	  (i.e.,	  written	  constitutions	  and	  statutes)	  explores	  the	  impact	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  on	  courts	  after	  Communism.	  In	  their	  study	  the	  authors	  conclude	  that	  in	  post-­‐Communist	  countries	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  did	  not	  capture	  the	  realities	  of	  courts	  exercise	  of	  their	  power.	  They	  found	  that	  formal	  institutions	  very	  often	  were	  unable	  to	  protect	  courts	  and	  guarantee	  their	  judicial	  independence.	  Similarly,	  Rosenn	  (1987),	  discussing	  judicial	  independence	  in	  Latin	  America,	  argues	  that	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  are	  rarely	  enforced.	  According	  to	  Rosenn,	  	  
most	  Latin	  American	  courts	  are	  staffed	  by	  career	  judges	  with	  no	  independent	  political	  base	  or	  contracts	  and	  with	  relatively	  narrow	  experience.	  Asking	  them	  to	  perform	  this	  function	  (particularly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  exercising	  the	  power	  to	  declare	  statutes	  unconstitutional	  erga	  omnes)	  is	  to	  plunge	  them	  into	  a	  political	  role	   for	   which	   they	   are	   ill-­‐prepared	   by	   both	   temperament	   and	   experience	  (1987:	  32)	  	  In	  my	  study,	  I	  expanded	  on	  existing	  literature	  of	  judicial	  independence	  by	  revisiting	  the	  role	  and	  impact	  of	  formal	  constitutional	  provisions	  on	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  Previous	  studies	  focus	  on	  individual	  provisions	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  a	  few	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  independ-­‐ence.	  My	  study	  combines	  these	  provisions.	  The	  reason	  is	  these	  provisions	  work	  in	  unison.	  Thus,	  constitutions	  can	  only	  bring	  about	  changes	  when	  all	  those	  provisions	  are	  provided	  in	  the	  constitu-­‐tion.	  	   To	  assess	  the	  link	  between	  constitutional	  guarantees	  and	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence,	  I	  first	  created	  a	  variable	  of	  de	  jure	  judicial	  independence	  comprised	  of	  nine	  constitutional	  provisions	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of	  judicial	  independence.10	  To	  determine	  the	  level	  of	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  in	  each	  Latin	  American	  country,	  I	  utilized	  the	  measure	  developed	  by	  Cingranelli	  and	  Richards	  (2008).11	  The	  re-­‐sults	  were	  twofold.	  First,	  I	  found	  that	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  do	  affect	  the	  level	  of	  judicial	  independence	  courts	  and	  judges	  exercise	  in	  practice,	  at	  least	  with	  regard	  to	  par-­‐
tially	  independent	  and	  fully	  independent	  courts.	  In	  other	  words,	  I	  found	  that	  partially	  independent	  and	  fully	  independent	  courts	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  exist	  in	  countries	  with	  all	  these	  nine	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence.	  	  This	  study	  also	  investigated	  which	  constitutional	  provisions	  are	  necessary	  to	  create	  these	  
partially	  independent	  and	  fully	  independent	  courts.	  In	  assessing	  the	  effect	  of	  individual	  provisions	  on	  the	  de	  facto	  level	  of	  judicial	  independence,	  the	  results	  show	  that,	  to	  create	  partially	  independent	  courts,	  provisions	  about	  tenure,	  removal	  procedure,	  budget,	  accessibility,	  separation	  of	  power,	  and	  judicial	  review	  must	  be	  included	  in	  the	  constitution.	  Moreover,	  constitutional	  provisions	  that	  in-­‐crease	  accessibility	  to	  the	  courts	  and	  provide	  removal	  procedures	  are	  indispensable	  to	  create	  fully	  
independent	  courts.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  these	  provisions	  must	  all	  be	  included	  in	  the	  constitution.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  are	  necessary	  provisions,	  but	  each	  alone	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  create	  partially	  or	  
fully	  independent	  courts.	  This	  paper	  contextualizes	  these	  findings	  through	  the	  use	  of	  a	  single-­‐country	  case	  study.	  Establishing	  which	  provisions	  aid	  in	  creating	  independent	  courts	  tells	  us	  only	  part	  of	  the	  story.	  We	  also	  need	  to	  understand	  how	  these	  constitutional	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  independence	  protect	  courts	  from	  political	  interference.	  	  
The	  Brazilian	  Case	  This	  paper	  uses	  the	  case	  of	  Brazil	  to	  assess	  the	  effect	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  of	  judicial	  independence	  on	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence.	  Case	  studies	  provide	  a	  rich	  understanding	  of	  the	  processes	  in	  which	  the	  interactions	  between	  dependent	  and	  independent	  variables	  occur.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Length	  of	  judgeship,	  budget,	  removal	  procedure,	  selection	  process,	  accessibility,	  separation	  of	  power,	  judicial	  review,	  number	  of	  justices	  in	  the	  highest	  courts,	  and	  qualifications.	  11	  The	  data	  are	  readily	  available	  on	  their	  website:	  http://ciri.binghamton.edu	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quantitative	  testing	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  de	  jure	  on	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  tells	  us	  only	  part	  of	  the	  story.	  It	  explains	  the	  effect	  but	  it	  does	  not	  show	  how	  this	  effect	  transpires.	  I	  investigate	  the	  relation-­‐ship	  between	  constitutional	  provisions	  and	  de	  facto	  judicial	  independence	  in	  Brazil	  using	  three	  sources:	  the	  constitutional	  text,	  elite	  interviews,	  and	  example	  of	  court	  decisions.	  In	  the	  summer	  of	  2011,	  I	  conducted	  20	  semi-­‐structured	  and	  structured	  interviews	  with	  lawyers,	  federal	  and	  state	  judges,	  political	  scientists,	  and	  legal	  experts	  in	  Brazil.	  My	  interviews	  used	  open-­‐ended	  questions	  regarding	  judicial	  independence,	  the	  Brazilian	  constitution,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  1988	  constitution	  on	  courts’	  independence,	  and	  the	  level	  of	  perceived	  independence	  of	  Brazilian	  courts	  (see	  Appendix	  A).	  	  The	  subjects	  were	  chosen	  in	  various	  ways.	  My	  initial	  pool	  of	  interviewees	  (8	  subjects)	  was	  federal	  and	  state	  judges	  whom	  I	  called	  and	  asked	  if	  they	  were	  willing	  to	  participate	  in	  my	  interview.	  Their	  numbers	  and	  addresses	  are	  readily	  available	  in	  the	  federal	  and	  state	  courts	  websites.	  Five	  other	  subjects	  were	  political	  scientist	  and	  law	  professors	  from	  a	  federal	  university.	  The	  remaining	  partic-­‐ipants	  were	  legal	  experts,	  civil	  servants,	  and	  lawyers	  who	  I	  encountered	  during	  my	  interviews	  and	  were	  willing	  to	  participate	  and	  share	  their	  opinions.	  The	  total	  number	  of	  participants	  was	  20	  sub-­‐jects.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  interviews,	  I	  examine	  examples	  of	  court	  cases.	  The	  sample	  of	  court	  cases	  was	  chosen	  based	  on	  elite	  interviews	  results.	  Many	  of	  the	  subjects	  used	  these	  cases	  to	  show	  how	  constitutional	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  independence	  contributed	  to	  protect	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  judiciary.	  Using	  them	  further	  illustrates	  the	  role	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  on	  de	  
facto	  judicial	  independence	  in	  Brazil.	  The	  case	  of	  Brazil	  is	  used	  in	  this	  study	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  Brazil	  is	  among	  the	  countries	  that	  created	  a	  constitution	  to	  foster	  its	  democratization	  process.	  The	  1988	  Brazilian	  constitution	  covers	  almost	  everything	  and	  everybody.	  It	  specifies	  extensive	  constitutional	  rights,	  including	  indi-­‐vidual,	  social,	  and	  cultural	  rights;	  it	  reallocates	  a	  number	  of	  powers	  to	  Congress,	  removing	  them	  from	  the	  President,	  and	  it	  included	  numerous	  provisions	  intended	  to	  safeguard	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  federal	  judiciary.	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Second,	  Brazil	  is	  a	  useful	  place	  to	  test	  my	  previous	  findings.	  The	  1988	  Brazilian	  constitution	  provides	  all	  the	  nine	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  independence.	  In	  this	  study,	  however,	  I	  particu-­‐larly	  focus	  on	  six	  provisions	  –	  removal	  process,	  length	  of	  judgeship,	  fiscal	  autonomy,	  accessibility	  to	  courts,	  separation	  of	  power,	  and	  the	  power	  of	  judicial	  review.	  These	  six	  constitutional	  provisions	  were	  were	  overwhelmingly	  mentioned	  by	  my	  interviewees.	  All	  my	  20	  subjects	  point	  out	  the	  role	  of	  these	  provisions	  in	  ensuring	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  judiciary	  (see	  Table	  1).	  Further-­‐more,	  scholars	  of	  Brazilian	  courts	  link	  these	  particular	  provisions	  to	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  judici-­‐ary	  in	  Brazil	  (Castro	  1997;	  Santiso	  2003;	  Rios-­‐Figueroa	  and	  Taylor	  2006;	  Barbosa	  2007).	  The	  rea-­‐son	  is	  these	  provisions	  have	  created	  more	  tension	  between	  courts	  and	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  the	  government	  whereas	  the	  other	  three	  provisions	  are	  more	  settled.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  number	  of	  justices	  from	  higher	  courts,	  for	  instance,	  there	  is	  no	  case	  in	  Brazil	  of	  arbitrary	  attempt	  or	  even	  through	  con-­‐stitutional	  amendment	  to	  alter	  the	  number	  of	  justices	  in	  the	  higher	  courts	  to	  influence	  their	  deci-­‐sions.	  Conversely,	  the	  guarantee	  of	  financial	  autonomy	  has	  created	  constant	  tension	  between	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  executive.	  The	  latter	  has	  in	  some	  instances	  tried	  to	  change	  or	  even	  determine	  the	  Brazilian	  judiciary’s	  budget.	  	  
Table	  3.1:	  Interviewee	  Responses	  Concerning	  the	  Type	  of	  Constitutional	  Provisions	  they	  Be-­‐
lieved	  are	  Relevant	  to	  Protect	  the	  Judiciary	  













and	  state	  levels)	  
	  
7	   7	   4	   10	   10	   8	  
Scholars	  
	  
1	   1	   3	   5	   4	   5	  
Civil	  Servants	  
	  
1	   	   1	   1	   	   1	  
Lawyers	  
	  
2	   3	   1	   4	   1	   6	  
Total	   11	   11	   9	   20	   15	   20	  	   This	  paper	  enters	  the	  aforementioned	  debate	  and	  seeks	  to	  further	  the	  existing	  studies	  of	  ju-­‐dicial	  independence	  in	  Brazil	  and	  Latin	  America.	  It	  adds	  to	  the	  existing	  literature	  by	  exploring	  the	  impact	  of	  institutional	  factors	  on	  the	  Brazilian	  judiciary.	  More	  specifically,	  it	  investigates	  the	  1988	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Brazilian	  Constitution,	  focusing	  on	  its	  role	  in	  creating	  a	  relatively	  independent	  judiciary	  in	  Brazil.	  I	  argue	  that	  due	  to	  the	  1988	  Brazilian	  Constitution,	  Brazilian	  courts	  are	  relatively	  independent,	  and	  that	  their	  independence	  is	  the	  result	  of	  provisions	  in	  the	  1988	  Constitution.	  Furthermore,	  this	  study	  helps	  understand	  how	  these	  constitutional	  provisions	  play	  a	  role	  in	  creating	  independent	  courts.	  To	  promoters	  of	  democracy	  and	  constitutional	  designers,	  it	  helps	  them	  not	  only	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  inclusion	  of	  these	  provision	  in	  the	  constitution,	  but	  also	  understand	  how	  to	  draft	  these	  provisions	  so	  they	  can	  have	  the	  intended	  goal:	  create	  independent	  courts.	  
Understanding	  the	  Independence	  of	  Brazilian	  Courts	  Adopted	  in	  1988,	  the	  Brazilian	  Constitution	  provides	  courts	  and	  judges	  with	  a	  range	  of	  judi-­‐cial	  independence	  protections.	  Inamovibilidade,	  or	  removal	  procedures,	  protects	  judges	  against	  re-­‐moval	  from	  their	  post	  without	  due	  process	  (Art.	  95,	  II).	  The	  Brazilian	  Constitution	  of	  1988	  also	  mandates	  a	  vital	  provision,	  vitaliciedade,	  or	  length	  of	  judgeship.	  This	  provision	  provides	  to	  judges	  once	  appointed,	  the	  right	  to	  unlimited	  tenure,	  unless	  a	  crime	  is	  committed,	  until	  they	  reach	  a	  man-­‐datory	  retirement	  age.	  For	  the	  Brazilian	  Superior	  Tribunals	  the	  mandatory	  retirement	  age	  is	  70	  years	  old	  (compulsory	  retirement)	  (Art.	  95,	  I).	  Irredutibilidade	  de	  vencimentos,	  or	  irreducible	  salary,	  is	  also	  guaranteed	  to	  judges	  (Art.	  95,	  III).	  	  The	  salary	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  Justices	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  sal-­‐ary	  of	  civil	  servants.	  Finally,	  the	  other	  five	  constitutional	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  independ-­‐ence	  provided	  by	  the	  1988	  Constitution	  are	  the	  power	  of	  judicial	  review	  (Art.	  97),	  full	  autonomy	  to	  administer	  and	  draw	  their	  budget	  proposals	  (art.100),	  the	  number	  of	  justices	  in	  the	  highest	  courts	  (art	  101,	  art.	  104,	  art.	  107,	  art.	  115,	  art.	  119,	  and	  art.	  123),	  the	  selection	  procedure	  (art.	  101,	  I),	  qualifications	  (art.	  94),	  and	  separation	  of	  power	  (art.	  2).	  The	  enumeration	  of	  these	  provisions	  demonstrates	  that,	  by	  any	  standard,	  Brazilian	  courts	  were	  given	  high	  levels	  of	  protection.	  Following	  Dias’s	  findings,	  these	  constitutional	  provisions	  pro-­‐tect	  courts	  from	  external	  interference.	  The	  following	  sections	  will	  show	  how	  provisions	  of	  length	  of	  judgeship,	  removal	  procedures,	  fiscal	  autonomy,	  accessibility	  to	  courts,	  separation	  of	  power,	  and	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judicial	  review	  play	  a	  particular	  role	  in	  protecting	  the	  courts	  in	  Brazil	  and	  foster	  judicial	  independ-­‐ence.	  	  
Judicial	  Independence	  through	  Length	  of	  Judgeship	  and	  Removal	  Procedures	  To	  understand	  how	  both	  the	  length	  of	  the	  judicial	  term	  and	  removal	  procedures	  foster	  judi-­‐cial	  independence,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  look	  at	  the	  definition	  of	  judicial	  independence	  used	  in	  this	  two	  of	  its	  components,	  impartiality	  and	  autonomy.	  According	  to	  Larkins	  (1996),	  judicial	  independence	  re-­‐fers	  to	  existence	  of	  judges	  who	  are	  not	  manipulated	  for	  political	  gain,	  and	  who	  are	  impartial	  towards	  
the	  parties	  of	  dispute.	  Provisions	  of	  the	  constitution	  that	  guarantees	  impartially	  and	  autonomy	  cre-­‐ate	  independent	  judiciaries.	  	  Impartial	  judges	  treat	  all	  citizens	  equally	  before	  the	  law	  and	  are	  able	  to	  protect	  their	  rights	  and	  secure	  them	  against	  encroachment	  by	  the	  government	  (Kaufman	  1979).	  Impartiality	  is	  essen-­‐tial	  in	  cases	  when	  the	  government	  is	  a	  party	  in	  the	  case.	  Impartial	  courts	  should	  not	  feel	  compelled	  to	  side	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  government	  because	  fear	  of	  retaliation.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  removal	  and	  length	  of	  judgeship	  provisions	  play	  a	  role	  to	  protect	  courts	  from	  these	  influences.	  The	  removal	  procedures	  and	  length	  of	  judgeship	  provisions	  ensure	  that	  judges	  and	  courts	  are	  insulated	  from	  political	  pressures.	  Setting	  the	  length	  of	  judgeship	  protects	  judges	  from	  being	  removed	  before	  their	  term	  has	  ended	  or	  through	  appropriate	  removal	  procedures	  (Keith	  2002).	  Additionally,	  certain	  types	  of	  tenure	  limits	  foster	  independence.	  Conventional	  wisdom	  holds	  that	  a	  relative	  longevity	  of	  judgeship	  protects	  judges	  from	  political	  pressure	  (Ginsburg	  2003).	  This	  is	  be-­‐cause	  they	  tend	  to	  outlast	  the	  exchanges	  of	  political	  power	  (Rios-­‐Figueroa	  and	  Taylor	  2006).	  This	  is	  particular	  pertinent	  among	  superior	  courts,	  where	  judges	  are	  appointed.	  Here,	  political	  actors	  have	  more	  stacks	  in	  the	  judicial	  decisions.	  Therefore,	  judges	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  independent	  when	  their	  length	  of	  judgeship	  is	  not	  linked	  with	  the	  length	  of	  their	  appointers’	  position	  (Helmke	  2005).	  Furthermore,	  coupled	  with	  the	  considerable	  length	  of	  judgeship,	  judges	  are	  protected	  from	  threats	  of	  removal	  if	  appropriate	  procedures	  are	  in	  place.	  The	  process	  of	  removal	  is	  crucial	  to	  judi-­‐
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cial	  independence.	  A	  constitutional	  provision	  that	  provides	  a	  removal	  process	  has	  two	  goals.	  First,	  the	  constitutional	  process	  binds	  political	  actors,	  prohibiting	  them	  from	  removing	  judges	  without	  the	  appropriate	  due	  process.	  Second,	  it	  shields	  judges	  from	  eschewing	  their	  decisions	  for	  fear	  of	  arbitrary	  removal.	  The	  harder	  it	  is	  to	  remove	  justices	  that	  are	  in	  charge	  to	  decide	  political	  ques-­‐tions,	  the	  freer	  they	  are	  to	  decide	  these	  cases.	  Thus,	  tough	  removal	  process	  for	  higher	  courts	  is	  like-­‐ly	  to	  give	  more	  protection	  to	  the	  courts	  (Rios-­‐Figueroa	  and	  Taylor	  2006),	  guaranteeing	  that	  judges	  will	  make	  their	  decisions	  based	  on	  the	  law	  and	  that	  they	  will	  not	  be	  unduly	  influenced	  by	  the	  gov-­‐ernment	  or	  parties	  involved	  (Despoy	  2009;	  Ferejohn	  1998;	  Fiss	  1993).	  In	  Brazil,	  my	  interviewees	  suggested	  that	  work	  well	  to	  guarantee	  impartial	  judges.	  Starting	  with	  the	  length	  of	  judgeship,	  the	  constitution,	  under	  article	  95,	  II	  provides	  to	  judges	  the	  right	  to	  un-­‐limited	  tenure,	  and	  only	  removed	  unless	  they	  are	  convicted	  of	  a	  crime,	  or	  they	  voluntarily	  retire.	  It	  is	  does	  not	  come	  as	  a	  surprise	  that	  seven	  out	  of	  11	  who	  mentioned	  this	  provision	  were	  judges.	  Ac-­‐cording	  to	  them,	  this	  provision	  provides	  security	  to	  courts	  ‘to	  decide	  according	  to	  the	  law.’	  One	  of	  my	  interviewees	  explains	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  provision	  stating	  	  	  with	   regard	   to	   vitalicidade	   [or	   unlimited	   tenure]	   this	   is	   a	   guarantee	   that	   [a	  judge]	  will	  not	  be	  removed	  or	  fired	  because	  someone	  does	  not	  like	  you.	  It	  is	  a	  guarantee	  that	  the	  Constitution	  gives	  you	  so	  you	  can	  go	  after	  anybody,	  decide	  against	  anyone,	  without	   losing	  your	   job.	  This	   is	  really	   important	  because	  if	  a	  person	   could	   be	   fired	   to	   reduce	   expenses	   [for	   instance],	   can	   you	   imagine?...	  good	  judges,	  honest	  judges	  would	  be	  threaten	  and	  they	  would	  be	  influenced	  in	  some	  cases	  to	  decide	  differently	  than	  they	  initially	  would.	  	  Similarly,	  a	  judge	  pointed	  out	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  provision	  to	  political	  actors	  like	  the	  President.	  The	  judge	  points	  out	  that	  	  Once	   they	  assume	  the	  position,	  he	  or	  she	  cannot	   leave,	   the	  president	  cannot	  come	  and	  say	  get	  out	  once	  he	  is	  automatically	  sworn	  for	  life.	  Thus,	  the	  guaran-­‐tee	   of	   life	   tenure	   gives	   the	   judges	   to	   make	   sure	   that	   it	   will	   not	   be	   re-­‐moved/dismissed	  from	  office	  because	  the	  President	  did	  not	  like	  his	  decision.	  	  Moreover,	  all	  my	  interviewees	  (eleven	  subjects)	  who	  responded	  that	  unlimited	  tenure	  pro-­‐tects	  courts	  also	  pointed	  out	  the	  significance	  of	  those	  removal	  procedures	  were	  important	  for	  inde-­‐
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pendence.	  Assuming	  that	  the	  constitution	  sets	  the	  term	  judges	  can	  serve	  in	  the	  courts,	  only	  through	  the	  appropriate	  process	  they	  can	  be	  removed.	  	  In	  the	  Brazilian	  constitution,	  the	  removal	  procedure	  has	  two	  goals.	  First,	  it	  guarantees	  inamovibilidade.	  That	  means,	  judges	  are	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  location	  (city,	  municipality,	  state)	  they	  passed	  the	  examination	  process.	  Thus,	  judges	  are	  not	  to	  be	  arbitrari-­‐ly	  removed	  from	  their	  position	  and	  be	  allocated	  to	  another	  location	  (different	  court,	  city,	  municipal-­‐ity,	  state).	  Second,	  it	  means	  that	  judges	  cannot	  be	  terminated	  from	  their	  function	  unless	  they	  have	  been	  convicted	  or	  a	  crime	  or	  a	  removal	  process	  has	  decided	  that	  they	  should	  be	  removed.	  Although	  both	  have	  the	  same	  goal	  –	  create	  impartial	  judges	  –	  they	  fit	  two	  different	  purposes.	  The	  first	  purpose	  is	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  judges	  who	  are	  allocated	  to	  a	  city,	  for	  instance,	  don’t	  fear	  that	  they	  will	  be	  removed	  and	  relocated	  to	  another	  city,	  or	  even	  state,	  because	  they	  have	  decid-­‐ed	  against	  powerful	  local	  individuals	  or	  groups.	  One	  of	  my	  interviewees	  mentioned	  that	  prior	  to	  the	  1988	  constitution,	  especially	  in	  small	  cities	  and	  municipalities,	  judges	  who	  attempted	  to	  defy	  pow-­‐erful	  individuals,	  were	  removed	  and	  relocated	  to	  remote	  areas,	  as	  a	  form	  of	  punishment.	  An	  inter-­‐viewee	  stated:	  the	  inamovibilidade	  is	  important	  because	  it	  guarantees	  that	  [they]	  are	  not	  go-­‐ing	  to	  send	  an	  individual	  [judge]	  to	  a	  remote	  area	  just	  because	  he	  convicted	  a	  powerful	  banker.	  This	  guarantee	  is	  not	  afforded	  to	  federal	  or	  state	  investiga-­‐tors,	  for	  instance,	  and	  because	  of	  that	  the	  federal	  investigator	  who	  was	  inves-­‐tigating	   the	   Banestado	   case	  was	   relocated	   and	   now	  works	   at	   the	   São	   Paulo	  airport.	  If	  he	  were	  a	  judge	  he	  could	  have	  said:	  ‘hey,	  I	  cannot	  be	  removed,	  you	  can	  take	  me	  from	  here.	  	  This	  provision	  has	  also	  another	  protection	  purpose.	  It	  protects	  judges	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  against	  their	  superiors.	  Not	  only	  it	  gives	  external	  independence	  against	  political	  influences,	  it	  also	  protects	  them	  from	  superior	  judges	  who	  might	  have	  stake	  in	  the	  decisions	  of	  lower	  courts	  judges.	  Thus,	  as	  one	  federal	  judge	  points	  out	  to	  me,	  	  before	   the	   inamovibilidade	   provision,	   federal	   judges	   had	   their	   post	   deter-­‐mined	  by	  their	  superiors,	  and	  very	  often,	  they	  were	  subjected	  to	  judges	  with	  tenure,	  who	  could	  ‘choose’	  who	  their	  substitute	  was.	  This	  practice	  violated	  the	  
inamovibilidade	  provision	  and	  let	  judges	  fearful	  to	  be	  relocated	  due	  to	  a	  mere	  administrative	   decision,	   especially	   if	   they	   acted	   in	   a	   manner	   that	   it	   was	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against	   with	   what	   some	   people	   thought.	   Now,	   all	   judges	   are	   allocated	   and	  their	   removal	   process	   obeys	   a	   seniority	   process,	   which	   turned	   the	   process	  more	  transparent	  and	  fair.	  Judges	  act	  with	  independence	  and	  security.	  	  Moreover,	  judges	  can	  be	  removed	  under	  the	  appropriate	  process.	  The	  body	  responsible	  for	  this	  process	  is	  the	  Conselho	  Nacional	  de	  Justice	  (CNJ).	  The	  National	  Council,	  between	  2007	  and	  2010,	  removed	  a	  total	  of	  36	  judges	  were	  removed	  from	  their	  functions	  (CNJ	  2010:	  31).	  Among	  them	  are	  the	  Superior	  Tribunal	  de	  Justiça	  (STJ),	  Paulo	  Geraldo	  de	  Oliveria	  Medina,	  and	  a	  Second	  Instance	  judge	  from	  the	  Tribunal	  Regional	  Federal	  da	  Segunda	  Região	  (TRF2),	  José	  Eduardo	  Carreira	  Alvim.	  These	  judges	  received	  compulsory	  retirement	  in	  an	  administrative	  procedure.	  They	  committed	  crimes	  involving	  giving	  decisions	  in	  favor	  of	  specific	  decisions,	  violating	  the	  impartiality	  principle.	  This	  is	  the	  first	  time	  a	  justice	  is	  tried	  and	  sentenced	  administratively.	  Meaning,	  members	  of	  the	  highest	  court	  and	  the	  court	  of	  last	  resort	  in	  Brazil,	  can	  be	  also	  impeached	  with	  a	  tough	  2/3	  majority	  in	  the	  Senate.	  That,	  as	  I	  have	  mentioned	  earlier,	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  remove	  superior	  courts	  justices	  arbitrarily,	  at	  least	  by	  a	  political	  branch12,	  particularly	  in	  Brazil	  where	  a	  coalition	  is	  necessary	  to	  pass	  anything.	  This	  is	  why,	  according	  to	  a	  political	  scientist	  scholar,	  “in	  the	  history	  of	  Brazil,	  politi-­‐cal	  parties	  have	  never	  initiated	  an	  attempted	  to	  impeach	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court.”	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  show	  how	  tenure	  and	  removal	  procedures	  paly	  a	  role	  in	  creating	  independ-­‐ent	  courts	  by	  providing	  them	  with	  protections	  to	  isolate	  them	  from	  political	  influences.	  Without	  fear	  of	  being	  removed	  and	  placed	  in	  a	  remote	  area	  or	  fired	  without	  due	  process,	  these	  provisions	  allow	  courts	  to	  act	  impartially.	  	  
Judicial	  Independence	  through	  Separation	  of	  Power	  This	  provision	  provides	  to	  the	  courts	  judicial	  autonomy	  and	  political	  insularity.	  An	  autono-­‐mous	  judiciary	  will	  be	  granted	  power	  to	  self-­‐regulate	  itself.	  Its	  administration,	  budget	  and	  person-­‐nel	  are	  self-­‐regulated,	  and	  clearly	  delineated	  in	  the	  constitution,	  limiting	  to	  a	  minimum	  any	  inter-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  Conselho	  National	  de	  Justiça	  is	  an	  organ	  under	  the	  Judiciary	  Branch	  thus	  with	  no	  rela-­‐tionship	  between	  the	  executive	  or	  legislative	  branches.	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ference	  from	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  government.	  Moreover,	  the	  clearer	  the	  limits	  of	  each	  branch,	  the	  more	  likely	  it	  is	  that	  they	  will	  refrain	  from	  interfering	  in	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  other	  branches.	  The	  separation	  of	  power	  provision	  does	  not	  only	  come	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  statement	  providing	  for	  it,	  as	  for	  example	  article	  2	  of	  Brazilian	  Constitution.	  It	  can	  come	  in	  many	  forms.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Brazil,	  the	  sep-­‐aration	  of	  power	  provision	  is	  articulated	  through	  provisions	  of	  fiscal,	  administrative	  and	  structural	  autonomy.	  	  In	  my	  interviews,	  when	  asked	  which	  constitutional	  provisions	  you	  believe	  are	  best	  able	  to	  protect	  judges	  and	  courts	  from	  external	  influences,	  nine	  of	  my	  subjects	  mentioned	  separation	  of	  power.	  But	  among	  the	  nine,	  only	  three	  specifically	  mentioned	  Article	  2	  of	  the	  constitution.	  For	  the	  others,	  some	  form	  of	  separation	  of	  powers	  served	  to	  illustrate	  how	  the	  importance	  of	  these	  provi-­‐sions	  for	  judicial	  independence.	  For	  instance,	  according	  to	  one	  interviewee,	  “judges	  in	  Brazil	  were	  the	  biggest	  beneficiaries	  in	  the	  1988	  Constitution.	  Their	  budget	  can	  never	  be	  reduced	  by	  any	  other	  branch	  of	  the	  government.	  It	  is	  unconstitutional.”	  That	  means,	  any	  interference	  to	  the	  budget	  pro-­‐posal	  is	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  separation	  of	  power	  provision.	  Another	  interviewee,	  in	  explaining	  the	  im-­‐portance	  of	  separation	  of	  power,	  refers	  to	  the	  provision	  about	  the	  irreducibility	  of	  salary.	  He	  stated	  during	   the	   dictatorship,	   the	   judiciary	   salary	   was	   low,	   and	   almost	   nobody	  would	  like	  to	  be	  judges.	  [After	  the	  1988	  constitution],	  with	  financial	  autonomy	  and	  professionalization	  of	  judgeship,	  being	  a	  judge	  gained	  status,	  respect	  and	  independence.	   Instead	   of	  waiting	   on	   the	   executive	   to	   pay	   us,	   now	   this	   is	   all	  under	  the	  judiciary	  power.	  	  	  	  Moreover,	  for	  one	  of	  my	  interviewee,	  a	  political	  science	  scholar,	  judicial	  independence	  meant	  separation	  of	  power.	  According	  to	  my	  interviewee,	  “in	  my	  understanding,	  independence	  is	  linked	  with	  the	  separation	  of	  power	  provision.”	  Following	  this	  idea,	  a	  lawyer	  points	  out	  how	  broad	  the	  separation	  of	  power	  provision	  is,	  encompassing	  other	  article	  to	  protect	  courts	  from	  external	  influence.	  	  the	  constitution	  protects	  the	  judiciary	  when	  it	  provides	  independence	  and	  au-­‐tonomy	  among	  the	  branches.	  There	  are	  provisions	  against	  other	  branches	  of	  government	   if	   they	   coerce	   the	   judicial	   power,	   article	   36,	   I,	   if	   the	   President	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tries	  to	  influence	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  article	  85,	  II,	  and	  the	  adminis-­‐trative	  and	  fiscal	  autonomy,	  article	  99.	  	  Despite	  pointing	  out	  that	  provisions	  of	  separation	  of	  powers	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  independ-­‐ence	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  one	  interviewee	  mentioned	  his	  skepticism	  about	  this	  idea.	  He	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  new	  trend	  of	  judicialization	  of	  politics	  has	  “subverted”	  the	  idea	  of	  separation	  of	  power.	  Accord-­‐ing	  to	  him,	  “started	  with	  Montesquieu,	  and	  then	  the	  federalists,	  and	  today	  [separation	  of	  power	  provision]	  gains	  a	  unclear	  dimension	  from	  a	  theoretical	  point	  of	  view.	  The	  independence	  that	  was	  mandated	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  Madison	  that	  the	  judiciary	  existed	  to	  stop	  power	  with	  power,	  interest	  with	  interest	  [does	  not	  exist].	  However,	  today	  it	  looks	  like	  that	  the	  dynamic	  [among	  branches]	  gained	  a	  different	  connotation	  because	  it	  looks	  like	  that	  the	  three	  branches	  end	  up	  doing	  all	  the	  functions	  [legislate,	  decide,	  and	  administer]	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  way	  they	  want.”	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  execu-­‐tive,	  the	  legislature,	  and	  the	  judiciary	  all	  exercise	  the	  legislative,	  adjudicative,	  and	  administrative	  functions.	  When	  asked	  what	  that	  means	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  such	  provisions	  to	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  courts,	  this	  interviewee	  continued	  explaining,	  “that	  does	  not	  mean	  provisions	  about	  separa-­‐tion	  of	  power	  are	  irrelevant.	  That	  is	  not	  what	  I	  meant.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  they	  are	  instruments	  to	  con-­‐stantly	  check	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  branches	  of	  the	  government.	  I	  would	  not	  envision	  a	  constitution	  without	  such	  provisions.”	  This	  section	  shows	  that	  separation	  of	  power	  is	  an	  important	  provision	  in	  the	  constitution	  and	  it	  comes	  in	  different	  forms.	  It	  protects	  courts	  against	  political	  interference.	  It	  delineates	  the	  functions	  of	  each	  branch.	  This	  is	  in	  accordance	  with	  Larkins’	  definition	  of	  judicial	  independence.	  Independent	  courts	  are	  able	  to	  exist	  without	  manipulation	  for	  political	  gains’,	  therefore	  acting	  au-­‐tonomously.	  	  As	  one	  of	  my	  interviewees,	  a	  state	  judge,	  explained:	  	  there	  are	  three	  branches	  of	  government	  in	  this	  country	  –	  executive,	  judiciary,	  and	   legislature.	   According	   to	   the	   constitution	  we	   are	   not	   to	   put	   our	   nose	   in	  each	  others’	  business.	  And	  what	  happens	  if	  we	  do?	  Well,	  we	  have	  all	  these	  ar-­‐ticles	  in	  the	  constitutions	  [referring	  to	  remedies	  in	  the	  1988	  Constitution]	  that	  say	  no,	  no,	  no.	  You	  violate,	  I	  can	  punish	  you.	  That	  makes	  the	  courts	  secure.	  	  
91 
Judicial	  Independence	  Though	  Fiscal	  Autonomy	  According	  to	  Larkins,	  one	  of	  judicial	  independence	  components	  is	  autonomy.	  Autonomous	  courts	  are	  allowed	  to	  self-­‐regulate	  themselves,	  with	  little	  or	  no	  influence	  from	  the	  political	  branch-­‐es.	  Fiscal	  autonomy	  is	  a	  provision	  that	  guarantees	  courts’	  independence.	  By	  controlling	  their	  budg-­‐et,	  courts	  are	  insulated	  from	  political	  interference.	  Political	  actors	  can	  undermine	  the	  role	  of	  the	  courts	  by	  making	  it	  difficult	  for	  the	  courts	  to	  operate	  on	  the	  daily	  basis	  and	  for	  individuals	  to	  access	  justice.	  	  Decisions	  about	  the	  internal	  administration,	  not	  only	  limited	  to	  budget	  but	  including	  per-­‐sonnel	  and	  structure,	  is	  the	  completely	  autonomy	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  Judicial	  branch.	  In	  Brazil,	  the	  1988	  Constitution	  gave	  complete	  power	  to	  courts	  to	  set	  their	  budget.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  con-­‐stitution	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  specific	  amount	  or	  percentage	  for	  the	  Judiciary’s	  budget,	  the	  Brazilian	  judiciary	  has	  been	  able	  to	  set	  their	  budget	  without	  much	  threat	  to	  have	  it	  reduced	  (Rios-­‐Figueroa	  and	  Taylor	  2006).	  This	  protection	  has	  two	  sources.	  First,	  article	  99	  of	  the	  constitution	  provides	  that	  they	  have	  autonomy	  to	  do	  so.	  Second,	  the	  separation	  of	  power	  guarantees	  that	  the	  other	  branches	  will	  not	  interfere	  with	  the	  courts	  functions.	  More	  specifically,	  in	  Brazil,	  the	  President	  can	  be	  tried	  for	  crime	  against	  the	  Judiciary	  if	  he	  or	  she	  interferes	  with	  its	  functions	  (Article	  85,	  I).	  Thus,	  the	  Bra-­‐zilian	  constitution	  not	  only	  provides	  clear	  autonomy	  to	  the	  court’s	  budget,	  but	  also	  punishes	  those	  who	  interfere	  with	  their	  functions.	  	  This	  is	  clearly	  illustrated	  in	  one	  of	  my	  interviews.	  In	  pointing	  out	  the	  provisions	  that	  protect	  the	  courts,	  one	  of	  my	  interviewees	  stated	  The	  courts	  in	  Brazil	  were	  really	  protected	  after	  the	  1988	  constitution.	  Look	  at	  their	  right	  to	  set	  their	  own	  finances.	  Once	  they	  send	  it	  to	  the	  President	  to	  be	  approved	  by	  Congress,	  it	  is	  done.	  There	  has	  never	  been	  any	  instance	  in	  Brazil	  when	  the	  budget	  has	  been	  denied.	  It	  is	  against	  the	  constitution.	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All	  my	  subjects	  in	  my	  interviews	  pointed	  out	  that	  “the	  1988	  Democratic	  Constitution	  of	  Bra-­‐zil	  introduced	  this	  provision	  to	  give	  more	  independence	  to	  the	  courts,	  so	  they	  do	  not	  need	  to	  rely	  heavy	  on	  the	  government,”	  as	  a	  lawyer	  in	  my	  interview	  stated.	  	  Fiscal	  autonomy	  has	  also	  to	  do	  with	  how	  much	  the	  judiciary	  was	  able	  to	  grow	  since	  the	  1988	  Constitution.	  If	  judicial	  independence	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  autonomously	  invest	  in	  their	  structure,	  personnel,	  and	  administration	  the	  Brazilian	  judiciary	  has	  been	  able	  to	  do	  that	  with	  great	  autonomy.	  One	  of	  my	  interviewees	  point	  out	  that	  the	  Brazilian	  courts	  are	  “one	  of	  the	  highest	  financed	  courts	  in	  Latin	  America,	  probably	  only	  losing	  for	  the	  United	  States.”	  According	  to	  a	  report	  in	  the	  O	  Estado	  de	  
São	  Paulo,	  the	  Brazilian	  judiciary	  budget	  has	  grown	  nearly	  eight	  times	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  (Sant’Anna	  2005).	  	  	  Despite	  protection	  by	  the	  constitution,	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  judiciary	  in	  determining	  its	  budget	  has	  become	  over	  the	  years	  a	  battle	  between	  the	  Executive,	  who	  wants	  to	  have	  more	  control	  over	  it,	  and	  the	  Judiciary,	  who	  points	  out	  that	  any	  interference	  in	  its	  budget	  is	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  sep-­‐aration	  of	  power	  clause.	  	  The	  battle	  between	  the	  Executive	  and	  the	  Judiciary	  and	  its	  budget	  illustrates	  this	  tension.	  In	  2012,	  The	  President	  Dilma	  Rousseff	  altered	  the	  budget	  proposed	  by	  the	  judiciary	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  expenses	  in	  2013.	  According	  to	  the	  Ministério	  do	  Planejamento	  (Fiscal	  Minister)	  the	  budget	  pro-­‐posed	  by	  the	  judiciary	  would	  have	  an	  impact	  of	  R$	  8.8	  billion	  (close	  to	  US$	  4	  billion)	  on	  the	  2013	  budget.	  The	  judges	  asked	  for	  a	  salary	  adjustment	  of	  35%	  to	  adjust	  for	  the	  2007	  and	  2008	  inflation.	  However,	  the	  Ministério	  do	  Planejamento	  counter-­‐proposition	  involved	  an	  adjustment	  of	  15.8%,	  divided	  in	  3	  years	  until	  2015.	  Considering	  the	  burden	  on	  the	  2013	  budget,	  the	  President	  amended	  the	  judiciary	  budget	  and	  sent	  it	  to	  Congress.	  	  Claiming	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  separation	  of	  powers	  provision,	  the	  Associação	  dos	  Magistrados	  Brasileiros	  (Brazilian	  Magistrate	  Association),	  the	  Associação	  Nacional	  dos	  Magistrados	  da	  Justiça	  do	  Trabalho	  (Labor	  Tribunal	  Magistrate	  National	  Association),	  and	  Associação	  dos	  Juízes	  Federais	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do	  Brasil	  (Brazilian	  Federal	  Judges	  Association)	  filed	  a	  writ	  of	  mandamus	  alleging	  that	  the	  President	  violated	  the	  constitutional	  provision	  that	  guarantees	  the	  courts	  financial	  autonomy.	  	  In	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  mandamus,	  STF	  Justice	  Luiz	  Fux	  argued	  that	  any	  alteration	  done	  by	  the	  President,	  before	  sending	  it	  to	  Congress,	  is	  unconstitutional.	  According	  to	  the	  decision,	  “the	  ex-­‐ecutive	  cannot	  simply	  ‘cut’	  part	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  budget”	  (Cristo	  2012).	  Further,	  the	  decision	  orders	  the	  President	  to	  send	  the	  initial	  budget	  to	  Congress,	  without	  alteration	  stating	  that	  (Fux	  2012)	  It	  is	  mandatory	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Federal	  Constitution	  (section	  X	  of	  artigo	  37)	  and	  federal	   law	   (10.331/01)	   [for	   the	  President]	   to	   submitt	   to	  Congress	   [without	  alterations	   to	   the	  budget],	  which	   is	  why	   the	  act	  perpetrated	  sets	  undeniable	  breach	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  financial	  autonomy	  (p.	  1)	  	  The	  autonomy	  of	  courts	  in	  setting	  is	  budget	  clearly	  gives	  them	  independence	  to	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  other	  branches	  to	  functions	  accordingly.	  It	  also	  protects	  them	  to	  decide	  against	  the	  govern-­‐ment	  without	  unduly	  influences.	  This	  section	  shows	  that	  by	  granting	  the	  Brazilian	  judiciary	  the	  au-­‐tonomy	  to	  set	  its	  budget,	  the	  1988	  constitution	  create	  independent	  courts.	  And	  as	  a	  interviewee	  poetically	  states,	  “the	  harmony	  between	  the	  three	  powers	  [the	  three	  branches	  of	  government]	  re-­‐quires	  that	  the	  executive	  don’t	  touch	  in	  the	  proposal	  of	  the	  Judiciary’s	  budget.	  
Judicial	  Independence	  through	  Accessibility	  to	  the	  Courts	  and	  Judicial	  Review	  It	  is	  less	  immediately	  apparent	  how	  accessibility	  to	  courts	  and	  the	  power	  of	  judicial	  review	  are	  less	  obvious	  on	  how	  they	  create	  independent	  courts.	  This	  is	  because	  these	  two	  provisions	  are	  less	  related	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  courts	  or	  their	  function	  in	  handing	  out	  impartial	  decision.	  How-­‐ever,	  these	  two	  provisions	  play	  a	  role	  in	  courts’	  independence	  by	  giving	  them	  a	  position	  in	  the	  polit-­‐ical	  scenario.	  These	  provisions	  thus	  influence	  courts’	  independence	  by	  determining	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  courts	  participate	  in	  the	  political	  debate.	  	  Larkins’	  definition	  notes	  an	  independent	  judiciary	  is	  one	  that	  “has	  the	  power	  as	  an	  institu-­‐tion	  to	  regulate	  the	  legality	  of	  government	  behavior,	  enact	  “neutral”	  justice,	  and	  determine	  signifi-­‐cant	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  values	  (1996:	  611).	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  illustrate	  how	  the	  constitutional	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provisions	  related	  to	  accessibility	  and	  to	  power	  of	  judicial	  review	  have	  given	  Brazilian	  courts	  the	  independence	  described	  by	  Larkins.	  More	  specifically,	  how	  in	  exercising	  their	  role	  as	  an	  institution,	  courts	  have	  gained	  relevant	  position	  within	  the	  larger	  political	  system	  and	  their	  interactions	  with	  the	  other	  branches.	  	  Constitutional	  design	  can	  influence	  how	  this	  ‘power	  to	  regulate	  the	  legality	  of	  government	  behavior’	  and	  ‘determine	  significant	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  values’	  before	  the	  courts.	  The	  vast	  number	  of	  constitutional	  rights	  provisions	  and	  the	  remedies	  created	  to	  protect	  these	  rights	  are	  fundamental	  to	  understand	  the	  role	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  in	  creating	  independent	  courts.	  Notwithstanding	  impartial	  decisions	  and	  autonomy,	  courts	  are	  independent	  when	  they	  can	  affirm	  themselves	  within	  the	  larger	  political	  system	  and	  their	  functional	  relationship	  with	  the	  other	  branches.	  Thus,	  courts	  should	  be	  able	  to	  declare	  unconstitutional	  a	  law	  that	  violates	  the	  Constitu-­‐tion,	  stop	  executive	  and	  legislative	  actions	  that	  violate	  constitutional	  rights,	  and	  set	  constitutional	  standards.	  Moreover,	  courts’	  ability	  to	  have	  a	  wide	  scope	  of	  authority	  with	  regard	  to	  constitutional	  review	  may	  not	  by	  itself	  indicate	  judicial	  independence.	  Thus,	  in	  the	  end	  of	  this	  section	  I	  illustrate	  the	  extent	  of	  Brazilian	  courts’	  impact	  in	  the	  broader	  political	  scenario	  gives	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  how	  constitutional	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  independence	  creates	  independence	  courts.	  This	  will	  be	  clearer	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  provision	  regarding	  judicial	  review	  in	  the	  1988	  Constitution.	  	  The	  accessibility	  to	  courts	  and	  judicial	  review	  provisions	  have	  been	  a	  factor	  in	  creating	  in-­‐dependent	  courts	  in	  Brazil.	  In	  fact,	  these	  two	  provisions	  were	  highly	  emphasized	  by	  most	  of	  my	  in-­‐terviewees	  in	  Brazil.	  Further,	  many	  of	  my	  interviewees	  interviewees	  (15	  out	  of	  20	  subjects)	  pointed	  to	  these	  two	  provisions	  to	  the	  reason	  why	  “Brazilian	  courts	  are	  the	  most	  powerful	  courts	  in	  the	  Lat-­‐in	  America,”	  a	  federal	  judge	  explained.	  	  To	  understand	  how	  these	  provisions	  help	  in	  protecting	  courts	  in	  Brazil,	  I	  explore	  two	  ar-­‐rangements	  in	  the	  constitution.	  The	  first,	  and	  related	  to	  accessibility	  to	  courts	  provision,	  is	  the	  ex-­‐pansion	  of	  the	  bill	  of	  rights	  in	  the	  1988	  Constitution.	  If	  rights	  as	  broad	  as	  the	  right	  to	  health	  care	  or	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education	  are	  mandated	  in	  the	  constitution,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  courts	  will	  be	  compelled	  to	  hear	  cases	  that	  allegedly	  violate	  these	  rights.	  Thus,	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  second	  arrangement	  to	  the	  inde-­‐pendence	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  judiciary:	  the	  power	  of	  judicial	  review.	  If	  courts	  are	  to	  be	  more	  independ-­‐ent,	  as	  Larkins	  posits,	  by	  regulating	  the	  other	  branches	  actions	  and	  determining	  constitutional	  rights,	  then	  they	  need	  provisions	  that	  allow	  them	  to	  review	  those	  actions	  and	  set	  these	  rights.	  	  
The	  Expansion	  of	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  and	  Accessibility	  to	  Courts	  Part	  of	  the	  democratization	  process	  in	  Latin	  America	  involved	  an	  expansion	  of	  rights	  (O’Donnell	  1992,	  1994;	  Rios-­‐Figueroa	  and	  Taylor	  2006;	  Melton	  and	  Ginsburg	  2012).	  One	  of	  my	  in-­‐terviewees	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  reason	  for	  such	  expansion	  was	  “rights	  would	  be	  more	  protected,	  if	  added	  in	  the	  constitution.”	  This	  takes	  us	  back	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  holds	  formal	  institutions	  predict	  be-­‐havior	  (Carey	  2000).	  As	  my	  interviewee	  continues	  in	  addressing	  the	  reason	  for	  such	  inclusion,	  “	  coming	  out	  from	  a	  military	  rule,	  the	  idea	  was	  that	  nobody	  would	  violate	  rights	  or	  try	  to	  suspend	  them	  without	  real	  consequences.”	  And	  the	  design	  of	  the	  1988	  Brazilian	  Constitution	  clearly	  intend-­‐ed	  to	  guarantee	  such	  protection.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  constitutional	  arrangements	  affect	  the	  role	  of	  courts.	  This	  is	  because	  they	  are	  the	  guardians	  of	  the	  constitutions.	  This	  makes	  more	  plausible	  that	  any	  violation	  of	  these	  constitutional	  protections	  will	  demand	  actions	  from	  the	  courts.	  So,	  the	  ques-­‐tion	  becomes,	  how	  does	  an	  expansion	  in	  the	  number	  of	  constitutional	  rights	  affect	  the	  independ-­‐ence	  of	  the	  courts?	  Before	  answering	  this	  question,	  lets	  explore	  this	  expansion.	  Title	  II	  of	  the	  1988	  Constitution	  is	  a	  detailed	  and	  extensive	  enumeration	  of	  Rights.	  Article	  5	  addresses	  a	  large	  number	  of	  individual	  and	  collective	  rights,	  such	  as	  freedom	  of	  religion,	  the	  right	  to	  privacy,	  right	  to	  life,	  right	  to	  own	  property,	  among	  others.	  Articles	  6	  and	  7	  declare	  that	  education,	  health,	  labor,	  leisure,	  social	  security,	  and	  security	  are	  social	  rights.	  In	  addition,	  these	  articles	  protect	  workers	  from	  being	  fired	  arbitrarily,	  create	  unemployment	  insurance,	  establish	  a	  minimum	  wage,	  and	  guarantee	  private	  property	  and	  free	  competition.	  Articles	  14	  to	  17	  are	  political	  rights,	  including	  voting.	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The	  constitutional	  arrangement	  of	  these	  rights	  explains	  why	  they	  foster	  formerly	  independ-­‐ent	  courts.	  The	  rights	  listed	  above	  can	  come	  from	  two	  different	  types	  of	  provisions:	  eficácia	  plena	  and	  meramente	  programáticos	  provisions.	  The	  first	  type	  of	  provisions	  can	  be	  exercised	  any	  time,	  thus	  they	  do	  not	  need	  ordinary	  or	  complementary	  laws	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  regulation.	  An	  example	  of	  these	  provisions	  is	  article	  44	  of	  the	  constitution	  that	  establishes	  that	  the	  “legislative	  power	  is	  exer-­‐cised	  by	  the	  National	  Congress,	  which	  is	  composed	  by	  the	  Senate	  and	  the	  House	  of	  Representa-­‐tives.”	  	  Thus,	  provisions	  that	  have	  eficácia	  plena	  are	  enforceable	  immediately.	  	  Conversely,	  the	  programmatic	  provisions,	  and	  what	  a	  federal	  judge	  who	  I	  interviewed	  called	  “constitucionalização	  de	  frustrações,”	  (constitutionalization	  of	  frustrations),	  are	  the	  programmatic	  provisions,	  or	  non-­‐self-­‐executing	  norms.	  These	  provisions,	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  effect,	  need	  addi-­‐tional	  regulatory	  laws	  (also	  called	  leis	  complementares)	  to	  specify	  and	  limit	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  right	  to	  be	  implemented.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  provision	  is	  one	  that	  establishes	  the	  right	  to	  strike	  by	  civil	  servants	  (article	  37,	  VII	  of	  the	  Constitution).	  According	  to	  the	  constitution,	  civil	  servants	  have	  the	  right	  to	  strike,	  in	  accordance	  to	  complementary	  law.	  This	  later	  type	  of	  provisions	  are,	  according	  to	  my	  interviewees,	  the	  main	  reason	  courts	  in	  Brazil	  exercise	  a	  relatively	  high	  independence.	  A	  federal	  judge	  I	  interviewed	  explained	  “because	  of	  this	  [programmatic	  rights]	  we	  have	  a	  strong	  judiciary	  who	  are	  called	  by	  every	  citizen	  to	  act	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  administrative	  actions.”	  In	  developing	  countries	  underperforming	  administrations	  often	  neglect	  to	  regulate	  pro-­‐grammatic	  provisions	  (O’Donnell	  1996;	  Carvalho	  2009;	  Castro	  1993).	  Frustrated	  citizens,	  therefore,	  seek	  relief	  from	  the	  courts.	  The	  more	  the	  courts	  are	  asked	  to	  remedy	  omissions	  as	  well	  as	  viola-­‐tions,	  by	  the	  administration,	  the	  more	  they	  become	  an	  indispensable	  part	  of	  the	  political	  process.	  Thus,	  as	  Larkins	  stresses	  in	  his	  definition,	  an	  independent	  court	  is	  one	  that	  is	  able	  to	  “regulate	  the	  legality	  of	  government	  behavior”	  as	  well	  as	  “determine	  significant	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  values	  (1996:	  611).	  In	  Brazil,	  legal	  accessibility	  allows	  courts	  to	  enter	  the	  political	  arena	  and	  assert	  them-­‐selves	  as	  an	  independent	  institution.	  This	  is	  what	  a	  legal	  expert	  called	  “a	  Casa	  das	  Mazelas,”	  or	  the	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House	  of	  Afflictions,	  “the	  house	  where	  everybody	  goes	  to	  cry,	  to	  complain	  about	  the	  political	  game.”	  Moreover,	  a	  judge	  point	  out	  “the	  problem	  of	  Brazil	  is	  not	  the	  fragility	  of	  the	  constitution	  but	  the	  fact	  that	  constitutional	  rights	  are	  not	  guaranteed.	  The	  instruments	  that	  the	  constitution	  gave	  to	  safe-­‐guard	  those	  rights	  give	  a	  lot	  of	  power	  to	  regulate	  these	  rights.”	  Thus,	  another	  judge	  pointed	  out	  “in	  a	  country	  like	  ours	  the	  weight	  that	  it	  is	  put	  in	  the	  judiciary	  is	  enormous,	  because	  of	  that	  [lack	  of	  complementary	  rights].	  In	  developed	  countries,	  you	  do	  not	  see	  that	  much	  of	  activity	  [regulate	  rights],	  particularly	  before	  the	  highest	  courts.”	  Take	  for	  example	  a	  case	  cited	  by	  a	  judge	  I	  interviewed.	  The	  aforementioned	  article	  37,	  VII,	  of	  the	  constitution	  disposes	  that	  with	  regard	  to	  civil	  servants	  and	  their	  right	  to	  strike,	  a	  complemen-­‐tary	  law	  should	  determine	  the	  limits	  and	  terms	  in	  which	  it	  can	  occur.	  Since	  the	  promulgation	  of	  the	  1988,	  no	  complementary	  law	  was	  proposed.	  To	  show	  how	  the	  lack	  of	  administrative	  action	  has	  in-­‐crease	  the	  role	  of	  the	  courts	  in	  regulating	  the	  other	  branches,	  he	  asserted	  “passed	  20	  years	  of	  the	  constitution,	  the	  law	  was	  never	  drafted.	  Thus,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  started	  to	  understand	  like	  this.	  Do	  we	  have	  a	  law	  for	  the	  private	  sector	  that	  regulate	  strikes?	  Yes	  we	  do.	  Can	  we	  adapt	  it	  to	  the	  public	  servants?	  Yes	  we	  do.	  Therefore,	  the	  private	  sector	  regulation	  about	  strike	  now	  is	  applicable	  to	  the	  public	  sector	  until	  a	  regulatory	  law	  [regarding	  the	  public	  sector]	  comes.”	  He	  gives	  another	  example.	  	  An	   individual	   who	   works	   in	   a	   dangerous	   job	   [because	   of	   that]	   can	   retire	  young.	  The	  stress	  is	  huge.	  This	  [right]	  is	  determined	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  it	  is	  prescribed	  in	  the	  law.	  In	  the	  public	  sector	  this	  law	  never	  came.	  Here,	  the	  judiciary	  [Supreme	  Court]	  did	  the	  same	  thing	  it	  did	  with	  the	  strike	  law.	  Let’s	  apply	  the	  private	  sector	  one	  until	  a	  law	  regarding	  the	  public	  sector	  comes.	  	  	  The	  elaborated	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  of	  1988	  Constitution	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  legislative	  actions	  allow	  the	  courts	  to	  exercise	  it	  ‘regulatory	  role,’	  and	  act	  as	  legislators.	  In	  another	  interview,	  a	  judge	  gave	  the	  following	  example:	  In	  explaining	  the	  increasing	  number	  of	  constitutional	  rights	  in	  the	  constitu-­‐tion	  and	  the	  regulatory	  role	  the	  courts	  have	  increasingly	  played	  in	  Brazil,	  this	  state	  judge	  explained	  how	  courts	  have	  become	  the	  venue	  for	  the	  disadvantaged:	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A	  citizen	  has	  a	  serious	  health	  problem	  but	  he	  does	  not	  have	  the	  money	  to	  buy	  the	  medication.	  He	  goes	  to	  a	  public	  hospital;	  however,	  the	  health	  department	  tells	  the	  patient	  that	  the	  medication	  he	  needs	  is	  not	  in	  the	  list	  of	  the	  medica-­‐tions	   provided	   by	   the	   health	   department.	   So,	   what	   does	   the	   patient	   do?	   He	  goes	  to	  court	  and	  asks	  that	  the	  medication	  be	  provided	  by	  the	  health	  depart-­‐ment.	  The	  court	  then	  tells	  the	  administration	  [state,	  municipalities,	  local	  gov-­‐ernment]	  to	  provide	  the	  medication.	  	  	   These	  examples	  illustrate	  the	  increasing	  role	  of	  the	  courts	  to	  ‘regulate	  the	  legality	  of	  gov-­‐ernment	  behavior’	  and	  ‘determine	  significant	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  values.’	  The	  “constitutionali-­‐zation	  of	  frustrations”	  turned	  the	  courts	  into	  the	  “House	  of	  Afflictions,”	  a	  place	  where	  all	  goes	  to	  re-­‐solve	  their	  problems.	  When	  constitutional	  arrangements	  of	  the	  1988	  Constitutional	  created	  means	  for	  the	  judiciary	  to	  be	  called	  upon	  constitutional	  rights	  issues,	  they	  gave	  courts	  independence	  trough	  their	  regulatory	  and	  constitutional	  interpretation	  roles.	  If	  judicial	  independence	  is	  then	  the	  power	  of	  courts	  in	  remedying	  the	  absence	  of	  programmatic	  laws	  or	  acts	  of	  violations	  of	  all	  these	  rights,	  then	  we	  can	  assume	  that	  the	  1988	  Brazilian	  constitution,	  through	  its	  expansion	  of	  constitu-­‐tional	  rights,	  did	  just	  that.	  	  The	  next	  section	  explains	  how	  the	  judiciary	  became	  the	  “House	  of	  Afflictions.”	  It	  is	  through	  constitutional	  instruments	  to	  remedy	  violations	  of	  constitutional	  rights	  that	  the	  judiciary	  has	  been	  able	  to	  regulate	  the	  actions,	  or	  inactions,	  of	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  the	  government	  and	  set	  constitu-­‐tional	  standards.	  It	  is	  through	  the	  power	  of	  judicial	  review	  provisions	  that	  courts	  have	  affirmed	  its	  independence.	  	  
The	  Power	  of	  Judicial	  Review	  Independent	  courts,	  according	  to	  Larkins,	  ‘has	  the	  power	  to	  regulate	  the	  legality	  of	  govern-­‐ment	  behavior’	  and	  determine	  significant	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  values.’	  In	  the	  previous	  section,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  increasing	  number	  of	  constitutional	  rights	  have	  increased	  the	  courts	  regulatory	  and	  constitutional	  role.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  show	  how	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  rights,	  courts	  were	  given	  instruments	  to	  act	  in	  such	  regulatory	  and	  constitutional	  manner.	  These	  remedies	  allow	  courts	  to	  check	  on	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  the	  government	  and	  often	  create	  public	  policy	  by	  determining	  the	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scope	  of	  the	  constitution.	  This	  increasing	  role	  is	  played	  through	  the	  power	  of	  judicial	  review.	  By	  
power	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  strength	  or	  degree	  of	  power.	  Although	  certainly	  this	  is	  one	  component	  of	  a	  powerful	  act	  or	  act	  with	  power,	  in	  this	  paper	  I	  will	  limit	  the	  idea	  of	  power	  to	  the	  extant	  in	  which	  the	  1988	  Constitution	  provided	  tools	  so	  courts	  could	  exercise	  their	  judicial	  review.	  	  For	  the	  Brazilian	  courts,	  and	  many	  other	  Latin	  American	  countries,	  the	  increasing	  role	  of	  the	  judiciary	  to	  interpret	  the	  law	  is	  the	  result	  of	  an	  obscure,	  complex,	  and	  prolix	  constitution.	  Ac-­‐cording	  to	  Silva	  (2004),	  the	  Brazilian	  constitution	  incentivizes	  the	  judicialization	  of	  politics	  because	  of	  its	  large	  number	  of	  provisions.	  Similarly,	  Rosenn	  (1990)	  argues	  that	  the	  1988	  Brazilian	  constitu-­‐tion	  lacks	  unity,	  specificity,	  and	  clarity.	  The	  judiciary	  must	  therefore	  step	  in	  to	  interpret	  it.	  In	  my	  interviews	  in	  Brazil,	  some	  lawyers	  suggested	  that	  active	  participation	  in	  interpreting	  the	  laws	  is	  due	  to	  Brazilian	  highly	  legalist	  structure.	  According	  to	  one	  interviewee,	  “in	  the	  search	  to	  find	  an	  ar-­‐ticle	  to	  protect	  us	  in	  the	  constitution,	  [legislators]	  are	  always	  making	  it	  [the	  constitution]	  grow	  big-­‐ger.”	  Because	  of	  that,	  the	  courts	  are	  constantly	  asked	  to	  resolve	  disputes.	  They	  are	  asked	  to	  remedy	  violations	  by	  the	  political	  parties,	  omissions	  of	  the	  administration	  for	  not	  providing	  constitutional	  guaranteed	  rights	  and	  interpret	  the	  laws.	  This	  authorization	  to	  review	  the	  acts	  of	  the	  executive	  and	  the	  legislative	  through	  innumera-­‐ble	  remedies,	  at	  all	  levels,	  federal,	  state,	  and	  local	  levels	  is	  large	  in	  the	  1988	  constitution.	  These	  tools	  comprise	  collective	  writ	  of	  security,	  habeas	  data,	  the	  direct	  action	  of	  unconstitutionality,	  and	  
unconstitutionality	  for	  omission	  and	  the	  mandate	  of	  injunction,	  and	  the	  popular	  action.	  A	  close	  look	  at	  some	  of	  these	  remedies	  shows	  that	  the	  constitution	  was	  able	  to	  create	  inde-­‐pendent	  courts	  through	  their	  review	  power.	  The	  use	  of	  the	  courts	  to	  resolve	  public	  policy	  concerns,	  non-­‐enforcement	  of	  rights,	  and	  political	  controversies	  that	  were	  historically	  addressed	  through	  the	  political	  process	  are	  now	  part	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  courts	  due	  to	  constitutional	  remedies.	  Courts	  now	  become	  part	  of	  the	  political	  process,	  usually	  by	  ordering	  the	  other	  branches	  to	  act	  upon	  their	  re-­‐sponsibilities	  or	  creating	  public	  policies	  by	  interpreting	  the	  law.	  To	  understand	  the	  context	  in	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which	  courts	  have	  been	  able	  to	  interpret	  the	  law	  in	  Brazil,	  I	  will	  illustrate	  with	  my	  interviews	  and	  courts	  cases.	  	  All	  my	  interviewees	  stressed	  that	  the	  direct	  action	  of	  unconstitutionality	  has	  helped	  position	  the	  courts	  within	  the	  larger	  political	  system.	  A	  district	  attorney	  who	  I	  interviewed	  points	  out	  a	  great	  example	  of	  how	  this	  constitutional	  remedy	  increased	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  courts.	  Ac-­‐cording	  to	  my	  interviewee,	  the	  direct	  action	  of	  unconstitutionality	  played	  a	  huge	  role	  during	  the	  former	  President	  Fernando	  Henrique	  Cardoso’s	  (FHC)	  government.	  After	  Collor’s	  impeachment	  and	  failure	  to	  recover	  Brazil’s	  economy,	  FHC	  introduced	  programmatic	  economic	  reforms.	  It	  was	  a	  se-­‐ries	  of	  reforms	  that	  took	  an	  entire	  year	  to	  be	  developed.	  But,	  a	  number	  of	  direct	  actions	  of	  unconsti-­‐
tutionality	  affected	  more	  than	  half	  of	  them.	  My	  interviewee	  explains	  that	  	  60%	  of	   the	  reform	  was	  considered	  unconstitutional	  and	  only	  40%	  of	   the	  re-­‐form	  was	  considered	  partially	  constitutional.	  That	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  power,	  consider-­‐ing	  that	  a	  political	  program	  created	  after	  one	  year	  of	  laborious	  work	  was	  de-­‐stroyed	  with	  one	  decision.	  Eleven	  people	  who	  were	  not	  democratically	  elected	  changed	  an	  entire	  economic	  reform.	  	  	  Another	  interviewee	  also	  explained	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  power	  of	  judicial	  review	  stating	  “the	  power	  of	  judicial	  review	  has	  put	  the	  courts	  in	  the	  center	  of	  the	  political	  debate.	  In	  Brazil,	  the	  police	  function	  that	  courts	  received	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  be	  constantly	  telling	  what	  the	  law	  is	  is	  a	  huge	  gain	  for	  the	  judiciary.”	  And	  she	  continued,	  “this	  gain	  gives	  courts	  great	  independence	  because	  the	  constitution	  says	  that	  they	  can	  do	  that	  [interpret	  the	  laws].	  These	  actions	  are	  protected	  under	  the	  law.”	  	   Moreover,	  three	  of	  my	  interviewees	  explain	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judicial	  review	  provisions,	  par-­‐ticularly	  the	  direct	  actions	  of	  unconstitutionality	  citing	  a	  notorious	  case	  about	  the	  Public	  Employees’	  Pension	  case.	  Although	  FHC	  failed	  to	  bring	  about	  all	  the	  desired	  economic	  reforms,	  in	  2003,	  President	  Lu-­‐la	  attempted	  to	  reform	  the	  Pension	  system	  again,	  enacting	  an	  amendment	  bringing	  the	  amount	  of	  public	  employees’	  pension	  down	  to	  the	  level	  of	  private	  sector.	  Prior	  to	  2003,	  civil	  servants	  in	  Brazil	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could	  retire	  at	  the	  age	  of	  43	  with	  a	  full	  salary.	  Contrary	  to	  what	  happened	  in	  the	  public	  sector,	  pri-­‐vate	  sector	  employees	  were	  entitled	  to	  only	  a	  very	  limited	  pension	  and	  had	  to	  seek	  private	  funds	  to	  ensure	  sufficient	  funds	  when	  retired.	  These	  attempted	  reforms	  would	  thus	  greatly	  reduce	  the	  pen-­‐sions	  received	  by	  public	  employees	  upon	  retirement.	  	  Using	  the	  so-­‐called	  direct	  action	  of	  unconstitutionality,	  national	  public	  employees’	  unions	  filed	  a	  suit	  challenging	  the	  amendment.	  The	  legal	  argument	  rested	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  public	  employ-­‐ees’	  had	  the	  right	  to	  irreversibility	  of	  their	  entitlements.	  Voting	  7-­‐4	  to	  uphold	  the	  amendment,	  the	  Brazilian	  Supreme	  Court	  argued	  that	  “no	  citizen	  has	  such	  a	  strong	  constitutional	  right	  as	  to	  prohibit	  the	  government	  from	  imposing	  a	  tax	  on	  his	  or	  her	  pension	  that	  would	  benefit	  and	  maintain	  the	  whole	  pension	  system”	  (Babosa	  2007).	  	  According	  to	  my	  interviewees,	  this	  decision	  shows	  two	  things.	  First	  that,	  “the	  judiciary	  has	  been	  able	  to	  independently	  exercise	  its	  judicial	  review	  power,	  without	  much	  interference	  of	  the	  government,”	  as	  explained	  by	  a	  lawyer.	  Second,	  it	  shows	  how	  the	  judiciary	  through	  its	  judicial	  re-­‐view	  power	  has	  gained	  “a	  special	  position	  in	  the	  political	  scenario,”	  another	  lawyer	  explained	  re-­‐garding	  this	  decision.	  But	  no	  more	  than	  the	  one	  of	  the	  justices	  involved	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  explain	  the	  role	  of	  this	  provisions	  on	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  judiciary.	  Brazilian	  Supreme	  Court	  Chief	  Justice	  Joaquim	  Barbosa,	  in	  explaining	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  decision	  in	  a	  speech	  delivered	  at	  UCLA	  School	  of	  Law	  in	  2007,	  acknowledges	  the	  courts’	  power	  and	  indispensable	  role	  in	  the	  political	  process,	  stating	  	  The	  Public	  Employees’	  Pension	  Case	  was	  of	  great	  significance.	  It	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  inequality	  in	  Brazil,	  which	  in	  many	  instances	  is	  created	  and	  legitimated	   by	   legal	   means.	   Moreover,	   the	   case	   set	   an	   important	   precedent	  that	  has	  paved	   the	  way	   for	   further	  measures	   to	  bridge	   the	  gap	  between	   the	  haves	  and	  the	  have-­‐nots	   in	  my	  country.	  Furthermore,	  the	  case	  shows	  how	  
the	  abstract	  method	  of	  review	  [direct	  action	  of	  unconstitutionality]	  also	  fur-­‐
thers	  the	  Court’s	  role	  in	  Brazilian	  politics	  (emphasis,	  p.	  192)	  	  It	  is	  clear	  from	  Chief	  Justice	  Barbosa	  that	  the	  remedy	  prescribed	  by	  the	  Brazilian	  constitu-­‐tion	  to	  redress	  violations	  of	  protected	  rights	  is	  what	  authorized	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  to	  sustain	  an	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entire	  administration	  policy	  and	  change	  the	  economic	  structure	  of	  an	  entire	  established	  system,	  the	  Public	  Employees’	  Pension	  system.	  This	  decision,	  only	  10	  years	  after	  the	  1988	  constitution	  was	  promulgated,	  reveals	  one	  thing	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  instruments	  to	  remedy	  violations	  of	  the	  vast	  number	  of	  rights	  addressed	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  First,	  courts	  are	  independent	  when	  they	  gain	  power	  through	  judicial	  review	  provisions	  to	  regulate	  government	  actions	  and	  set	  constitutional	  standards.	  In	  Brazil,	  constitutional	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  independence	  gave	  courts	  the	  abil-­‐ity	  to	  exercise	  these	  powers.	  At	  least	  with	  regard	  to	  formal	  judicial	  independence,	  the	  1988	  Brazili-­‐an	  constitution	  provides	  a	  number	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  independence.	  Formally	  speaking,	  Brazilian	  courts	  have	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  independence.	  It	  is	  in	  through	  this	  pro-­‐visions	  that	  courts	  have	  been	  able	  to	  gain	  independence.	  	  
Conclusion	  This	  paper	  argues	  that	  key	  provisions	  in	  the	  1988	  Constitution	  ensure	  Brazilian	  courts	  in-­‐dependence.	  Specifically,	  constitutional	  provisions	  related	  to	  fiscal	  autonomy,	  length	  of	  judgeship,	  removal	  procedures,	  separation	  of	  power,	  accessibility	  to	  the	  courts,	  and	  judicial	  review	  seem	  to	  play	  a	  remarkable	  role	  in	  ensuring	  the	  Brazilian	  courts’	  independence.	  This	  argument	  supports	  my	  previous	  study	  finding	  that	  the	  relatively	  level	  of	  independence	  Brazilian	  courts	  enjoy	  is	  a	  function	  of	  certain	  constitutional	  provisions.	  Bringing	  back	  the	  definition	  of	  judicial	  independence	  by	  Larkins	  (1996),	  this	  study	  suggests	  that	  the	  constitutional	  provisions	  ensure	  judicial	  independence	  in	  Brazil	  by	  doing	  three	  things.	  First,	  by	  providing	  provisions	  regarding	  length	  of	  judgeship,	  fiscal	  autonomy,	  separation	  of	  power,	  and	  removal	  procedures,	  Brazilian	  courts	  could	  be	  protected	  against	  political	  manipulation.	  Impar-­‐tial	  judges	  exist	  without	  fear	  manipulation,	  threats,	  or	  punishment	  for	  not	  ruling	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  government	  or	  powerful	  individuals.	  The	  Brazilian	  constitution	  has	  created	  impartial	  judges	  by	  granting	  them	  the	  right	  to	  not	  be	  removed	  under	  arbitrary	  circumstances.	  It	  has	  also	  guaranteed	  impartiality	  by	  providing	  the	  length	  of	  judgeship.	  Moreover,	  autonomous	  courts	  exist	  when	  they	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have	  the	  power	  to	  self-­‐regulate	  themselves.	  Through	  the	  provision	  of	  fiscal	  autonomy,	  courts	  freed	  courts	  from	  any	  political	  influence.	  Finally,	  the	  provisions	  related	  to	  judicial	  review	  are	  instrumen-­‐tal	  to	  give	  courts	  the	  ability	  to	  regulate	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  the	  government	  and	  ad-­‐judicate	  in	  significant	  constitutional	  issues.	  The	  study,	  however,	  does	  not	  answer	  one	  of	  my	  interviewees’	  own	  question:	  “who	  should	  say	  what	  medications	  to	  use?	  The	  courts?”	  Future	  studies	  are	  thus	  needed	  to	  understand	  fully	  where	  courts	  fit	  into	  a	  country’s	  policy-­‐making	  scheme.	  There	  is	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  judicial	  decisions	  have	  impacted	  the	  other	  branches’	  functions.	  Exploring	  this	  reality	  might	  help	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  role	  judicial	  independence	  plays	  in	  emerging	  democracies,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  benefits	  and	  con-­‐cerns	  of	  such	  a	  role.	  	  The	  future	  of	  research	  on	  judicial	  independence	  in	  developing	  countries	  is	  bright.	  As	  new	  countries	  transition	  to	  democracy,	  studies	  using	  developing	  countries	  or	  democracy	  promotion	  should	  address	  whether	  the	  degree	  of	  independence	  and	  power	  the	  judiciary	  have	  bee	  actualized	  through	  formal	  institutions.	  I	  find	  that	  constitutional	  structure	  plays	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  determin-­‐ing	  the	  role	  courts	  will	  play	  in	  democracies.	  The	  Brazilian	  example	  shows	  clearly	  how	  certain	  con-­‐stitutional	  provisions	  directly	  influence	  the	  power	  of	  courts	  and	  judges.	  	  It	  is	  up	  to	  emerging	  democracies	  to	  decide	  what	  the	  role	  of	  their	  judiciary	  should	  play.	  This	  role	  is	  often	  times	  determined	  by	  the	  constitution.	  This	  study,	  for	  promoters	  of	  democracy	  and	  con-­‐stitutional	  designers,	  helps	  them	  not	  only	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  inclusion	  of	  these	  provision	  in	  the	  constitution,	  but	  also	  understand	  how	  to	  draft	  these	  provisions	  so	  they	  can	  have	  the	  intended	  goal:	  create	  independent	  courts.	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Appendix	  A	  1. Among	  constitutionalists,	  there	  is	  an	  idea	  that	  the	  constitution	  has	  an	  important	  role	  in	  protecting	  the	  judiciary	  against	  external	  influences.	  Do	  you	  believe	  that	  the	  1988	  Consti-­‐tution	  play	  that	  role?	  Why	  or	  why	  not?	  If	  yes,	  how	  so?	  	  2. Which	  constitutional	  provisions	  do	  you	  believe	  are	  best	  able	  to	  protect	  judges	  and	  courts	  from	  external	  influences?	  Which	  do	  you	  believe	  are	  least	  able	  to	  do	  so?	  3. What	  forces	  do	  you	  think	  cause	  variance	  in	  the	  level	  of	  judicial	  independence	  judges	  in	  your	  country	  can	  exercise?	  Are	  there	  political	  causes?	  Economic?	  Social?	  4. What	  do	  you	  think	  are	  the	  factors	  that	  guarantee	  compliance	  or	  the	  observance	  of	  formal	  rules	  by	  the	  other	  political	  institutions	  in	  your	  country?	  5. Do	  you	  think	  that	  the	  overall	  number	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  pertaining	  to	  the	  judiciary	  influences	  in	  the	  degree	  of	  judicial	  independence	  courts	  and	  judges	  in	  your	  country	  exercise?	  6. Looking	  at	  the	  evolution	  of	  your	  country’s	  constitution,	  would	  you	  say	  that	  judi-­‐cial	  independence	  has	  increased,	  decreased,	  or	  not	  really	  changed?	  Why	  do	  you	  think	  this?	  7. In	  your	  estimation,	  does	  your	  country’s	  constitution	  and	  the	  specific	  provisions	  in	  it	  matter?	  Why	  or	  why	  not?	  8. Why	  do	  you	  think	  there	  are	  discrepancies	  or	  variations	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  judicial	  independence	  judges’	  exercise?	  	  	  
